Psychological Time: The effect of task complexity upon the human estimation of duration. by Webber, Simon
 
 
 
http://waikato.researchgateway.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act 
and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right to 
be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be made to 
the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TIME:  
THE EFFECT OF TASK COMPLEXITY UPON THE  
HUMAN ESTIMATION OF DURATION 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the  
University of Waikato 
by 
SIMON JAMES WEBBER 
 
 
 
 
University of Waikato 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
ABSTRACT 
  
This thesis was designed to investigate the effect of task complexity upon how 
humans estimate duration.  Previous task complexity research suggests that duration is 
overestimated with simple tasks and underestimated with complex tasks.  One-hundred and 
forty-two first and second year university students participated.  Twelve experiments were 
conducted, which required participants to complete computer generated jigsaw puzzles and 
periodically estimate how long they thought they had been doing the puzzle.  In Experiment 
1, participants were required to complete a jigsaw puzzle before making an estimate.  In the 
remaining eleven experiments, estimates were made throughout the session whilst 
participants worked on the jigsaw puzzle.  In the first four experiments, a task was complex 
if there were more puzzle pieces and simpler if there were fewer puzzle pieces.  There were 
no significant results obtained from the first four experiments.  Given the lack of effect 
from the first four experiments, the next two experiments partially replicated two task 
complexity studies to determine how task complexity can be used as an explanation for 
why estimations of duration differ.  Again, there were no significant results obtained from 
these two experiments.  The next four experiments tested whether people’s estimates of 
duration were affected by the rate of reinforcement they receive (i.e., successfully moving a 
puzzle piece to a new location per unit time).  In the first of these two experiments (7 and 8) 
there was no effect of the manipulation, which consisted of decreasing the distance which a 
puzzle piece could be moved on the screen, relative to the distance the computer mouse was 
moved and fixing the speed at which a puzzle piece could be moved.  In Experiments 9 and 
10, more discriminative stimuli were used to indicate to participants that a change in the 
reinforcement rate was occurring.  There was a significant result in Experiment 9 in one 
condition but this effect was not replicated in Experiment 10.  In Experiment 11, the 
reinforcement rate was reduced to zero and there was a significant effect on participants’ 
estimates of duration.  However, these results suggested a confound between whether the 
reinforcement rate or not being able to access the jigsaw puzzle was affecting estimates of 
duration.  In Experiment 12, access to the jigsaw puzzle was limited, whilst simultaneously 
controlling the reinforcement rate and the results showed that not having access to the 
jigsaw puzzle affected how participants estimate duration.  These findings suggest that 
information can act as reinforcement, enabling a person to engage in private behaviour.  
When there is no access to reinforcement, time ‘drags’ for humans.   
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experiments conducted in this study.  In all of the experiments the participants were 
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awarded 1 % course credit for each hour of participation, regardless of whether they 
completed the experiment.  Following the completion of each experiment, the participants 
were fully informed of the purpose of the experiment and given the opportunity to discuss 
any queries with the Experimenter.  The participants were also offered access to the 
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“When a man sits with a pretty girl for an hour, it seems like a minute.   
But let him sit on a hot stove for a minute and it’s longer than any hour.   
That’s relativity”  
 
 
Albert Einstein 
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Psychological Time 
 
The human perception of duration or what is commonly known as ‘psychological 
time’ (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Flaherty, 1999; Fraisse, 1963) is an integral part of life 
and behaviour (Orme, 1969).  Whether waiting for the bus to arrive, being stuck in traffic, 
having a long day at the office or running to cross the street before the pedestrian light goes 
off, everyone is affected by how they perceive time to be passing.  Flaherty (1999) claims 
that for humans, when perceiving time, there is some kind of underlying order, in that time 
can appear to ‘fly’ or it can appear to ‘drag’, irrespective of gender, ethnicity or culture.  
Research into psychological time has shown that various factors influence people’s 
estimates of duration.  Several themes have emerged from this research including the 
amount of attention given to the task (Casini & Macar, 1997; Mattes & Ulrich, 1998), the 
complexity of the task (Axel, 1924; DeWolfe & Duncan, 1959), the interest in the task 
(Gray, Gray & Loehlin, 1975; Loehlin, 1959) and the expectation of outcomes (Dube & 
Schmitt, 1996; Fraisse, 1963).  Each of these themes will be reviewed below.  
 
Attention 
 
Mattes and Ulrich (1998) assessed how people’s perception of time is affected by 
attention to stimuli.  There are two theories of how the process of attention might impact on 
the perception of time.  The first is the attenuation hypothesis (Thomas & Weaver, 1975), 
which states that when attention is given to the stimuli, the duration of stimulus 
presentation is perceived as longer than when no attention is being given to the stimuli.  
Thomas and Weaver’s (1975) attenuation hypothesis is based on counting models 
(Creelman, 1962; Treisman, 1963) which assume that an internal timer or pacemaker within 
the organism generates pulses which are accumulated during the stimulus interval to be 
judged.  The more pulses that are accumulated during the judging interval the longer is the 
perceived duration.  According to Thomas and Weaver (1975), the number of pulses 
decreases when attention is given to a nontemporal task, hence the duration of the interval 
is perceived to be short. 
The second theory is the temporal profile hypothesis (Stelmach & Herdman, 1991; 
Stelmach, Herdman & McNeil, 1994), which assumes that directed attention to a stimulus 
event shortens the perceived duration.  Stelmach et al.’s (1991, 1994) temporal profile 
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hypothesis suggests that temporal-profile or information transmission signals of the visual 
system are modified by attention to stimuli.  This is because the “processing of attended 
signals occurs at a faster rate than it does for unattended signals” (Stelmach et al. 1994, p 
108) resulting in a perception that an event has a short duration.    
Mattes and Ulrich (1998) presented two stimuli, the first being a pre-cued stimulus 
that participants focused their attention on, the second being the target stimulus.  
Participants were required to press one of three keys to indicate whether they thought the 
duration of the target stimulus was short, medium or long.  Matts and Ulrich (1998) 
manipulated the amount of time that the pre-cued stimulus was presented and predicted that 
this would affect the participants’ judgement of the target stimulus duration, so that when 
the longer pre-cued stimulus was presented, the duration of the target stimulus would be 
estimated as longer.  Their results confirmed their predictions and they argued that this 
supported the attenuation hypothesis.   
 Casini and Macar (1997) predicted that when minimal attention is given to a 
temporal task and when there is uncertainty about when a change in stimulus intensity is 
going to occur, participants will underestimate the duration of a task.  Participants were 
required to perform two tasks.  The first was to judge the duration (i.e., short or long) of a 
visual stimulus being presented.  The stimulus was the illumination of a green diode.  The 
second task required participants to indicate whether a change in the intensity of the green 
diode was ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ by pressing one of two response keys at the end of the trial.  
Thus, participants were required to shift their attention in terms of judging duration to 
indicating changes in stimulus intensity.  Stimulus intensity was changed either early or late 
in a trial but participants did not know when the change would occur.  They only knew it 
would occur at some point in the trial.  Casini and Macar (1997) expected that the 
participants’ uncertainty about when a change in stimulus intensity was going to occur, 
either during the beginning period or towards the end of the trial, would shift attention 
away from the temporal task.  For example, it was predicted that if stimulus intensity was 
changed towards the end of a trial, more attention would be focused on trying to detect 
when a change in the stimulus would occur and therefore less attention would be given to 
the temporal task, resulting in an underestimation of duration.  The results supported this 
prediction.     
Loehlin (1959) investigated different kinds of tasks commonly used in other time 
perception experiments, such as analogies (Axel, 1924), weight discriminations (Harton, 
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1938) and puzzles (Rosenzweig & Koht, 1933), which have been shown to influence 
people’s perception of time passing.  Loehlin (1959) sought to gain information on how 
time was perceived for people doing simple and complex tasks and to determine how 
participants perceived the task (e.g., were they interesting or were they boring).  One of 
Loehlin’s (1959) main experimental findings was that attention to stimuli affected the 
estimation of the duration of filled and empty time intervals.  Intervals lacking in content 
(i.e., empty time) allowed more attention to be given to the empty time interval, resulting in 
an overestimation of the duration.  In contrast, intervals with content (i.e., filled time) 
resulted in an underestimation of the duration.  Whilst it is clear what ‘empty’ time 
intervals are and how these intervals can be ‘filled’, the issue of the degree of ‘fill’ still 
needs to be addressed.  The following section describes in more detail filled time.   
  
Task complexity 
 
Axel (1924) investigated different activities that can influence people’s perception 
of time.  He was interested in classifying the various types of ‘filling tasks’ in terms of 
different levels of behaviour based on the complexity of the task.  For example, a filling 
task such as tapping a pencil was classified as a low level behaviour because this type of 
task is not very complex, whereas a filling task like solving anagrams was classified as a 
high level behaviour because this type of task is more complex.  Participants were required 
to engage in four different tasks, each varying in the degree of complexity.  At the end of 
each task, the participants were required to record their estimation of the duration of the 
task.  
Axel (1924) found that the duration of the intervals filled with what he classified as 
‘lower level’ activities, such as tapping and writing ‘i’s, were estimated as being long,  
whereas the duration of intervals for what he classified as ‘higher level’ activities, such as 
solving anagrams, were estimated as being short.  Thus, Axel’s (1924) general finding was 
that the durations of more complex tasks were underestimated and the durations of less 
complex tasks were overestimated.  
 DeWolfe and Duncan (1959) also tested how the different levels of complexity of a 
task influence the estimation of duration.  In their experiment, three types of tasks were 
used that corresponded to three levels of complexity.  The first task was rest where 
participants did nothing at all and this was classified as a low-level behaviour.  The second 
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task was a reversed alphabet-printing task where participants printed the letters of the 
alphabet upside down, from right to left.  This was classified as medium-level behaviour.  
The third task was an anagram solving task and was classified as high-level behaviour.  A 
comparison method was used with two conditions, a standard condition, presented first and 
a comparison condition, presented second.  The three types of tasks were randomly 
presented both in the standard and comparison conditions.  Thus, there were nine possible 
combinations of tasks that could be presented in the standard and comparison conditions 
(i.e., rest-rest; rest-alphabet; rest-anagram; alphabet-rest; alphabet-alphabet; alphabet-
anagram; anagram-rest; anagram-alphabet and anagram-anagram).  Participants were 
required to estimate the duration of the standard condition by doing the particular task in 
the comparison condition for as long as they thought they had been doing it in the standard 
condition.   
DeWolfe and Duncan (1959) predicted that if a person does a high-level behaviour 
in the standard condition followed by a low-level behaviour in the comparison condition, 
then the time spent doing the comparison task should be shorter than the time it took to do 
the task in the standard condition.  Similarly, when a low-level behaviour is presented in 
the standard condition followed by a high-level behaviour in the comparison condition, the  
time spent doing the comparison task should be longer than the time it took to do the task in 
the standard condition.  Generally, then, DeWolfe and Duncan (1959) predicted that 
participants would perceive time as passing faster contingent upon the increasing levels of 
the standard task during the standard condition and slower with increasing levels of the 
comparison task during the comparison condition. The results supported this hypothesis. 
Smith (1969) also studied how human estimations of duration are affected by the 
complexity of a task.  The method of verbal estimation was used, where participants did the 
specific task and then wrote down (in seconds) their estimates of how long they had been 
doing the task.  The task was solving analogies and there were three conditions; easy, 
medium and hard analogies.  Smith (1969) found that participants’ estimations of duration 
were affected by the complexity of the task; as analogy difficulty increased, estimations of 
duration decreased. 
Wilsoncroft, Stone and Bagrash (1978) varied task complexity by giving 
participants two different types of mathematical problems to solve.  The first type was a 
one by one digit problem, which was the easy or low complexity condition.  In this 
condition, randomly selected digits ranging from two to five were used.  The second type 
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was a two by one digit problem, which was designated by the researcher to be the hard or 
high complexity condition.  In this condition, randomly selected digits ranging from six to 
nine were used.  An automatic card changing machine presented a card with the digits 
displayed on it, for either the hard or easy condition.  Participants were required to solve the 
problems.  After the presentation of the digit card, a neutral stimulus, a white card with a 
fixation point, was presented and participants were to leave the white card presented for as 
long as they thought they had been solving the previous particular problem.  By pressing a 
switch, participants turned off the white card and an unseen timer recorded their estimation.   
Wilsoncroft et al. (1978) predicted that participants would overestimate duration 
when working on the easy tasks and underestimate duration when working on the hard 
tasks.  The prediction was correct for participants doing the easy tasks.  However, 
participants estimations for the hard tasks were not as predicted (i.e., underestimated).  In 
such cases, participants also overestimated duration.  
Fraisse (1963) suggested that changes occurring in stimuli are perceived to be more 
or less ‘broken-up’, when tasks are comprised of individual units.  When each of these units 
is observed, time seems to ‘drag’.  For example, a minute seems a lot longer when watching 
the second hand of a clock mark each of the sixty second units than if one was not watching 
the second hand.  When individual task units are not perceived as broken-up, then changes 
occurring in the stimuli are not attended to and so the duration of the task is perceived as 
passing faster than when the units are observed.  Fraisse (1963) claims that the 
underestimation of duration occurs because tasks that are not perceived as broken-up can be 
described in terms of being ‘unified’ or having ‘purpose’.  For Fraisse (1963), purpose, in 
relation to taking dictation, is “the faithful reproduction of the text” (p 225), which seems to 
make the individual units of the task less important.  However, descriptions of behaviour in 
terms of purpose are often considered problematic.  Chiesa (1994) claims that explaining 
behaviour in terms of purpose is attributing causal status to future events and that this is not 
possible.  A future event has not happened and may never happen.  Hence, it cannot 
influence present behaviour.  Rather, antecedent events influence behaviour.  It is unclear 
then, how a task that has more ‘unity’ and thus, according to Fraisse (1963), has purpose, 
can result in shorter estimations of time.  Explanations of this kind are problematic, as 
argued by Chiesa (1994), because they do not indicate any kind of controlling variable 
influencing changes in behaviour.  A controlling variable, influencing a person’s estimation 
of duration for example, would be the complexity of the task and the type of task being 
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used.  Fraisse (1963) claims that ‘unified’ tasks are purposeful, and as such, would 
influence a person’s estimates.  It seems that Fraisse (1963) has mistakenly used the word 
‘purpose’ as a synonym for ‘unified’, which inevitably leads to superfluous explanations of 
behaviour.  
 As previously mentioned, the duration between two events can be occupied by what 
has been classified as ‘empty time’ and ‘filled time’ (Allen, 1980; Fraisse, 1963).  Empty 
time is a period when there is no presentation of a stimulus.  It is the gap or break between 
the presentations of stimuli; for example, the silence between when one song ends and the 
next one begins on a compact disc.  Filled time cannot be described so easily because 
definitions vary.  It might be described as a period in which stimuli are continually 
presented, so that there is no break or gap in the presentation (e.g., the presentation of a 
continuous tone).  On the other hand, it can also be described as a period of time filled by 
behaviour that someone is doing, like digging the garden or a task that a participant may be 
required to perform in an experiment, like taking dictation.  Regardless of the difficulties in 
definition, the general view is that filled time intervals are perceived as shorter than empty 
time intervals (e.g., Axel, 1924; Fraisse, 1963; Loehlin, 1959).   
Boredom and Interest 
                                                                                                                                    
 As noted before, Loehlin (1959) investigated different kinds of variables which 
influence people’s perception of time.  He used a variety of tasks, such as getting 
participants to concentrate on time passing, think pleasant thoughts, solve anagrams, take 
dictation and listen to readings.  Participants estimated the duration of each task and rated 
them as either interesting or boring.  One result of Loehlin’s (1959) study was that the 
participants’ perceptions of duration were influenced by whether they perceived the tasks as 
either boring or interesting.  If a task was perceived as boring, the duration of the interval 
was overestimated and if it was perceived as interesting the interval was underestimated.  
This finding suggests a correlation between reports of boring versus interesting and slow 
versus fast, but to argue that one of these ‘causes’ the other is circular.  Does time appear to 
drag because the task is boring or is the task boring because time drags?  This type of 
circular reasoning does not further the understanding of how humans perceive time relative 
to the task they may or may not be engaged in.   
 7
Gray et al. (1975) studied whether estimations of duration, for participants they 
rated as being extroverts and introverts, would differ when participants’ interests in a task 
were dissimilar.  Eysenck (1957) differentiated extroverts and introverts as being objective 
and impulsive, and subjective and self-controlled respectively.  Gray et al.’s (1975) 
participants rated several readings, on a 5-point scale, in terms of whether they thought the 
readings were interesting or dull.  The readings were chosen from a pilot study and these 
readings had been previously judged as interesting, neutral or dull.  Participants then judged 
the duration of how long they thought they had spent reading each particular reading.  Gray 
et al. (1975) found, when comparing both the extroverts’ and introverts’ mean time 
estimates for the readings, that there were no differences between the two groups’ estimates 
of duration.   
 Hawkins and Tedford (1976) examined how the experience of duration is affected 
by how interesting a task is and by how related particular tasks are.  Participants listened to 
four tapes containing passages from two books on sexuality and human physiology that 
varied on dimensions of interest and relatedness.  They then rated whether the recording 
was interesting or uninteresting and then judged the duration length of the tape.  The 
interest dimension had been previously established by college students who had rated the 
passages on sexuality as interesting and the passage on human physiology as uninteresting.  
On the relatedness dimension, the related tape was a recording of the text as it appeared in 
the book and the unrelated tape was made up from randomly ordering the words in the text 
so that the syntax was disrupted.   
 Hawkins and Tedford (1976) based their experiment on Ornstein’s (1975) storage 
size theory, which states that the experience of duration is directly related to the amount of 
material stored in memory.  Hawkins and Tedford (1976) argued that related items should 
require less storage and therefore a shorter duration should be experienced.  Results did not 
support the hypothesis, as participants judged the unrelated tapes to be of a shorter duration 
than related tapes.  However, tapes which were rated as interesting were judged to be of 
shorter duration than tapes which were rated as uninteresting.   
 
Outcomes 
 
Dube and Schmitt (1996) investigated how unfilled intervals (termed empty time)  
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affect estimates of duration within what they called ‘social episodes’.  Social episodes are 
structured social situations that unfold over time.  In these situations humans have 
expectations about obtaining outcomes.  For example, visiting a doctor’s clinic, where one 
‘checks in’, sees the doctor and then pays the bill on the way out.  The social episode can 
be broken down into three parts or phases.  The first is the pre-process phase, which is 
concerned with the general goal of starting the service transaction (i.e., ‘checking in’ at the 
doctor’s clinic).  The second is the in-process phase, which is the core of the service 
encounter or the goal of the episode (i.e., seeing the doctor and getting examined).  The 
final stage is post-process phase, where the service encounter is terminated in order to 
move to another goal (i.e., paying the doctor’s bill and going to another appointment).   
To test the effect of social episodes on duration estimates, participants were 
involved in a study on consumer behaviour.  The study used a between-subjects design and 
the participants received payment at the end of the experiment for participating in the study.  
There were three groups, one for each of the social phase conditions.  Each session lasted 
for one hour where, in the first part of the session, participants evaluated print 
advertisements and in the second part they completed two personality scales and an 
evaluation of the experimental session.  A ten minute unfilled interval occurred during each 
of the three social phase conditions.  The unfilled interval was where the Experimenter told 
participants that he had forgotten some important information and would return shortly 
after going to retrieve it.  Precisely ten minutes after the Experimenter had left a 
confederate entered the laboratory and asked causally how long participants had thought the 
Experimenter had been gone.  After participants responded to this question, the confederate 
left and the Experimenter returned, apologising for his absence.  For the pre-process phase, 
the ten minute unfilled interval occurred after the introduction to the experiment, where 
participants were greeted, told to remove their watches and had the procedure explained to 
them, and before both parts of the experiment began.  For the in-process phase, the ten 
minute unfilled interval occurred after Part 1 of the experiment was completed but before 
Part 2 was completed.  For the post-process phase, the ten minute unfilled interval occurred 
after Part 2 of the experiment was completed but before the evaluation and before 
participants were paid.  Three dependent measures were used.  The first was the estimate 
given to the confederate about the ten minute unfilled interval (i.e., how long participants 
thought the Experimenter had been gone); the second was the estimate given at the end of 
the experiment about how long the duration of the ten minute unfilled interval was, and the 
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third was an estimate given as part of the evaluation, of whether participants thought the 
duration of the ten minute unfilled interval had been long or short.   
Dube and Schmitt (1996) found that the duration of the in-process phase was 
overestimated, in comparison to the pre-process and post-process phases.  They argued that 
during an in-process phase, individuals have more specific expectations about obtaining 
their outcome or goal, as opposed to the pre-process and post-process phases.  Previous 
researchers (Cahoon & Edmond, 1980; Jones & Boltz, 1989; Quingley, Combs & O’Leary, 
1984) have shown that during unfilled intervals, where expectation is high about upcoming 
events (e.g., receiving reinforcement or outcomes, such as getting to see the doctor during 
Dube and Schmitt’s (1996) in-process phase), time has been perceived to pass slower than 
when there are no expectations about upcoming events (e.g., Dube and Schmitt’s (1996) 
pre-process and post-process phases).  When an unexpected delay occurs during the in-
phase process it is perceived as longer than the delays during the other two phases.  This 
was because it was presumed that the pre-process and post-process phases were not 
associated with a higher probability that outcomes will be delivered, thus expectation for 
the delivery of outcomes is not as high during these phases as during the in-process phase.  
If the expectation for reinforcement is not so high, such as when one is waiting to see the 
doctor, the pre-process phase, or after having left the doctor’s premises, the post-process 
phase, then time is not perceived to pass slowly.  However, time is perceived to pass slowly 
at the moment one expects to receive their reinforcement (i.e., seeing the doctor), which is 
the in-process phase, if there is a delay during this phase.  
Fraisse (1963) suggested that people’s perception of duration is comprised of 
elements of frustration and expectation, in that humans become frustrated at not obtaining 
immediate satisfaction in what they are currently doing (i.e., not being able to obtain an 
expected or desired outcome).  It seems that a comparison is being made between “what 
is”, the unsatisfied current behaviour, and “what will be”, the expected outcome (Fraisse, 
1963).  Fraisse (1963) argues, that “we are not conscious of time when we are fully 
satisfied with the present situation” (p 206).   
It seems then, according to Fraisse (1963), that when an individual is not obtaining 
outcomes as expected, time is perceived to pass slowly.  For example, when catching a bus 
there is a specified time for when the bus will arrive.  It is presumed or expected by an 
individual wanting to catch a bus that the bus will arrive at the scheduled time.  Thus, they 
would organise themselves so as to be at the bus stop a little bit before the scheduled arrival 
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time.  If however, the bus doesn’t arrive on time, Fraisse (1963) suggests time will drag 
because a comparison is possibly being made by the individual about when the outcome 
should have been obtained (i.e., the persons’ expectation that the bus will arrive at the 
allotted time).   
 
Research Issues 
 
Attention, interest, outcomes and task complexity have been suggested to 
independently influence the estimation of duration.  It is unclear though, how interest and 
attention can be independent variables influencing the estimation of duration, given that 
these are descriptive terms only.  For example, when an individual is interested in what 
they are doing, it follows that they are naturally paying attention.  It is problematic to 
explain that a person’s perception of duration is the result of interest in and attention to, the 
particular task they may happen to be doing.  These types of explanations are circular and 
therefore do not explain anything about what influences changes in the estimation of 
duration (i.e., the independent variable).  Interest and attention are aspects of the 
individual’s behaviour and not properties of a task.  Thus, it is problematic to suggest that a 
person’s perception of duration changes, when explained in terms of interest and attention, 
because the variable or the task being manipulated to influence a person’s estimation of 
duration is ignored.   
Task complexity as an explanation for changes in a person’s estimation of duration 
is also problematic.  Arguing that changes in the estimation of duration are related to 
whether a task is complex or not, does not adequately explain how differences in 
estimations of duration are affected by task complexity.  What is it about a task that makes 
it more complex than another task, thereby influencing estimations of duration?  What does 
it mean when there is a change in the complexity of a task?  Does task complexity relate in 
some way to outcomes (i.e., getting things done?) (Lee, 1994).  Lee (1994) suggested that 
the behaviour of organisms could be better understood in terms of ‘things done’, the 
“changes that an organism brings about in the world outside itself” (p 17).  For example, in 
Dube and Schmitt’s (1996) ‘social episodes’ study, a person arriving for an appointment 
with their doctor was seen as obtaining an outcome.  Similarly, meeting the doctor and 
leaving the clinic are also seen as obtaining outcomes.  Are then, changes in task 
complexity a result of obtaining outcomes?   
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Questions arise about task complexity, with perhaps the most important one being, 
“what is it”?  More research is needed to show how task complexity can be used as an 
explanation for why estimations of duration differ.  This research started by investigating 
the issue of task complexity in an attempt to show how people’s estimates of duration are 
influenced by the task they may happen to be engaged in.     
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EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 This experiment was the first in a series investigating how a person’s estimates of 
duration are affected by varying an aspect of the task they are engaged in.  In previous task 
complexity studies, the type of task that has been used has varied greatly sometimes within 
and, almost always, across studies.  For example, DeWolfe and Duncan (1959) used 
anagram and alphabet printing tasks within their study and Wilsoncroft et al. (1978) used 
mathematical tasks.  Thus, no standard task has been used.  What was wanted for this 
present research was a task that humans were familiar with and would do readily and that 
could be manipulated.  Most people have histories with jigsaw puzzles.  Jigsaw puzzles can 
be presented on a computer and therefore, it is possible to vary aspects of a jigsaw puzzle 
(e.g., size and number of pieces) without varying the basic task.  A further advantage of a 
computer generated puzzle is that it would allow for arranging and recording of 
experimental events.  Not only can aspects of this task be varied but it is also possible to 
vary such things as the speed with which pieces can be moved.  Thus, a jigsaw puzzle that 
was presented and completed on the computer screen was designed for use in this study.   
This first experiment aimed to see whether making a task more difficult would alter 
a person’s estimates of the time they had been engaged with the task.  For jigsaw puzzles, 
the number of pieces the picture is broken into is an easily quantified variable; also 
completing a puzzle with more pieces takes longer than one with fewer pieces and so the 
number of jigsaw pieces was manipulated in this first experiment.  Task complexity 
researchers (e.g., Hogan, 1975) have argued that a simple task is where there are fewer 
stimuli presented and a complex task is where there are more stimuli presented.  Thus, in 
the context of a jigsaw puzzle, fewer puzzle pieces could make the task simpler and more 
puzzle pieces could make the task more complex.  It was hypothesized that participants 
would give different estimates of duration when there were different numbers of pieces.  
Two different numbers of pieces were used here and it was expected that fewer pieces (the 
simple puzzle condition) would lead to longer time estimates for any given time period than 
when there were more pieces (the complex puzzle condition).  
 This experiment used the method of estimation to measure perceived duration of the 
time intervals (Allan, 1979).  This procedure has been employed successfully by previous 
researchers to measure human time perception (Axel, 1924; Craik & Hay, 1999; Loehlin, 
1959; Smith, 1969) and requires participants to estimate the amount of time passing, and 
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report this either by speaking out loud or by writing down their estimates.  In this 
experiment, the participants wrote down their estimates.   
  
Method  
Participants 
 
The participants were first-year Psychology students at the University of Waikato, 
New Zealand.  They are referred to as P1.1 to P1.15.  They were recruited through a notice 
placed on a notice board in the Department of Psychology.  After participation, 1% was 
credited to their first-year Psychology course.  The course credit was received irrespective 
of their performance in the experiment.  
Apparatus 
 
The experiment was conducted in a room, 7 m x 7.8 m, lit by ten fluorescent tubes.  
Dell OptiPlex GX1 computers were used to control the experimental events.  The computer 
generated black and white jigsaw puzzles of two different dimensions.  There were two 
experimental conditions, one for each of the jigsaw puzzles.  In one condition, termed the 
simple puzzle condition, sixteen jigsaw pieces, four across and four down, each measuring 
62 mm x 48 mm, were displayed inside a square, measuring 248 mm x 192 mm on the 
computer screen at the beginning of the condition.  In the other condition, termed the 
complex puzzle condition, thirty-six pieces, six across and six down, each measuring 42 
mm x 32 mm, were displayed inside the square (252 mm x 192 mm) on the computer 
screen at the beginning of that condition.  Figure 1.1 shows the jigsaw puzzle picture, 
which was used in both conditions throughout the session.  A small picture of the 
completed puzzle, measuring 65 mm x 45 mm, was located in the top left-hand corner of 
the computer screen in both conditions.  It was displayed when the participants moved the 
pointer over a ‘preview’ button, measuring 80 mm x 30 mm, that was located to the right of 
the target picture at the top of the computer screen.  Each participant could complete the 
puzzle by dragging puzzle pieces around with the mouse. 
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                                 Figure 1.1.  Jigsaw puzzle picture.
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Procedure 
 
 Each of the two conditions was in effect for one half of the experimental session.  
Half of the participants did the simple condition first and half did the complex condition 
first.  There were 16 pieces in the simple puzzle and 36 pieces in the complex puzzle.  
 The puzzle was presented several times in each condition and had to be completed 
each time before it was presented again.  In the simple puzzle condition it was presented ten 
times.  This was because pre-experimental tests showed that participants would take about 
1 min to complete the simple puzzle.  Thus, it was expected to take approximately 12 min 
to complete the condition.  When the participants had completed a puzzle, a small box 
appeared in the centre of the computer screen, with instructions that read as follows: 
 
Please enter on the estimation sheet provided, in minutes, seconds or both, your estimate of how long 
it took you to complete the last jigsaw. Then move the pointer over the ‘Continue’ button and 
depress the left mouse button.   
   
The participant then made an estimation of duration before starting the next puzzle, until 
ten estimates were made, one for each puzzle completed.  The condition finished when the 
participant completed the picture puzzle for the tenth time. Then, if the simple condition 
preceded the complex condition, a click on the continue button gave the next condition.  If 
the simple condition came after the complex condition the ‘Congratulations’ screen 
appeared. 
 In the complex puzzle condition, the puzzle was presented five times.  This was 
because pre-experimental tests revealed that participants were expected to take about 2.5 
min to complete the complex puzzle.  Therefore, it was expected that it would take 
approximately 12 min to complete the complex condition.  Thus, both conditions ran for 
approximately equal 12-min intervals.  As in the simple condition, participants used the 
computer mouse to click on the continue button if the complex condition came before the 
simple condition.  If the complex condition came after the simple condition, the 
‘Congratulations’ screen appeared once the puzzle had been completed.  Figure 1.2 shows 
the display on the computer screen for each phase of the experiment.   
 At the start of the session, the Experimenter escorted the participants into the 
computer laboratory.  Participants were tested in a group setting but individually.  Thus, 
each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to read the sheet of instructions.  
The instructions were as follows:  
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Start phase           
                                              
Puzzle phase 
                                                     
                                 
Estimation phase 
                                             
                                                                    
Puzzle phase 
                                                      
                                            
Estimation phase 
                                              
End phase 
                                             
 
 
Figure 1.2.  Computer screen display for Experiment 1, showing the Start phase, the                                
puzzle phase in the Simple and Complex conditions, and the Estimation and End phases.  
 (Simple Condition)
(Complex Condition)
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Introduction: 
This experiment involves working with jigsaw puzzles.  The pieces can be moved  
 around to complete a picture. You will be required to complete a puzzle and to estimate  
 how long you thought it took you to complete the puzzle.  Please remove your watch  
 and give it to the Experimenter.  It will be returned after the experiment.  Please  
 read the steps below to familiarise yourself with the experimental procedure. 
 
Step 1:   In the experiment, puzzles with sixteen and thirty six square pieces will be displayed on the 
computer screen.  Each of these squares is part of a picture you will see in the top left hand 
corner of the computer screen. Your task is to use the mouse to move the pointer over a 
square and depress the left mouse button to drag that square to a new location. You can 
repeat this until you have completed the puzzle.  
 
 
Step 2: When the puzzle is completed a box will appear in the centre of the computer screen asking 
you to estimate how long you thought you spent doing the last puzzle. You may write your 
estimate in terms of minutes, seconds or both on the estimation sheet provided. 
 
 Once you have written down your estimate on the sheet use the mouse to move the pointer 
over the ‘Continue’ button situated below the estimation instructions and depress the left 
mouse button to start the puzzle again. If you have any questions please ask them now. You 
may start the experiment by using the mouse to move the pointer over the ‘Start’ button and 
depress the left mouse button to begin.  
 
Once any questions were answered, the Experimenter asked the participant to remove their 
watch, if they were wearing one, and informed the participant that it would be returned at 
the end of the experiment.  The Experimenter then told the participant that they 
could start when ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further 
communication between the Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the 
session.  When the participant completed the picture puzzle the fifteenth and final time and 
had made their estimation, irrespective of the order in which the puzzles were presented, a 
box appeared on the computer screen, which read as follows:   
 
Congratulations! You have completed the experiment. The Experimenter will now de-brief 
you on the experiment. Thank-you for your participation. 
 
Once the participant had finished the experiment they were debriefed by the Experimenter 
as to the aim of the experiment. 
 
Results 
 
There are several ways to present the data from the actual times and the estimates in 
this experiment.  Shown here are the ratios of the estimates of the times to the actual times. 
These, when presented as logarithms, show the relative degree the estimates differ from the 
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actual times, independently of the absolute size of the time interval being estimated. Thus, 
for example, the same number results whenever the estimate is twice the size of the actual 
interval regardless of the length of the actual interval.  Logarithmic presentation means that 
proportionately the same degree of overestimation and underestimation appear as the same 
size deviation from zero.   
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the logarithms, taken to the base 10 (both here and 
elsewhere in the thesis) of the estimates over the actual times it took participants to 
complete each puzzle in the simple and complex conditions, plotted against the successive 
number of estimates made throughout the session.  All ratios were derived from dividing 
the estimated times by the actual times, such that a positive measure indicates an 
overestimation of duration and a negative measure indicates an underestimation of duration.  
It can be seen from Figure 1.3 that of the 7 participants who did the simple puzzle first, 5 
(P1.1, P1.2, P1.3, P1.5 and P1.7) always overestimated duration when doing the simple 
puzzle.  P1.4 overestimated duration on all but the first puzzle in the simple puzzle 
condition.  P1.6 both overestimated and underestimated duration when doing the simple 
puzzle.  In the complex puzzle condition, 4 of the participants (P1.3, P1.4, P1.5 and P1.7) 
consistently overestimated duration.  P1.6 underestimated duration, whereas participants 
P1.1 and P1.2 overestimated and underestimated duration in the complex condition.  
In Figure 1.4 it can be seen that 2 (P1.9 and P1.10) of the 8 participants who 
completed the complex puzzle condition first, always overestimated duration, whereas 
P1.12 always underestimated duration.  The remaining 5 participants both overestimated 
and underestimated during the complex condition.  In the simple condition, Participants 
P1.9, P1.11 and P1.15 always underestimated duration.  P1.8, P1.10, P1.12 and P1.14 both 
overestimated and underestimated duration after doing the simple condition.  Participant 
P1.13 generally overestimated duration after completing each puzzle in the simple 
condition.  P1.9, P1.10, P.14 and P1.15 all moved towards underestimating the interval 
length relatively more over the simple puzzle condition.  
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was performed, with the manipulation of the 
complexity of the task as the within-subjects variable and the order in which the task was 
presented as the between-subjects variable.  The ANOVA compared the means of the 
logarithms of the estimates over the actual times it took participants to complete each 
puzzle, for both the simple and complex conditions.  It was found that there was no 
significant main effect of complexity (i.e., number of pieces) (F (1, 13) = .510, p > .05).   
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Figure 1.3. Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times in the simple and complex 
conditions, plotted against the successive number of estimates made in the session, for P1.1 
to P1.7.  
Figure 1.4. Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times in the simple and complex 
conditions, plotted against the successive number of estimates made in the session, for P1.8 
to P1.15.  
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There was a significant between-treatments effect of presentation order                              
(F (1, 13) = 19.069, p < .05) and a significant interaction effect between task complexity 
and presentation order (F (1, 13) = 7.002, p < .05).  The effect size for presentation order 
was medium (ŋ = .595), whereas the effect size for the interaction was small (ŋ = .350).  
Overall, these data show that the complexity of the task did not affect participants’ 
estimates as expected and that there was an order effect that differed across conditions.  
Figure 1.5 shows the estimates of the times and the actual times it took for 
participants to complete each puzzle in the simple and complex conditions, plotted against 
the successive number of estimates made throughout the session, for the participants who 
did the simple puzzle first.  These show the size of the interval being assessed and the 
difference between the two data paths is the amount by which the participants over or under 
estimated the interval length.  It can be seen that the times taken to complete the simple 
puzzle were very short and that these decreased over the first condition for most 
participants.  The complex puzzle did, as predicted, take more time to complete for all 
participants and some participants got faster over the condition.  P1.1 gave the largest 
differences between actual and estimated times of all participants in the simple condition, 
as did P1.5 in the complex condition.  P1.3, P1.5 and P1.7 gave estimates close to the actual 
times in the simple puzzle condition but gave greater differences in the complex puzzle 
condition.  Figure 1.3 shows that these differences did not result in systematic differences 
in the relative degrees of accuracy.  P1.2, P1.4 and P1.6 gave estimates reasonably close to 
the actual times in both conditions but again the log ratios (Figure 1.3) show no consistent 
differences in relative degree of accuracy from the other participants.    
Figure 1.6 shows the estimates of the times and the actual times it took for 
participants to complete each puzzle in the complex and simple conditions, plotted against 
the successive number of estimates made throughout the session, for participants who did 
the complex puzzle first.  Again the simple puzzle was quicker to complete than the 
complex puzzle.  For all of the participants, both the actual and estimated times decreased 
over the complex puzzle condition and the participants’ estimates were generally close to 
the actual times as the session progressed.  Figure 1.4 shows, however, that the small 
differences between the estimates and the actuals did not result in systematic changes in the 
relative degrees of accuracy.  P1.8, P1.9 and P1.10 generally gave estimates that were 
longer than the actual times in the complex condition, while the estimates of P1.13, P1.14 
and P1.15 were quite close to the actual times in that condition.  Figure 1.4 shows that these  
latter participants were more accurate than the others in that condition. In the simple puzzle 
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Figure 1.5. Estimated and actual times, in the simple and complex conditions, plotted 
against the successive number of estimates made in the session, for P1.1 to P1.7.  
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Figure 1.6. Estimated and actual times, in the simple and complex conditions, plotted 
against the successive number of estimates made in the session, for P1.8 to P1.15.  
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condition the actual times taken to complete the puzzle were short and all estimates were 
close to the actual times.  The trends seen in the relative degree of accuracy for P1.9, P1.10, 
P1.14 and P1.15 (Figure 1.4) are not as clearly apparent in Figure 1.6, a product of the fact 
that small changes in the differences between actual and estimated times have large effects 
on the log ratios when the actual intervals are short.   
 
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, computerised jigsaw puzzles were used to investigate whether 
the estimation of the time spent doing the puzzle was affected by the number of pieces in 
the puzzle.  Participants did not estimate duration as predicted from the task complexity 
literature and there was a clear effect of condition order on the speed of jigsaw completion.   
In the results here, the logarithmic ratios show the relative degree of error in 
estimating the actual time and should be independent of the length of the interval being 
estimated.  Although Allan (1979) argues that it is unclear if the simple version of Weber’s 
law applies to temporal perception, as there was a lack of consistent evidence of this (e.g., 
Creelman, 1962), she notes that what is clear is that the relationship between durations to 
be estimated and the estimates themselves, is, in one form or another, proportional.  Thus, 
at longer durations we would expect a larger absolute error compared to a shorter duration.  
However, the proportional error should be similar irrespective of the absolute magnitude of 
the duration.  Therefore, proportional measures of error, such as the ratios used here, are 
preferable to simple magnitude measures, particularly where, as in this experiment, the 
durations being estimated vary markedly in size.   
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show that participants generally became faster at doing the 
jigsaw puzzle as the session progressed, irrespective of which condition was completed 
first.  This is seen not only in the downward trend in the actual times within participants’ 
data but also across participants, where generally the initial rate of completing the simple 
puzzle was faster for participants who had already completed the complex puzzle condition 
and the initial rate of completing the complex puzzle was faster for those who had already 
completed the simple puzzle condition.  
The ratio measures should have allowed comparisons of the estimates from the 
different durations of jigsaw puzzle completion.  One problem, however, was, as the 
ANOVA showed, there was an effect of condition order on these measures.  Figure 1.4 
shows that this significant order effect was most likely a product of the increasing degree of 
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underestimation seen over the simple puzzle condition but only when it was second.  
Participants were completing the simple puzzle very quickly and the actual degree of 
underestimation was small (Figure 1.6) but did increase over this condition.  It is not clear 
whether the very short times being estimated gave rise to this problem.  This order effect 
confounds interpretation of the present results and it is not possible to separate out any 
effects of the different durations of the jigsaw puzzle on the estimates from any effects of 
task complexity.   
The next experiment replicated this present experiment with participants estimating 
after predetermined equivalent intervals in both the simple and complex conditions.  The 
intervals after which participants were required to make estimates were chosen so that they 
had to estimate the passage of time more frequently than it was estimated in this 
experiment.   
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EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The times at which estimates were being made differed between conditions, 
possibly confounding the results of Experiment 1.  This next experiment controlled for any 
effects of the different times at which participants estimated duration.  The control 
consisted of setting the times at which estimates were made to be the same in both 
conditions.  The times selected ranged between 30 s and 120 s.  This range of intervals was 
selected as it was that used in a task complexity study by Craik and Hay (1999).  In that 
study, there were two groups of participants, older and younger adults, who were required 
to make estimates of duration using the estimation method or production method.  In the 
present study, as a consequence of setting the durations to be estimated, the session was 
also of a fixed length and the number of estimates that participants made throughout the 
session increased compared to Experiment 1.    
 
Method  
Participants 
 
The participants were 12 first- and second-year Psychology students at the 
University of Waikato, New Zealand.  They are referred to as P2.1 to P2.12.  They were 
recruited through a notice placed on a notice board in the Department of Psychology and 
through a brief verbal presentation given by the researcher to them in class.  After 
participation, the first year Psychology students received 1% course credit for their first-
year Psychology course.  The course credit was received irrespective of their performance 
in the experiment.  Second-year students were not eligible for course credit.  
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
Procedure 
 
The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 1.  The differences were that, 
firstly, when a puzzle was finished another one began immediately.  Secondly, the number 
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of estimates that participants had to make was increased.  Each session ran for 40 min and 
was divided into two 20-min periods.  There were two conditions, one in each 20-min 
period.  In the simple condition the puzzle had sixteen pieces and in the complex condition 
it had thirty-six pieces.  Half of the participants were presented with the simple condition 
first and half were presented with the complex condition first.  The participants made an 
estimate of the duration of time that had passed since they made their last estimate 
whenever prompted to do so by the computer programme.  The first estimate in a session 
was of the time from the start of the session to the prompt for the estimate, whereas all 
subsequent estimates were of the time from the previous estimate.  The participants were 
asked to make an estimate of the time that had passed four times in each 5-min period; at  
30 s, 60 s, 90 s and 120 s.  There were eight 5-min periods per session.  Thus, participants 
made 32 estimates throughout the session.  These estimates were recorded on the estimation 
sheet provided.  If participants were working on the puzzle when an estimate was 
requested, the incomplete puzzle was presented again, once the estimate was made, so that 
it could be completed.  If, when the puzzle was completed and no estimate was due, the 
puzzle was represented immediately. 
As in Experiment 1, the Experimenter escorted the participants into the computer 
laboratory.  Each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to read the sheet of 
instructions.  The instructions were as follows:  
 
 Introduction: 
This experiment involves working with jigsaw puzzles.  You can move pieces around to 
complete a puzzle.  Every now and again you will be required to estimate how long you 
think it has taken you as you’ve worked on the puzzle(s).  Please read the steps below to 
familiarise yourself with the experimental procedure. 
 
Step 1:  In each half of the experiment, a puzzle will be displayed on the computer screen.  Each of 
these squares is part of a picture you will see in the top left hand corner of the computer 
screen when you move the pointer over the preview button directly to the right of the target 
picture. Your task is to use the mouse to move the pointer over a square and depress the left 
mouse button to drag that square to a new location. You can repeat this process as you work 
on the puzzle.  
 
Step 2: As you work on the puzzle a box will appear every now and again in the centre of the 
computer screen asking you to estimate how long you think you have currently spent doing 
the puzzle. You may write your estimate in terms of minutes and seconds or both on the 
estimation sheet provided. 
  
Once you have written down your estimate on the sheet use the mouse to move the pointer 
over the ‘Continue’ button situated below the estimation instructions and depress the left 
mouse button to start the puzzle again. If you have any questions please ask them now. You 
may start the experiment by using the mouse to move the pointer over the ‘Start’ button and 
depress the left mouse button to begin.  
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Once any questions were answered, the Experimenter asked the participant to remove their 
watch if they were wearing one and informed the participant that it would be returned at the 
end of the experiment.  The Experimenter then told the participant that they could start 
when they were ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further 
communication between the Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the 
session.  Once the participant had finished the experiment, they were debriefed by the 
Experimenter as to the aim of the experiment.   
 
Results 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which 
participants were required to make their estimates, for the simple and complex conditions, 
plotted against the successive number of estimates made throughout the session.  Data 
above the dotted line show overestimation and data below the dotted line show 
underestimation.  It can be seen that P2.1, P2.2, P2.3, P2.6, P2.7 and P2.11 tended to 
overestimate duration in both conditions.  P2.5, P2.9 and P2.10 tended to underestimate 
duration in both conditions.  P2.4, P2.8, and P2.12 underestimated and overestimated 
duration in both conditions.   
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with task complexity and 
time (at which estimates were made) as within-subject variables and the order in which the 
task was presented as the between-subject variable.  The ANOVA compared the means of 
the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants were required to 
make their estimates, for both the simple and complex conditions, and for the actual times 
at which estimates were made.  There was no main effect of complexity (i.e., number of 
pieces) (F (1, 10) = 2.465, p > .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .198).  There was no 
between-treatments effect of presentation order (F (1, 10) = .482, p > .05) and the effect 
size was small (ŋ = .046).  There was a main effect of the times at which estimates were 
made (F (3, 30) = 12.055, p < .05) and the effect size was medium (ŋ = .547).  Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the log ratios from the 30-s interval were significantly different to 
those from the other three time intervals (p <.05).  The analyses also showed that there 
were no significant interactions between any combinations of complexity, presentation 
order and the times at which estimates were made, at the .05 alpha level.   
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 Figure 2.2 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, 
together with the 95-percent confidence interval, for each condition averaged over all 
participants’ data, plotted against the actual times.  The asterisks show data from the 
complex condition and the squares show data from the simple condition.  The log ratios 
show that duration was overestimated at the 30-s and the 60-s intervals, and accurately 
estimated at the 90-s and 120-s intervals in the simple condition.  In the complex condition, 
duration was overestimated at all interval durations.  The log ratios show that estimates  
decreased in both conditions as the interval at which estimates were made increased.  
Duration was overestimated more at the 30-s interval in both conditions than for any of the 
other intervals.   
  Figure 2.3 shows a plot of the averages of each participant’s estimates plotted 
against the actual times for each condition.  The dotted line shows where the estimates 
would fall if they were completely accurate.  Data points plotted above the dotted line 
indicate overestimation and those below the line indicate underestimation.  The asterisks 
indicate data from the complex condition and the solid circles indicate data from the simple 
condition.  P2.1 through P2.6 completed the simple condition first followed by the complex 
condition, whereas P2.7 through P2.12 completed the complex condition first.  P2.1, P2.2, 
P2.3, P2.6, P2.7, P2.11 and P2.12 overestimated duration and P2.5 and P2.9 underestimated 
duration whilst doing the complex puzzle.  P2.4 and P2.8 both overestimated and 
underestimated duration, throughout the complex condition.  P2.10 estimated reasonably 
accurately during the complex condition.  In the simple puzzle condition, P2.2, P2.6, P2.7 
and P2.11 overestimated duration, whereas P2.5 and P2.9 underestimated duration.  P2.1, 
P2.3, P2.4, P2.8 and P2.12 both overestimated and underestimated duration in the simple 
condition.  P2.10 estimated very accurately in this condition.  
Figure 2.3 shows that the participants’ estimates generally got larger as the interval 
to be estimated got longer.  If the simple puzzle condition led to greater overestimation of 
time then the asterisks should generally be below the solid circles regardless of condition 
order.  This was true for only three participants (P2.2, P2.6 and P2.7).  The reverse was true 
for most of the data for remaining participants (a few data points are exceptions, but 
differences between the estimates in these cases are not great).  These data then suggest 
greater overestimation of time in the complex puzzle condition for many participants. 
Figure 2.4 shows the actual times it took for participants to complete each puzzle in 
the simple and complex conditions, plotted against the number of times the puzzle was  
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Figure 2.2. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                        actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, for  
  each condition, plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
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          Puzzles completed     Puzzles completed           Puzzles completed 
 
Figure 2.4. Actual times, in the simple and complex conditions, plotted against the number 
of times the puzzle was completed in each condition. 
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completed in each condition.  This allows for a comparison to be made with the actual 
times it took participants in Experiment 1 to complete each puzzle in the simple and the 
complex conditions.  Estimates are not included in this figure because estimates were not 
made at the time the puzzle was completed.  P2.1 to P2.6 did the simple puzzle condition 
followed by the complex puzzle condition, whereas P2.7 to P2.12 did the complex puzzle 
condition followed by the simple puzzle condition.  As the session progressed, all 
participants generally got faster at doing the puzzle regardless of whether they started with 
the simple or complex puzzle condition.  Generally, across the two groups, the times taken 
to complete the first puzzle in the second condition were shorter than the times the 
equivalent complexity puzzle had taken in the first condition.  Table 2.1 shows the number 
of times the puzzle was completed in each condition and the total number of times the 
puzzle was completed in the session.  P2.7 completed the most number of puzzles, whereas 
P2.1 completed the least number of puzzles.   
 
Discussion 
 
This experiment examined the effect of participants making estimates at set times 
throughout the session.  The results support those from Experiment 1 in showing that there 
was no consistent effect of the number of puzzle pieces on whether duration was 
overestimated or underestimated.  Thus, the lack of main effect in Experiment 1 was 
probably not a product of the different times intervals being estimated in the two 
conditions.  The order effect observed in Experiment 1 was not reproduced here.  The data 
in Figure 1.4 suggest that the order effect found there may have been a product of the 
decreasing log ratios when the simple puzzle condition was second.  Figure 1.6 shows that 
the actual times being estimated in this condition were very short as a result of the 
participants becoming so much faster at completing the puzzle.  Figure 1.6 also shows that 
there were only small changes in absolute accuracy over the simple puzzle condition.   
When the actual duration is small, small increases in accuracy give large changes in the 
ratios.  As in Experiment 1, the participants here got faster at doing the puzzle over the 
course of the session as shown in Figure 2.4.  In the present experiment, as in the previous 
one, the actual puzzle completion times for the simple puzzle condition were shorter when   
this condition was second.  However, unlike the previous experiment, this did not affect the 
estimates of duration.  Taken together these data suggest that the order effect in   
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Table 2.1. The number of times the puzzle was completed in each condition  
and the total number of times the puzzle was completed in the session.  
 
 
 
Participant   Number completed      Total 
 
               Condition 
    
                                           Simple        Complex 
 
P2.1   5  1  6 
P2.2   22  6  28 
P2.3   9  3  12 
P2.4   20  4  24 
P2.5   13  2  15 
P2.6   7  1  8 
 
                      Complex         Simple 
 
P2.7   5  52  57 
P2.8   2  23  25    
P2.9   0  13  13 
P2.10   1  30  31 
P2.11   5  39  44 
P2.12   1  25  26   
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Experiment 1 may have come from the very short times being estimated in the simple 
puzzle condition when it was second.  The procedure used in the present experiment 
avoided the changes in the time being estimated and this seems to have removed the order 
effect seen previously. 
As mentioned previously, Craik and Hay (1999) used three intervals at which 
participants estimated duration.  Both groups of participant’s estimates, for both estimation 
methods they used, increased as the interval to be estimated got progressively longer, which 
is to be expected if judged duration is some constant ratio of actual duration.  Participants’ 
estimates in this experiment also increased as the actual times increased and there was a 
tendency for most participants in this experiment to overestimate duration during both the 
complex and simple conditions at larger intervals (see Figure 2.3).  However, this tendency 
to overestimate duration was not reflected in the logarithm ratio measures, where in Figure 
2.2, participants more accurately estimated duration in both conditions at the larger 
intervals.  As mentioned in Experiment 1, proportional measures of error are preferable to 
magnitude measures.  It might be possible then, as shown in Figure 2.2, that participants 
found it harder to estimate duration accurately at shorter intervals than at longer intervals.  
However, it is unclear why at the 30-s interval duration was overestimated more than at the 
other three intervals.  The sequence of the time intervals after which estimates were made 
in this experiment was 60 then 30 then 90 then 120.  Thus, the 30-s interval always 
followed 60 s.  It may be that this influenced the data.  The order of the times to be 
estimated was randomised in the next experiment so as to remove any possible confound of 
a fixed presentation order.   
Craik and Hay (1999) found that task complexity significantly affected estimates of 
duration in the more complex conditions of the task for the 120-s interval only.  A re-
examination of the present data (Figure 2.2) shows that, with the 120-s intervals, 7 
participants overestimated duration more in the complex puzzle condition than in the 
simple puzzle condition and 5 underestimated it more in the complex puzzle condition.  So 
it was not the case here that the longer interval gave different results from the shorter 
intervals.   
A difference between Craik and Hay’s (1999) study and the present study is that 
they varied the complexity of the task by getting participants to respond to more than one 
dimension of stimulus in their most complex condition, whereas the task in the present 
experiment varied the number of pieces to be moved to create the final picture from 16 to 
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36 over the two conditions.  Craik and Hay (1999) found no effect using between one and 
four stimulus dimensions but did find one for a 120-s interval using all five dimensions.  It 
could be then, that the present study did not vary the number of jigsaw pieces over a great 
enough range to affect the task.  Therefore, it was decided to vary the complexity of the 
puzzle by increasing (for the complex puzzle condition) and decreasing (for the simple 
puzzle condition) the number of pieces in the puzzle in the next experiment.  
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EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 The results from Experiment 2 indicated no effects of the number of pieces upon 
participants’ estimates of duration.  In the present experiment the number of jigsaw pieces 
in the simple condition was decreased and the number of pieces in the complex condition 
was increased.  It was hoped that creating a larger contrast between conditions might result 
in time being estimated as passing more slowly in the simple condition than in the complex 
condition.  The order of the times at which participants made their estimates was 
randomised and the puzzle picture was also presented in colour rather than in black and 
white for ease of viewing.  
 
Method  
Participants 
 
Fifteen participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P3.1 
to P3.15.   
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
Procedure 
 
The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 2, but for three differences.  
First, there were nine pieces in the puzzle for the simple condition and eighty-one pieces in 
the complex condition.  Second, the puzzle was changed from black and white to colour.  
Finally, the order in which the intervals at which participants were required to make 
estimates was randomised.  As in previous experiments, participants were escorted into the 
computer laboratory by the Experimenter.  The participant sat down at a computer and was 
asked to read the same sheet of instructions used in the previous experiment.  Any 
questions were answered and the Experimenter asked the participant to remove their watch, 
if they were wearing one, and informed the participant that it would be returned at the end 
of the experiment.  The Experimenter then told the participant they could start when ready.  
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The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further communication between the 
Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the session, when the participant 
was debriefed as to the aim of the experiment.   
 
Results 
 
 Figure 3.1 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which 
participants were required to make their estimates, for the simple and complex conditions, 
plotted against the successive number of estimates made throughout the session.  For P3.1 
to P3.8, the order of the conditions was ‘simple/complex’, whereas for P3.9 to P3.15, it was 
‘complex/simple’.  P3.2, P3.6, P3.8 and P3.15 overestimated duration in both conditions, 
whereas P3.9 underestimated duration in both conditions.  P3.4, P3.5, P3.7, P3.12 and 
P3.13 both overestimated and underestimated duration in both the simple and complex 
conditions.  P3.1 overestimated and underestimated duration in the simple condition and 
overestimated duration in the complex condition.  P3.3 overestimated and underestimated 
duration in the simple condition and underestimated duration in the complex condition.  
P3.11 overestimated duration in the complex condition and underestimated duration in the 
simple condition.  P3.10 and P3.14 underestimated duration in the complex condition, 
whilst underestimating and overestimating duration in the simple condition. 
 A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with task complexity and 
time (at which estimates were made) as within-subject variables and the order in which the 
task was presented as the between-subject variable.  The ANOVA compared the means of 
the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants were required to 
make their estimates, for both the simple and complex conditions, and for the actual times 
at which estimates were made.  There was no main effect of complexity (i.e., number of 
pieces) (F (1, 13) = .042, p > .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .003).  There was no 
between-treatments effect of presentation order (F (1, 13) = .953, p > .05) and the effect 
size was small (ŋ = 0.068).  There was a main effect of the times at which estimates were 
made (F (3, 39) = 6.822, p < .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .344).  Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the log ratios from the 30-s interval were significantly different to 
those from the other three time intervals (p <.05).  The analyses also showed that there 
were no significant interactions between any combinations of complexity, presentation 
order and the times at which estimates were made, at the .05 alpha level. 
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Figure 3.1. Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times in the simple and complex 
conditions, plotted against the successive number of estimates made in the session.  
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 Figure 3.2 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, 
together with the 95-percent confidence interval, for each condition averaged over all 
participants’ data, plotted against the actual times.  The asterisks show data from the 
complex condition and the squares show data from the simple condition.  The log ratios 
show that duration was overestimated at the 30-s and the 60-s intervals in both conditions 
and accurately estimated at the 90-s and 120-s intervals in both conditions.  There were 
very few differences in the estimates made in the simple and complex conditions.  The log 
ratios of the estimates to actual times decreased in both conditions as the interval at which 
estimates were made increased.  The log ratios also show that duration was overestimated 
more at the 30-s interval in both conditions than for any of the other intervals.   
Figure 3.3 shows a plot of the averages of participants’ estimates plotted against the 
actual times for each condition.  The dotted line shows where the estimates would fall if 
they were completely accurate.  Data points plotted above the dotted line indicate 
overestimation and those below the line indicate underestimation.  The asterisks indicate 
data from the complex condition and the solid circles indicate data from the simple 
condition.  P3.1 through P3.8 completed the simple condition first followed by the complex 
condition, whereas P3.9 through P3.15 completed the complex condition first.  P3.1, P3.2, 
P3.6, P3.8, P3.11, P3.12 and P3.15 overestimated duration and P3.3, P3.4, P3.9, P3.10 and 
P3.14 underestimated duration whilst doing the complex puzzle.  P3.13 accurately 
estimated duration in the complex condition.  P3.5 and P3.7 also accurately estimated 
duration in the complex condition, except during the 120-s interval, where P3.5 
overestimated duration and P3.7 underestimated duration.  In the simple puzzle condition, 
P3.1, P3.2, P3.3, P3.5, P3.6, P3.8, P3.12 and P3.15 overestimated duration, whereas P3.4, 
P3.9 and P3.11 underestimated duration.  P3.7 and P3.13 accurately estimated duration in 
this condition.  P3.10 and P3.14 overestimated duration at the 30-s and 60-s intervals but 
were accurate in their estimates at the 90-s and 120-s intervals.  
Figure 3.3 shows that participants’ estimates generally got larger as the interval to 
be estimated got longer, as well as decreasing for some participants at the 120-s interval 
(P3.3, P3.7, P3.10, P3.11 and P3.15).  Five participants (P3.2, P3.3, P3.5, P3.10 and P3.14) 
underestimated duration in the complex condition compared to the simple condition, 
whereas the reverse was true for P3.6, P3.8, P3.9, P3.11 and P3.12.  The data for the 
remaining 5 participants (P3.1, P3.4, P3.7, P3.13 and P3.15) were variable.  These data  
suggest that there are no consistent differences in the way the estimates deviated from the 
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     Figure 3.2. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                         actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, for  
   each condition, plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
 
 
   
 42
  
 
 
                               
            
 
 
 
 43
actual times in both the simple and complex puzzle conditions. 
 
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, the disparity between the numbers of pieces in the puzzle in the 
two conditions was increased.  There was, however, still no main effect of the number of 
puzzle pieces upon duration estimates.  Thus, this attempt to manipulate task complexity by 
changing the number of pieces in the puzzle had no effect on estimates of duration.   
The order of the intervals at which participants made their estimates was 
randomised to remove any possible confound of a fixed presentation order.  Figure 3.3 
showed that participants’ estimates of duration varied, with some participants’ (e.g., P3.11) 
estimates decreasing in both the simple and complex conditions at the 120-s interval and 
other participants (e.g., P3.6) consistently overestimating duration in both conditions.  
Comparisons of Figure 3.2 and Figure 2.2 show that participants in the present study 
estimated duration more accurately at all intervals than did the participants in Experiment 2, 
especially in the complex condition.  It could be that randomising the times at which 
estimates were made resulted in this difference.  
Previous research suggests that as a task gets more complex, time is estimated as 
passing faster than it is with less complex tasks (Allen, 1980; Axel, 1924; Dube & Schmitt, 
1996; Loehlin, 1959).  The results of the first three experiments here suggest that this is not 
the case for the task used here.   
Researchers have also used methods other than the present one to measure 
participant’s estimates of duration (Allan, 1979; Craik & Hay, 1999; Troutwine & O’Neill, 
1981).  One method, the production method (Allan, 1979) is where participants are told 
beforehand how long they are to work on the task.  Participants then begin the task and 
terminate the trial when they think the specified time period has elapsed.  The production 
method has provided reliable estimate measures (Craik & Hay, 1999).  Craik and Hay 
(1999) compared the methods of verbal estimation and production, and concluded that there 
were no differences in the results between the two methods.  The next experiment used the 
production and the estimation methods and compared the results from each method to see if 
Craik and Hay’s (1999) results were reproduced using a jigsaw task.   
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EXPERIMENT 4 
 
In the first three experiments the estimation method was used, where participants 
were asked to estimate the time that had passed by writing down their estimates.  Another 
reliable method that has been used for gaining such estimates is the production method 
(Allan, 1979; Craik & Hay, 1999).  In the production method participants are asked to 
indicate when they think a particular time has passed.  Craik and Hay (1999) compared the 
two methods to test whether there were any differences in the results.  They suggested that 
both methods should give similar results and found that this was so.  This next experiment 
used both estimation methods with the current procedure.  The aim was to compare the 
results from the verbal estimation method with those from the production method to see if 
Craik and Hay’s results held for the present procedure.   
 
Method  
Participants 
 
Sixteen participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P4.1 
to P4.16.   
 
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 3, except for one difference.  
Participants had to ‘produce’ or work on a puzzle for a specified set period, as well as make 
estimates of duration as they did in Experiment 3.  Half of the participants did the 
production condition first and of these participants, half of them did the simple puzzle first 
and half did the complex puzzle first.  The other half of the participants did the estimation 
condition first and of these participants, half of them did the simple puzzle first and half did 
the complex puzzle first.  The specified durations for the production conditions were 30 s, 
 45
60 s, 90 s and 120 s, and the order in which they were presented was randomised.  Like the 
earlier experiments, the Experimenter escorted participants into the computer laboratory.  
Each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to read the sheet of instructions.  
The instructions were as follows: 
 
 
 
 Introduction: 
This experiment involves working with jigsaw puzzles where you move pieces around to 
complete a picture. You will be required to do a puzzle and to estimate how long you think 
it is taken you to do the puzzle.  You will also be required to do a puzzle for a set period 
(this is known as ‘production’).  Please read the steps below to familiarise yourself with the 
experimental procedure. 
 
Step 1:  In each half of the experiment, a puzzle will be displayed on the computer screen.  Each of 
these squares is part of a picture you will see in the top left hand corner of the computer 
screen when you move the pointer over the preview button directly to the right of the target 
picture. Your task is to use the mouse to move the pointer over a square and depress the left 
mouse button to drag that square to a new location. You can repeat this process as you work 
on the puzzle.  
 
Step 2: As you work on the puzzle, a box will appear every now and again in the centre of the 
computer screen asking you to estimate how long you think you have currently spent doing 
the puzzle. You may write your estimate in terms of minutes or seconds or both on the 
estimation sheet provided.  As you progress through the experiment a box will also appear 
asking you to ‘produce’ or do the puzzle for a set period.   
  
If you have any questions please ask them now. You may start the experiment by using the 
mouse to move the pointer over the ‘Start’ button and depress the left mouse button to 
begin.  
 
Once any questions were answered, the Experimenter asked the participant to 
remove their watch, if they were wearing one, and informed the participant that it would be 
returned at the end of the experiment.  The Experimenter then told the participant that they 
could start when ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further 
communication between the Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the 
session.  Once the participant had finished the experiment they were debriefed by the 
Experimenter as to the aim of the experiment.   
 
Results 
 
Figure 4.1 shows, for P4.1 to P4.8, the logarithms of the estimates over the actual 
times at which participants were required to make their estimates, for the production and 
estimation method, and corresponding complexity conditions, plotted against the successive  
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Figure 4.1. Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, for the production and  
estimation methods, and corresponding complexity conditions, plotted against the successive 
number of estimates made in the session, for P4.1 to P4.8.  
P = Production: E = Estimation. 
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number of estimates made throughout the session.  As in previous experiments these graphs 
show the error in successive estimations over the course of the session but do not show 
which time was being estimated.  P4.1 to P4.8 completed the method of production then the 
method of estimation, with the first four of these participants completing the simple puzzle 
then the complex puzzle and the last four completing the complex puzzle followed by the 
simple puzzle.  The log ratios show that all of these participants both overestimated and 
underestimated duration over the conditions.  For six participants (P4.1, P4.2, P4.3, P4.4, 
P4.5 and P4.6) there was a downward trend over the first few estimates of the session but 
apart from this, there were no clear systematic differences across all participants’ data 
resulting from the number of puzzle pieces or the method of estimation visible in these 
data.  For P4.7 the data show overestimation in the estimation conditions and 
underestimation in the production conditions; this is also visible to some degree for P4.4 
and P4.5.  For P4.1, P4.6 and P4.8, there is some sign of the ratios for the production 
method being higher than those from the estimation method.  
Figure 4.2 shows the same data as Figure 4.1 for P4.9 to P4.16, who all completed 
the estimation method first in each condition.  For these participants there are no trends at  
the start of the session and, again, there are no visible systematic differences across 
participants’ data resulting from the number of puzzle pieces.  P4.9, P4.10, P4.15 and P4.16 
all showed some tendency to give higher error ratios in the estimation conditions than in the 
production conditions for both simple and complex puzzles, while P4.13 and P4.14 show 
the reverse (i.e., higher ratios with production than with estimation).  Thus, visual analyses 
of these graphs suggest that, generally, the degree of overestimation and underestimation 
did not change systematically with either the method of estimation or puzzle complexity.   
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with task complexity, method type 
and time (at which estimates were made) as within-subject variables and the order in which 
the task and method were presented as between-subject variables.  The ANOVA compared 
the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants 
were required to make their estimates, for both the simple and complex conditions, the 
method used, and for the actual times at which estimates were made.  There was no main 
effect of complexity (i.e., number of pieces) (F (1, 12) = 3.927, p > .05) and the effect size 
was small (ŋ = .247).  There was also no main effect of the method used (i.e., estimation or 
production) (F (1, 12) = 2.973, p > .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .199).  There was  
no significant interaction between complexity and method used (F (1, 12) = 1.357, p > .05).   
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      Figure 4.2. Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, for the estimation and  
      production methods, and corresponding complexity conditions, plotted against the successive    
      number of estimates made in the session, for P4.9 to P4.16.  
      P = Production: E = Estimation. 
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There was a main effect of the times at which estimates were made  
(F (3, 36) = 16.984, p < .05) and the effect size was medium (ŋ = .586).  Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the log ratios from all intervals were significantly different to 
those from the other intervals, except the 90-s and 120-s intervals, which were not 
significantly different from each other (p >.05).  There were no between-group effects of 
method presentation order (F (1, 12) = .000, p > .05) or of complexity presentation order  
(F (1, 12) = 1.392, p > .05).  There was no interaction between method presentation order 
and complexity presentation order (F (1, 12) = .866, p > .05).  The analyses also showed 
that there were no significant interactions between any combinations of complexity, method 
used and the times at which estimates were made, at the .05 alpha level.   
The mean data from the simple and complex conditions are given in Figure 4.3.  
This shows the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, 
together with the 95-percent confidence interval, from all data from the simple condition 
and all data from the complex condition.  The mean data from the method of estimation are 
given in Figure 4.4.  This shows the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the 
actual times estimated, together with the 95-percent confidence interval, from all data from 
each of the production and estimation conditions.  These two figures show that the log 
ratios of the estimates made in the two complexity conditions were, on average, very 
similar to each other as were those from the two methods of estimation.         
 To investigate the effect of time to be estimated further, Figure 4.5 shows the 
logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, together with the 95-percent 
confidence interval, for production and estimation, and corresponding complexity 
conditions averaged over all participants’ data, plotted against the actual times.  The 
squares indicate data from the production-simple condition; the asterisks indicate data from 
the production-complex condition; the circles indicate data from the estimation-simple 
condition, and the crosses indicate data from the estimation-complex condition.  The mean 
ratios of the estimates of duration to the actual times decreased in all conditions as the 
intervals at which estimates were made increased.  These differences over times were 
significant in the ANOVA reported above, except for between 90 s and 120 s.  The mean 
estimates for the 30-s interval were generally overestimates and those for the 120-s interval 
were generally underestimates in all conditions.  The mean ratios of the estimates to actual 
times from the production conditions were smaller than those during the estimation  
conditions for any particular time but, although consistent for these mean data, these 
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                 Figure 4.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual  
                     times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against   
          the simple and complex conditions.  
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          Figure 4.4. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual  
                     times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against   
          the production and estimation conditions.  
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differences were not significant in the ANOVA reported above. 
 To explore the individual data with regard to the interval being estimated further,   
Figure 4.6 shows a plot of the averages of each participant’s estimates plotted against the 
actual times estimated, for both the simple and complex conditions, and the method used.  
The dotted lines show where the estimates would fall if they were completely accurate.  
Data points plotted above the line indicate overestimation and those below the line indicate 
underestimation.  The dots indicate data from the production-simple condition; the asterisks 
indicate data from the production-complex condition; the circles indicate data from the 
estimation-simple condition, and the crosses indicate data from the estimation-complex 
condition.  P4.1 through P4.8 completed the production condition first, whereas P4.9 
through P4.16 completed the estimation condition first.  P4.1 through P4.4 and P4.9 
through P4.12 completed the simple condition first, whereas P4.5 through P4.8 and P4.13 
through P4.16 completed the complex condition first.   
 The data shown in Figure 4.6 vary greatly between participants.  P4.4, P4.7, P4.9, 
P4.10, P4.11 and P4.15 generally overestimated duration in the estimation and two 
complexity conditions at the 30-s, 60-s, 90-s and 120-s intervals.  P4.4, P4.7, P4.9, P4.10, 
P4.11, P4.15 and P4.16 generally underestimated duration in the production and two 
complexity conditions at the 30-s, 60-s, 90-s and 120-s intervals.  P4.2, P4.6 and P4.8 
estimated duration relatively accurately in all conditions at all duration intervals.  The data 
from Figure 4.6 indicate that there were no systematic differences in the estimates across 
participants for complexity, estimation method or interval being estimated. The data do not 
show any consistent trend in the estimation of duration for any condition or for the times at 
which estimates were made.     
 
Discussion 
 
 In this experiment, the estimation method was compared with the production 
method.  There were no significant differences resulting from the method of estimation.  
The graphical analysis supports this, in that there were no systematic effects of method or 
complexity.  That there were no differences found between the estimation methods is 
consistent with results from previous research where different methods were directly 
compared (Allan, 1979; Craik & Hay, 1999).  In this experiment and in Experiment 3, the  
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Figure 4.6. Scatterplot averages of participants estimates plotted against  
the actual times estimated for both the method and complexity conditions.  
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times at which estimates were made were randomised so as to avoid any possible confound 
of a fixed presentation order.  In this experiment, there was an effect of the times at which 
estimates were made on participants’ estimates of duration, except at the 90-s and 120-s 
intervals.  In Experiment 3 there was an effect of the actual times but only at the 30-s 
interval.  Thus, when estimates are made after a longer duration period has passed, it 
appears that participants have a tendency towards underestimating duration, whereas at 
shorter durations, they tend to overestimate duration (see Figures 3.2 and 4.5).  
 The results of the current experiment and those from the first three experiments, 
suggests that varying the number of puzzle pieces did not affect participant’s estimates of 
duration, unlike the results previous researchers have reported for other tasks (Allen, 1980; 
Axel, 1924; Dube & Schmitt, 1996; Loehlin, 1959).  These researchers varied task 
complexity extensively along different dimensions in their experiments, arguing that time 
was perceived to go faster as a function of the task being more ‘complex’, and that time 
was perceived to go slower as a function of the task being less ‘complex’.  It might be 
expected that the results from varying task complexity by varying the tasks (e.g., anagrams 
and mathematical problems) would be comparable to those tasks varying complexity on 
one dimension (in this case number of jigsaw puzzle pieces).  This was not the case.   
 It may be possible, however, that no comparison can be made between tasks that use 
different types of stimuli (e.g., anagrams and jigsaw puzzles) because the tasks are very 
different.  Further investigation is required to, as it was stated at the beginning of this 
thesis, ‘show how task complexity can be used as an explanation for why estimations of 
duration differ’.  A comparison could be made with a task that is similar to jigsaw and 
varies on one dimension only.  The results of such a comparison should provide a basis for 
developing a procedure to further examine the human estimation of duration.  The next 
series of experiments partially replicates the methodology of two earlier task complexity 
studies where the different complexity tasks involved the same stimuli, as in the jigsaw 
here, and where complexity was varied by varying the actual task required.  The first of 
these two experiments is a study by Allen (1980), where task complexity was manipulated 
by getting participants to sort playing cards into one stack (face up), two stacks according 
to colour and four stacks according to suit for three different durations.  Sorting cards into 
four stacks was the most complex of the sorting tasks.  Participants then made estimates 
about how long they thought they had been sorting cards. This task has been used by other 
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researchers as a simple and effective way of manipulating time judgements (Hicks, Miller, 
Gaes & Bierman, 1977; Hicks, Miller & Kinsbourne, 1976).   
 The card sorting task was thought to be similar to jigsaw because the task was 
visual, in that each playing card showed a picture (the royal cards) or variations of pictures 
(the house cards).  Secondly, the number of cards able to be shown (similar to the number 
of pieces visible) was easily manipulated, in that one, two or four cards were turned over at 
any one time.  Thirdly, the task was one dimensional (i.e., only cards were used).  Finally, 
the card sorting task was a within-subjects design, like jigsaw.  This task was also easy to 
reproduce, given experimental time constraints.  A fuller description of the procedure and 
methodology is given in Experiment 5.  
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EXPERIMENT 5 
 
In this experiment, a previous task complexity study (Allen, 1980) was partially 
replicated as a basis for developing a procedure to investigate time estimation further.  
Allen (1980) investigated the effect of task complexity (in this case different card sorting 
tasks) and the effect of situation (one designed to be perceived as pleasant and another 
designed to be perceived as unpleasant) upon 24 participants’ estimates of duration.  Allen 
(1980) proposed a cognitive argument of ‘task-relevant’ processing, where a person 
actively ‘processes’ stimuli, which in turn affects their estimates of duration.  For example, 
a person may translate stimuli into binary choices, which has the effect, according to Allen 
(1980), of decreasing estimates of duration or making time appear to go faster.  The card 
sorting task in Allen’s (1980) study required participants to sort playing cards into one 
stack (face up), two stacks according to colour and four stacks according to suit.  Sorting 
cards into four stacks was the most complex task, because Allen (1980) claimed that there 
were more stimuli (increased amounts of information) to ‘process’.  Thus, Allen (1980) 
suggested that internal task-relevant processing may affect estimates of duration contingent 
upon the complexity of a task.     
Allen (1980) used two groups of participants (the between-subjects component), 
three task complexity conditions, one control condition, and three different durations (the 
within-subjects component).  Participants were tested individually in a laboratory and were 
supervised by an undergraduate student, who was also a confederate in the study.  The 
confederate told one group that another experiment was being conducted where lengthy 
columns of numbers were being added up on paper and then torn up.  The other group was 
told that in another experiment, participants were rating pictures of nudes.  This 
information was fictitious and constituted the situational component of the study.  Once 
participants were given this information, the procedure was the same from then on for both 
groups.  Allen (1980) predicted that the card-sorting task would be perceived as being 
boring for the group told about the nude picture-rating task and interesting for the group 
told about the number task.   
Participants were then asked by the Experimenter to sort playing cards and were 
told to estimate time intervals between when the Experimenter instructed them to ‘start’ 
and then ‘stop’ timing.  The three duration intervals used were 13 s, 22 s and 37 s.  During 
the interval that they were required to time, participants sorted the playing cards into stacks 
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(as described above).  In the control condition, participants did not sort cards but just 
estimated duration.  At the end of the experiment, after all the card sorting had been 
completed, using a 1-to-10 scale, participants rated their experience of the experiment, 
where the digit ‘1’ signified an extremely boring experience and the digit ‘10’ signified an 
extremely interesting experience.   
   Allen (1980) found that task complexity (i.e., card sorting) affected participants 
estimates of duration.  Estimates of duration were longest in the control condition and 
shortest in the most complex card-sorting (i.e., four-stack) condition.  The estimate 
averages (over all three duration intervals) for the 1-stack, 2-stack, 4-stack and control 
conditions were: 25.15 s, 25.56 s, 22.39 s and 27.11 s respectively.  The number of cards 
sorted in each condition differed significantly, with fewer cards being sorted in the four-
stack condition (i.e., the information being processed affected the number of cards sorted).  
There were also significant differences in estimates made at each of the three duration 
intervals.  The estimate averages for the 13 s, 22 s and 37 s conditions were: 15.28 s,    
24.28 s and 35.59 s respectively.  The two groups did not differ significantly in how they 
estimated time to pass but did differ (as predicted) in how they rated their experiences (i.e., 
the group told about the nude picture-rating task thought the card-sorting task was boring).    
The card sorting task has also been used by other researchers as a simple and 
effective way of manipulating time judgements (Hicks et al., 1977; Hicks et al., 1976).  
Hicks et al. (1976) investigated the effect of varying information processed (as outlined 
above in Allen’s (1980) study) by participants during an interval using two timing 
paradigms.  Participants were required to sort playing cards into a single stack, face up; two 
stacks according to colour and four stacks according to suit.  Cards were sorted for a period 
of 42 s.  The Experimenter instructed participants when to begin sorting cards, when to stop 
sorting them and when to make their estimate.  Two types of estimates were made.  The 
first was prospective, where the participants were told before starting the task that they 
would have to make an estimate of how long they thought they had been sorting cards.  The 
second was retrospective, where participants were told to estimate time once the 42 s card- 
sorting period had elapsed.  Hicks et al. (1976) found that prospective estimates decreased 
as more cards were required to be sorted (i.e., four stacks according to suit).  The estimate 
averages for the 1-stack, 2-stack and 4-stack conditions were: 52.92 s, 42.83 s and 31.00 s 
respectively.  Retrospective estimates were not linearly related to cards sorted into stacks 
(i.e., estimates did not decrease as the number of cards required to be sorted increased).   
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Hicks et al. (1977) investigated the effects of concurrent tasks upon participant’s 
estimates of duration in four experiments.  In the first experiment, the concurrent task was a 
card sorting task, which required participants to sort cards as well as make a judgement 
about how much time had passed whilst cards were being sorted.  Cards were sorted into a 
single stack, face up; two stacks according to colour and four stacks according to suit.  
There was also a control condition where no cards were sorted but where an estimate was 
still made.  There were three durations: 8 s, 13 s and 22 s.  The prospective estimate 
paradigm was used and the Experimenter instructed participants when to start and stop 
sorting cards and when to make their estimates.  Hicks et al. (1977) found that estimates 
decreased as more cards were sorted (i.e., ‘processed’).  Estimates were largest in the 
control condition compared to estimates made in any of the three card sorting conditions.  
The estimate averages for the 1-stack, 2-stack, 4-stack and control conditions were: 19.54 s, 
16.49 s, 16.39 s and 20.91 s respectively.    
The three studies described above all used card sorting tasks to influence how 
participants estimated duration.  This experiment used the within-subjects component of 
Allen’s (1980) study (i.e., card sorting at three intervals) to investigate how estimates of 
duration might be affected by using the card sorting task from Allen’s (1980) study as a 
way of manipulating task complexity.  Allen’s (1980) study was selected for three reasons.  
Firstly, because the times at which estimates were made (i.e., the card sorting intervals) 
varied, just like the times at which estimates were made in the previous three experiments 
in this thesis.  In the study by Hicks et al. (1976) only one interval was used.  Secondly, the 
effect size in Allen’s (1980) study of card sorting on duration estimates was medium.  This 
was calculated from F and the degrees of freedom: 
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Finally, Allen’s (1980) study, used the prospective method of estimation, which had been 
used in the studies by Hicks et al. (1976) and Hicks et al. (1977), where it had been found 
that estimates decreased as more cards were sorted.  Thus, the prospective method of 
estimation appeared to be a reliable way to measure estimates when using a card sorting 
task.  The between-subject situational group comparison from Allen’s (1980) study was not 
replicated because the effects of social situations were not being studied here.   
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Method 
Participants 
 
Nine participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P5.1 to 
P5.9.  
Apparatus 
 
The experiment was conducted in a room, 3 m x 2.1 m, lit by 2 fluorescent tubes.  
Two decks of Realm Playing cards were used to manipulate the experimental events.  One  
recording sheet was used by the Experimenter to record the participant’s estimates.  
Procedure 
 
At the start of the session, the Experimenter escorted one participant into the 
laboratory.  The participant sat down at a desk and was asked to read the sheet of 
instructions.  The instructions were as follows:  
 
  Introduction: 
This experiment involves working with playing cards.  You will be required, at certain 
times, to sort the cards into piles and to estimate how long you thought it took you to sort 
the cards.  At other times you will not be required to sort the cards into piles, but just 
estimate the time that has passed.  Please remove your watch (if you are wearing one) and 
give it to the Experimenter.  Your watch will be returned after the experiment.  Do not 
attempt to count or mark time in any way during the experiment. Please read the steps 
below to familiarise yourself with the experimental procedure. 
 
Step 1:  In front of you on the desk are two packs of playing cards shuffled together into one pile, 
with Jokers removed.  During the trials when you are required to sort the playing cards, you 
will sort them into either a single stack, face up; into two stacks according to colour, or into 
four stacks according to suit.  The Experimenter will tell you before you start whether you 
will sort the cards into a single stack, two stacks or four stacks.  You will begin sorting the 
cards when the Experimenter says, “Start” and stop sorting the cards when the Experimenter 
says “Stop”.  Once you have stopped sorting the cards, tell the Experimenter how long you 
thought you were sorting them.  You may estimate time in terms of minutes, seconds or 
both.  The Experimenter will record your estimate and then reshuffle the cards in 
preparation for another trial. 
 
Step 2: At other times in the experiment you will not be required to sort the cards.  The 
Experimenter will tell you when this will happen.  On these trials you will be required to 
estimate time only, remembering not to count or mark time in any way.  The Experimenter 
will say, “Start” and you will begin to estimate time passing.  When the Experimenter says 
“Stop” you will stop estimating time.  You will then tell the Experimenter how long you 
thought the time was during that interval, either in minutes, seconds or both.  After the 
Experimenter has recorded your estimate, another trial will begin.  The Experimenter will 
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tell you what the trial will be before you begin, i.e., another card sorting trial or an estimate 
only trial.  
  
 Once any questions were answered the Experimenter asked the participant to 
remove their watch, if they were wearing one, and informed the participant that it would be 
returned at the end of the experiment.  The experiment then commenced. 
 Each experimental session consisted of twelve trials.  Each trial involved a 
combination of one of three durations and either one of three card sorting tasks (at three 
levels of complexity) or a period of waiting (control condition).  Each interval/task 
combination occurred once per participant.  The three card sorting tasks were: sorting cards 
into a single stack face up (the lowest level of complexity); sorting cards into two stacks 
according to colour (the medium level of complexity), and sorting the cards into four stacks 
according to suit (the highest level of complexity).  In the control trials, no card sorting was 
required.  Each trial was 13-s, 22-s or 37-s long.   
 The Experimenter timed each trial with a stopwatch and told the participant when to 
start and when to stop each trial and which task they were to do.  He also asked participants 
for their time estimate at the end of each trial and recorded these.  The twelve task/interval 
combinations were ordered according to a randomly determined sequence and this same 
sequence was used for all participants.  Once the twelve trials had been presented the 
participants were thanked by the Experimenter for participating and were debriefed as to 
the aim of the experiment.    
 
Results 
 
 Figure 5.1 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which 
participants were required to make their estimates, for the card sorting conditions, plotted 
against the successive number of estimates made in the session.  P5.2, P5.5, P5.7 and P5.8 
generally underestimated duration in all conditions.  P5.1 and P5.4 generally overestimated 
duration in all conditions.  P5.3, P5.6 and P5.9 underestimated and overestimated duration 
throughout the session.   
 A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with cards sorted and the 
times at which estimates were made, as within-subject variables.  The ANOVA compared 
the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants 
were required to make their estimates, for the cards sorted and for the actual times at which  
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Figure 5.1. Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times for the card sorting conditions, 
plotted against the successive number of estimates made in the session. C1: Control; C2: 1 Stack; 
C3: 2 Stacks; C4: 4 Stacks. 
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estimates were made.  It was found that there was no main effect of manipulating the 
number of cards sorted (F (3, 24) = 2.573, p > .05) or of trial duration                                  
(F (2, 16) = 0.162, p > .05) on estimates of duration.  The effect size for cards sorted was 
small (ŋ = .020) and effect size for trial duration was also small (ŋ = .243).  There was no 
interaction between cards sorted and trial duration (F (6, 48) = 0.798, p > .05) and the effect 
size was small (ŋ = .091).   
 This lack of effect can be illustrated further.  Figure 5.2 shows the means of the 
logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, together with the 95-percent 
confidence interval, from all data from the card sorting and control conditions.  The 
estimates from the three card sorting conditions were very similar to each other and to the 
estimates made during the control condition.  The estimate averages for the 1-stack, 2-
stack, 4-stack and control conditions were, 36.67 s, 29.85 s, 38.11 s and 27.30 s 
respectively.   
 Figure 5.3 shows the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times 
estimated, together with the 95-percent confidence interval, from all data from the three 
trial durations.  The log ratios of the estimates to the actual times from the three trial 
durations are very similar.   
 
Discussion 
 
 This experiment partially replicated the procedure of a previous task complexity 
study (Allen, 1980).  However, although the procedure was replicated, the results were not.  
Allen (1980) found that participants consistently estimated duration as passing faster with 
the more complex card sorting tasks.  Here, there was no effect of card sorting (i.e., task 
complexity) on participants’ estimates of duration.  
 The results of this experiment did not support the idea that the number of cards 
sorted in specified piles would affect estimates of duration as there were no systematic 
effects, as shown in Figure 5.1.  Similarly, the data from Figures 5.2 and 5.3 do not show 
any systematic effects of estimates of duration.  The estimate averages for participants in 
this experiment were larger in the card sorting conditions than those in Allen’s (1980) study 
(although the estimate averages in the control condition were similar).  The estimate 
averages for each of the three time intervals were larger than those found in Allen’s (1980)  
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   Figure 5.2. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual  
                      times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against   
           the card sorting and control conditions.  
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            Figure 5.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual  
                      times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against   
          the three trial durations.  
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study at the 22-s and 37-s intervals, but were similar at the 13-s interval.        
 The estimate averages for the 13 s, 22 s and 37 s conditions were 15.94 s, 30.39 s 
and 52.61s respectively.  The estimate averages for the three trial durations (see Figure 5.3) 
when compared to the estimate averages for the four trial durations in Experiment 4 (see 
Figure 4.5) show for the card sorting task, that participants did not tend to increasingly 
underestimate duration as the times at which estimates were made increased, as was the 
case for the jigsaw puzzle task.                                                                                
 The task complexity component of Allen’s (1980) study was precisely replicated in 
this experiment.  However, the results from this experiment do not support the claim that 
estimates decrease or increase as predicted in relation to the different levels of task 
complexity, when the task requires sorting cards into piles.  Thus, it is not clear why 
Allen’s (1980) task complexity results were not replicated here.   
 Allen (1980) suggested that having increased amounts of information to process 
results in estimations of time going faster.  If this argument is correct, then in the earlier 
four jigsaw experiments it would have been expected that time would reliably be estimated 
as going faster in the complex conditions (i.e., where there were more puzzle pieces and 
therefore, more information to ‘process’).  However, this was not the case.  Similarly, in 
this experiment in the more complex card sorting task conditions, time was not estimated as 
going faster than in the less complex card sorting conditions.  However, in the studies by 
Allen (1980), Hicks et al. (1976) and Hicks et al. (1977) estimates decreased as more cards 
were required to be sorted.  The inconsistency in the results of this experiment and of those 
in the previous earlier experimental series of this thesis, suggests the results from the 
studies by Allen (1980), Hicks et al. (1976) and Hicks et al. (1977) may not be reliable.  In 
all of these three studies, and in the current experiment, the methodology used was very 
similar (i.e., the prospective method of estimation was used and cards were sorted into the 
same stacks).  However, despite these methodological similarities, the results of this 
experiment differed to those from the three card-sorting studies.   
Given the failure to replicate the card sorting task findings, the next experiment was 
the second in the series that partially replicated a task complexity study in a further attempt 
to develop a procedure for investigating how the complexity of a task affects people’s 
estimates of time.  A study by Hogan (1975) was selected from the task complexity 
literature.  The stimuli used in this study (e.g., line drawings) were easily replicable and the 
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complexity of the task was clearly defined, and therefore, allowed for ease of manipulation.  
A fuller description of the procedure and methodology is given in Experiment 6. 
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EXPERIMENT 6 
 
 In Experiment 5, the procedure from a task complexity study (Allen, 1980) was 
partially replicated as a basis for developing a procedure to investigate time estimation 
further.  The results failed to replicate those of Allen (1980) and other similar studies (e.g., 
Hicks et al. (1976) and Hicks et al. (1977)) and it was unclear why this was so.  Further 
investigation was required to explain these results but it was decided that a second attempt 
at finding a procedure be conducted instead.  Thus, Experiment 6 involved partially 
replicating another task complexity study, this time one that used line drawings.     
 Two studies by Ornstein (1969) and Hogan (1975) investigated task complexity and 
time estimation using line drawings.  Hogan (1975) investigated the effects of how 
experimental stimuli were qualitatively assessed by participants (i.e., what participants 
thought about the stimuli that were used) on time estimation.  He used a between-subjects 
design, in which 137 participants were shown two sets of test stimuli; line drawings and 
colour slides of abstract paintings.  Each trial consisted of either line drawings or paintings 
being presented.  A standard drawing or painting was presented for 15 s immediately 
followed by a slide of a comparison drawing or painting also presented for 15 s.  The 
comparison stimulus was randomly selected from a set of five comparison stimuli varying 
in complexity.  The ten pairs of slides made up ten conditions, with each trial being 
experienced by different participants.  During a trial and after the presentation of either the 
drawing or painting slide, participants circled a digit on a nine-point scale to indicate 
whether they thought the duration the comparison stimulus was presented for was 
shorter, equal to or longer than the duration the standard stimulus was presented for. 
The qualitative aspect of the study required participants to answer three questions about 
whether they thought the comparison slide or the standard slide was more complex, more 
aesthetic and which slide they liked the best.  These questions were asked after the 
completion of each trial.  Hogan (1975) found that the durations of very simple and very 
complex stimuli were judged to be significantly longer than the durations for moderately 
complex stimuli.  The mean time judgement scores, for the least-to-most complex stimuli 
were: 4.4, 4.3, 4.0, 4.3 and 4.5.   
 Hogan (1975) argued that overly simple and overly complex stimuli could not be 
cognitively processed, hence the durations were overestimated.  Hogan argued that this was 
because overly complex stimuli, filled time (Fraisse, 1963), and overly simple stimuli, 
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empty time (Fraisse, 1963), are perceptually and cognitively processed in the same way, 
resulting in overestimations of duration.  Moderately complex stimuli are not perceived in 
the same way, as more stimulus information can be processed to give more accurate 
perceptions of time passing.  This information is not available during empty intervals 
because of the lack of stimuli present and during filled intervals because the information is 
too stimulating and therefore cannot be processed.  If it is assumed that viewing a simple 
stimulus is a simple task and viewing a more complex stimulus is a more complex task then 
these results do not agree with those from other task complexity researchers (e.g., Axel, 
1924; Fraisse, 1963) where time is estimated as passing faster when tasks are more 
complex and slower when tasks are simpler.  If Hogan’s (1975) argument is correct, then it 
may be that the time spent doing very simple and very complex tasks would both be 
overestimated.  Note, however, that Hogan used a between-subjects design.   
 Ornstein (1969) also tested the effects of varying the complexity of line drawings 
upon human’s estimation of duration.  Participants in Ornstein’s (1969) study were shown a 
standard line drawing, followed by one of five complex drawings (see Figure 6.1).  Both 
drawings were presented for 30 s and a within-subjects design was used.  After the 
presentation of both drawings, participants were required to estimate how long the 
presentation of the complex drawing was in relation to the presentation of the standard 
drawing.  Ornstein (1969) found that less complex line drawings were judged to be 
presented for a shorter duration than the standard drawing, and that more complex line 
drawings were not judged to be presented for a longer duration than the standard.  
Ornstein’s results then agree with those of researchers such as Axel (1924) and Fraisse 
(1963).  
 Line drawings have produced interesting and contrary effects on time estimation.  
Given both studies reported at least some degree of effect, this next study involved the use 
of line drawings.  The procedure was a partial replication of that used by Hogan (1975), 
using the stimuli designed by Ornstein (1969) and using a within-subjects design as used by 
Ornstein (1969).  The qualitative aspect of Hogan’s (1975) study was excluded as the 
relationship between time estimation and preferences for and aesthetic judgements of the 
environmental stimuli were not being investigated here.  The study aimed to see if there 
were any consistent effects of these various line drawings on estimates of the relative 
presentation time on a standard and test stimulus.   
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Method 
Participants 
 
Fourteen participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as 
P6.1 to P6.14.   
Apparatus 
 
The experiment was conducted in a room, 7 m x 7.8 m, lit by 10 fluorescent tubes.  
Dell OptiPlex GX1 computers were used to control the experimental events. 
 
Procedure 
 
At the start of the session, the Experimenter escorted the participants into the 
laboratory.  The participants sat down at a desk and were asked to read the sheet of 
instructions.  The instructions were as follows:  
  
 Introduction: 
 
This experiment involves working with line drawings.  You will be required to look at the 
line drawings that will be presented on the computer screen and to estimate how long you 
thought the drawings were presented for.  Please remove your watch and give it to the 
Experimenter.  It will be returned after the experiment.  Do not attempt to count or mark 
time in any way during the experiment. Please read the steps below to familiarise yourself 
with the experimental procedure. 
 
Step 1:  To begin the experiment, push the space bar.  Two sets of line drawings will be presented 
consecutively and this will constitute one trial.  First, a standard line drawing will be 
presented, followed by a comparison line drawing.  At the end of each trial you will write 
down on a recording sheet your estimate of whether you thought the comparison line 
drawing was presented for a shorter, equal or longer duration than the standard line 
drawing, using a 9-point scale.  Write your name on the recording sheet before the 
experiment begins.  Circle one number on the 9-point scale.  The digits 1 to 4 indicate that 
the comparison line drawing is of a shorter duration than the standard line drawing; the digit 
5 indicates that the comparison line drawing is of equal duration to the standard line 
drawing, and the digits 6 to 9 indicate that the comparison line drawing is of a longer than 
the standard line drawing.  
 
Once any questions were answered the Experimenter asked the participant to  
remove their watch, if they were wearing one, and informed the participant that it would be 
returned at the end of the experiment.  The Experimenter then told the participant they 
could start when ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further 
 71
communication between the Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the 
session during debriefing.   
 There were five trials conducted in one experimental session.  A standard line 
drawing, the same in each trial, was always presented first followed by one of five 
comparison line drawings, which were presented randomly.  The same random order for the 
presentation of the comparison drawings was used for each participant.  Both the standard 
and comparison line drawings were presented for a duration of 15 s, where the comparison 
was presented immediately after the standard.  Figure 6.1 shows the line drawings selected 
from Ornstein’s (1969) study that investigated differences in stimulus complexity using line 
figures.  Complexity was varied in terms of the number of each drawings’ interior angles; 
the more interior angles, the greater the complexity.   
 Participants estimated duration after each trial by circling one number on a 9-point 
scale, to indicate whether they thought the duration of the comparison line drawing was 
shorter than, a score ranging from one to four, equal to, a score of five, or longer than, a 
score ranging from six to nine, the standard line drawing.  Once the estimate was made, 
another trial began by the participants pushing the space bar.  When the experiment had 
finished, the participants were then thanked by the Experimenter for participating and 
debriefed as to the aim of the experiment. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the relative duration ratings for the least to most complex stimuli 
presented to participants for each participant.  For ease of presentation, and given that 
participants’ duration ratings were variable, Table 6.1 groups them, showing the number of 
participants who rated the comparison stimulus, for each complexity level, as either longer, 
shorter than, or equal to, the standard stimulus.  It can be seen from Table 6.1 that more 
participants rated the comparison stimulus as longer or shorter than the standard stimulus 
rather than, equal to it, when the comparison stimulus was least and most complex.  
A Friedman test was conducted on the ratings of task complexity to assess whether 
or not there were any significant effects over the different complexity levels on the 
participants estimates.  It was found that stimulus complexity did not influence the 
estimates of duration (χ2 (df=4, N = 14) = 3.258, p > .05).  Table 6.2 shows the mean rating 
scores as functions of stimulus complexity level.  It can be seen that for the most complex 
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                                                               Most complex            Stimulus 5 
 
 
  Figure 6.1.  Standard and comparison line drawings (Ornstein, 1969). 
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Table 6.1 
 
The rating of duration selected by each participant for each comparison stimuli. 
 
              
 
Complexity Level 
            Least        Most 
 
  Duration       1  2  3  4  5                 
   Rating 
 
   Comparison 
     stimulus 
 
   Longer          P6.1        P6.2  P6.1    P6.8    P6.1 
 (than standard)       P6.2        P6.3  P6.3  P6.10  P6.5 
               P6.3        P6.5  P6.4    P6.7 
               P6.7        P6.6  P6.5    P6.8 
               P6.12      P6.9  P6.6    P6.10 
               P6.14      P6.11  P6.9    P6.12 
               P6.12  P6.12 
               P6.13 
 
  Shorter P6.4        P6.1        P6.7  P6.2  P6.2 
 (than standard)      P6.5        P6.4        P6.8  P6.6  P6.3 
              P6.8         P6.7        P6.10  P6.7  P6.4 
              P6.9         P6.8        P6.14  P6.12  P6.9 
              P6.10       P6.10    P6.13  P6.11 
              P6.11       P6.14    P6.14  P6.13 
          P6.14 
 
    Equal P6.6    P6.2  P6.1  P6.6 
   (to standard)        P6.13    P6.11  P6.3 
       P6.13  P6.4 
         P6.5 
         P6.9 
         P6.11 
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 Table 6.2 
 
Mean rating scores as a function of stimulus  
complexity level. 
 
 
 
Complexity level  Mean rating scores  
 
Stimulus 1 (least complex) 4.7 
Stimulus 2   5.0 
Stimulus 3   5.3 
Stimulus 4   4.6 
Stimulus 5 (most complex) 5.1 
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stimulus, Stimulus 5, participants estimated the duration of this stimulus to be almost equal 
to that of the standard stimulus.  The second to least complex stimulus, Stimulus 2, was 
judged exactly equal in duration to that of the standard stimulus.  The durations for the least 
most complex stimulus, Stimulus 1, and the second to most complex stimulus, Stimulus 4, 
were judged slightly shorter than the duration of the standard stimulus.  The duration for the 
third most complex stimulus, Stimulus 3, was judged to be longer than that of the standard 
stimulus. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study was a second attempt at trying to find a procedure to investigate time 
estimation further, given the lack of significant results from the first four task complexity 
experiments in this thesis and the previous partial replication (Experiment 5).  The partial 
replication of Hogan’s (1975) study required participants to estimate whether the 
presentation times of complex line drawings were longer than, shorter than or equal to, the 
presentation times of a standard line drawing.  The present results did not replicate those of 
either Hogan (1975) or of Ornstein (1969).  The relation between the estimates and 
complexity level varied unsystematically over participants.   
The results from the all of the experiments so far in this study, Experiments 1 
through 6, which included two partial replication studies, have not been able to show that 
task complexity, as varied here, affects estimates of duration as suggested by previous task 
complexity researchers (e.g., Axel, 1924; DeWolfe & Duncan, 1959; Fraisse, 1963; Smith, 
1969; Wilsoncroft et al., 1978).  The designs of the first four experiments were based 
around previous task complexity studies that reported effects of task complexity upon the 
human estimation of duration.  Similarly, the two partial replications followed the 
procedures used in Hogan’s (1975) and Allen’s (1980) studies.  Given the strong similarity 
between methodologies used in this thesis and those of previous task complexity studies, 
the question should be asked about the validity of those designs, given the non-significant 
results obtained from the first six experiments in this thesis.  Where there were variations in 
procedures across studies, there were no obvious reasons why these should have affected 
the results.  It seems that another approach is needed to explain how the tasks that people 
are engaged in affects their estimates of time passing.  
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INTERIM DISCUSSION  
 
The first four experiments were designed to investigate how varying task 
complexity on one dimension would affect human estimates of duration.  Complexity was 
manipulated by varying the number of pieces in a computer generated jigsaw puzzle.  Over 
these experiments both the method of estimation and the method of production were used to 
measure participants’ judgements of duration.  The manipulations in the first four 
experiments did not significantly affect participants’ estimates of duration.   
Given these results, it was thought, at this stage, that what was needed was an 
attempt to see if manipulation of the variables other task complexity researchers had used 
would give control over estimates of duration.  Consequently, the methodology of two 
different task complexity studies, those of Allen (1980) and Hogan (1975) were partially 
replicated.  Both of these studies manipulated task complexity as well as testing other 
variables of interest (e.g., social perceptions).  The partial replications consisted of 
manipulating only the task complexity aspect of each of these studies.  The results of the 
replications showed that there was no effect of task complexity upon participants’ estimates 
of duration, whereas in the original studies, Allen (1980) and Hogan (1975) found an effect 
of task complexity.   
Despite several attempts at conducting experiments to assess how task complexity 
influences a person’s perception of time passing, the findings from this series of 
experiments brings into question the validity of the task complexity designs used in this 
thesis, as these findings do not support results as previously reported by task complexity 
researchers.  Generally, the argument is that if a task is more complex, time is perceived to 
go faster, and if a task is less complex, time is perceived to go slower (Allen, 1980; Axel, 
1924; Craik & Hay, 1999; DeWolfe & Duncan, 1959; Dube & Schmitt, 1996; Fraisse, 
1964; Gray et al. 1975; Gulliksen, 1927; Hogan, 1975; Juhnke & Scott, 1988; Loehlin, 
1959; Sawyer, Meyers & Huser, 1994; Smith, 1969; Watt, 1991; Zakay, Nitzan & 
Glicksohn, 1983).  Within task complexity studies, however, there is much variability in 
design, such as varying task complexity on different dimensions, rather than on just one 
dimension.  For example, Loehlin (1959) compared estimates of duration from participants 
who were involved in many different tasks, such as counting ‘the’s’ and solving anagrams.  
The discrepancy in results from this series of experiments and the task complexity literature 
suggests that more research is needed into finding out how task complexity affects human’s 
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estimates of duration.  Maybe this should not be surprising, given the great range of 
methodologies used in task complexity research (e.g., dimensional and task variations).  A 
theoretical approach is needed, one that might explain and clarify what task complexity is 
and how the complexity of a task influences a human’s perception of time passing.  
 
The Behavioral Theory of Timing 
 
 In basic animal research on the perception of duration, the findings are less 
ambiguous than those from the human literature on task complexity.  Results from basic 
behavioural animal research on timing support a theoretical approach known as the 
behavioral theory of timing (Killeen & Fetterman, 1988, 1993).  Inherent to this theory, is 
the idea that behaviour is determined by consequences, which are perceived by the 
organism as being either positive (i.e., reinforcing) or negative (i.e., punishing).  The 
behavioral theory of timing (BeT) suggests that the rate of reinforcement or how often 
reinforcers are received by an organism, drives the speed of an internal pacemaker, a 
hypothesized regulator within the organism, which governs an organism’s perception of 
time passing (Killeen & Fetterman, 1988, 1993).  An organism emits responses called 
adjunctive behaviours (Killeen & Fetterman, 1988, 1993).  These behaviours are states that 
correspond to each class of adjunctive responses.  An organism learns to associate certain 
responses with reinforcement in the context of the behaviours associated with that state.   
The pacemaker emits pulses that move the organism into a state that it has learned to 
associate with a cue for making a response.  For example, a pigeon may make a ‘short’ 
response, if at the time of response requirement, it was engaged in behaviour (e.g., 
preening) it had learnt to associate with the short-duration stimulus.  Contingent upon 
making the response, the organism moves from one state to the next as a function of the 
pulses emitted by the pacemaker.  Changes in pacemaker speed are assumed to be mediated 
by changes in the arousal level of the organism, which is driven by the rate of 
reinforcement.   
 Research into BeT has shown that humans’ and pigeons’ estimates of duration vary 
as a function of specifically manipulating the reinforcement rate (Bizo & White, 1995a; 
1994a; 1994b; Fetterman & Killeen, 1990, 1991; Morgan, Killeen & Fetterman, 1993; 
Wearden, Philpott & Win, 1999).  Bizo and Whites’ (1995a; 1994a; 1994b) studies used a 
two-alternative free-operant psychophysical procedure.  Pigeons responded on either the 
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left or the right key in a 50-s trial.  During the first 25 s of the trial, responses to the left key 
were reinforced and during the last 25 s of the trial, responses to the right key were 
reinforced.  There were forty-eight trials, each separated by an inter-trial interval.  Bizo and 
White (1995a) investigated whether differential rates of reinforcement affect changes in the 
pacemaker period.  The manipulation of the differential rate of reinforcement was achieved 
by two independent variable-interval (VI) schedules operating across conditions throughout 
the experiment.  Bizo and White (1995a) found that differential rates of reinforcement 
affected the pacemaker period, τ, (i.e., a pigeon’s ability to estimate duration).  For 
example, estimates of τ were largest on the left key when the differential reinforcement rate 
favoured left-key responses, whereas estimates were smallest on the right key when the 
differential reinforcement rate favoured this key.  
Bizo and White (1994a) tested whether interreinforcer interval (IRI) durations affect 
the average interpulse time of an organism’s pacemaker, a core assumption of BeT.  In their 
first experiment, the IRI was manipulated by varying the VI schedule that was operating on 
the two response keys, left and right, throughout the experiment.  The results showed that 
average interpulse time was affected by the IRI (e.g., when the IRI was increased and 
decreased, there was also an increase and decrease in the average interpulse time of an 
organism’s pacemaker).  A second experiment was conducted to test whether the 
availability or unavailability of reinforcement was affecting temporal discrimination.  The 
procedure was the same as that in the first experiment except that responses for trials 
including reinforcers and those not including reinforcers were recorded, to show that 
changes in the average interpulse time, if a function of the IRI, would be observed for both 
the reinforcement and non-reinforcement trials.  This was to counter the idea that pigeons 
may have been discriminating reinforcement occurrence, hence possibly confounding 
effects of the IRI.  The results of this experiment showed that changes in interpulse time 
were a function of the IRI, independent of experimental events serving as discriminative 
stimuli for reinforcement (i.e., pigeons discriminating reinforcer occurrence).  Results from 
both experiments support the BeT assumption that the IRI affects interpulse time.   
Bizo and White (1994b) investigated whether reinforcement density influences the 
rate of an organism’s pacemaker.  Reinforcement density was altered separately in two 
experiments by varying the intertrial interval (ITI) and reinforcer duration.  In Experiment 1 
the ITI was varied using three different intervals in nine conditions.  The pacemaker rate 
was affected by reinforcement density when the ITI was manipulated.  In Experiment 2, 
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reinforcement duration was manipulated to change reinforcement density but not the 
reinforcer frequency.  When reinforcer duration is manipulated, reinforcer frequency 
remains constant, hence any changes in reinforcer duration are not confounded with 
reinforcer frequency when manipulating reinforcer density.  Results from this experiment 
supported those from Experiment 1 and together both sets of results showed that 
reinforcement density affects pacemaker rate.   
Fetterman and Killeen (1991) investigated, in two experiments, both using pigeons, 
how the probability and amount of reinforcement affects the speed of the pacemaker.  In 
Experiment 1a pigeons performed a discrimination task and the magnitude and probability 
of reinforcement was manipulated.  There were three key lights.  At the start of the trial the 
centre key was illuminated red for a 4-s period (‘short’) or for a 12-s period (‘long’).  Upon 
the termination of the red key light, both the left and right response keys were illuminated 
with white light.  Reponses to the left key, following a 4-s period, were correct and 
responses to the right key were correct following a 12-s period for half of the pigeons.  The 
reverse was true for the other half of the pigeons.  Correct responses resulted in 3-s access 
to reinforcement (grain) followed by a 10-s ITI.  Incorrect responses initiated the ITI.  The 
session ended when 50 reinforcers had been delivered.  After the pigeons began to 
successfully discriminate (the training period), two procedural changes were made.  Firstly, 
reinforcement was delivered for fifty-percent of correct responses made and the ITI was 
initiated for correct responses that were not reinforced.  Secondly, a non-correction 
procedure was used, where stimuli were scheduled independently of the choice made on the 
previous trial.  After the discrimination training ended, probe tests were conducted.  Five 
probe trials comprised one half of the trials within each session and were presented equally 
often at arithmetically spaced durations.  Reinforcement was delivered only for the non-
probe trials, with equal presentations of the ‘short’ and ‘long’ stimulus conditions.  Under 
probe testing (which began immediately after discrimination training ended), two 
manipulations were implemented.  Firstly, the amount of the reinforcement (grain) that 
pigeons received was altered by changing the duration of the hopper cycle.  The durations 
were in the following order: 3 s, 6 s, 1.5 s and 6 s.  The second manipulation consisted of 
changing the reinforcement probability rate, so that correct responses were reinforced on 
either 20% or 80% of trials, counterbalanced across pigeons.  Reinforcement duration and 
ITI access remained constant at 3 s and 10 s respectively.  Probability levels were changed 
every ten sessions.  On the .80 schedule, the session ended after 60 reinforcers had been 
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delivered and on the .20 schedule, the session ended after 40 reinforcers had been 
delivered.  Results of this experiment were not significant in that pigeons did not estimate 
time as predicted (i.e., the rate of the pacemaker was not increased).   
In Experiment 1b, the ITI was varied to assess if this would affect the pigeons’ 
timing behaviour.  The procedure was similar to Experiment 1a, except for the following 
differences.  A 10-s and a 100-s ITI were used and these were counterbalanced across 
pigeons and correct responses were reinforced at a .50 ratio.  Pigeons were trained for 20 
sessions with their respective ITI values before the probe trials began.  The house light 
flashed on and off for 3 s preceding a trial to indicate to the pigeon that it should attend to 
the onset of the left or right key light (in the hope that the ITI would be incorporated into 
the reinforcement context).  Sessions ended after fifty reinforcers had been delivered and 
the ITI was changed every ten sessions in accordance with an ABA design.  Results were 
varied and did not show that the ITI had a significant effect on pigeon’s timing behaviour.    
In Experiment 2, a titration procedure was used where an adjustment was repeatedly 
made to the value of the longer stimulus.  This enabled a comparison to be made with the 
constant short stimulus value, the difference between the two being a measure of timing 
accuracy.  Thus, on each trial a standard signal (8 s) and a comparison signal were 
presented.  The duration of the comparison signal was increased or decreased contingent 
upon how correct the pigeon’s responses were and this constituted the titration procedure, 
where performance was established at a 75% correct criterion (e.g., if a pigeon responded 
correctly on 75% of the trials, then the comparison signal duration length was not changed).  
There were three groups; an ITI group, where the ITI was either 10 s or 100 s; an amount 
group, where pigeons had access to reinforcement for 1.5 s or 6 s, and a probability group, 
where correct responses were reinforced at a 25% or 75% probability.  These manipulations 
were delivered using an ABAB design.  Results showed that the manipulations of 
probability and amount of reinforcement influenced pigeons’ timing behaviour as predicted 
by BeT, whereas manipulation of the ITI did not have the desired effect.   
 Morgan et al. (1993) also tested the hypothesis that changes in the rate of 
reinforcement will affect the rate of an internal pacemaker, as predicted by BeT.  Pigeons 
were pre-trained on a temporal discrimination task, where responses on the left key were 
reinforced after a centre key was illuminated for 10 s (Short) and responses on the right key 
were reinforced after the centre key had been illuminated for 20 s (Long).  In the first ten 
sessions, correct responses were reinforced and a 3-s blackout occurred for incorrect 
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responses.  A repetition of the trial was repeated for incorrect responding.  During the last 
ten sessions, the probability of reinforcement for a correct response was reduced to 0.5 and 
a 3-s blackout followed responses made on the un-reinforced trials.  Pre-training ended 
after forty sessions and each session ended after sixty reinforcers had been delivered.  After 
pre-training, baseline responding was established.  During this condition, correct responses 
were reinforced at a probability of 0.25 and on 75% of trials the short (10-s) and long (20-s) 
durations were presented.  On the remaining 25% of trials, a 14-s probe was used to assess 
temporal discrimination.  All responses were followed by a 3-s blackout.  The average 
inter-food interval ranged between 60 s and 70 s.  The baseline condition ended after 
twenty sessions, with sessions ending after sixty reinforcers had been delivered.  The 
reinforcement rate was then manipulated by increasing and decreasing the length of the 
inter-food interval (IFI) (i.e., during a fast bias condition there was a 10-s IFI, whereas 
during a slow bias condition, the IFI was 60 s).  Reinforcers were freely delivered and there 
were eight sessions.  After reinforcement manipulation, pigeons were tested, by doing the 
temporal discrimination task in extinction (i.e., where responses were not reinforced) to 
measure the effects of the increased and decreased reinforcement rates.  Each session had 
112 trials and this condition ended after two sessions.  After the testing condition, one 
session was conducted where reinforcement was made available to test pigeon’s timing 
relative to the previous extinction condition.  At the end of this condition, pigeons were 
placed back on baseline condition.  Morgan et al. (1993) found that pigeons that were 
exposed to the higher rates of reinforcement, estimated time as slowing down and pigeons 
that were exposed to lower rates of reinforcement, estimated time as speeding up upon 
returning to baseline.  
Bizo and White (1997) conducted a study that compared the predictive accuracy of 
two timing theories, scalar expectancy theory (SET) and BeT.  SET assumes that temporal 
estimates involve information processing components.  These components are an internal 
pacemaker, a comparator and memory.  The pacemaker emits pulses which are counted by 
an accumulator.  These counts are then stored in long-term or reference memory.  Timing 
for animals occurs by comparing the pulse count in reference memory with the count in 
working memory (the count currently in the accumulator).  Responses are based on the 
ratio between these two counts.  Or in other words, an animal responds based on the ratio of 
an immediate expectancy of time to reinforcement to an overall expectancy of time to 
reinforcement.  Thus, when the time interval between the local expectancy to reinforcement 
 83
and the overall expectancy to reinforcement changes, animals rescale their time estimates in 
accordance with Weber’s law.  Weber’s law, when applied to temporal perception, states 
that “the just noticeable difference, ∆, between two stimulus durations is a constant 
proportion, k, of do, the shorter of the two values” (Allan, 1979, p. 343).  When the relative 
differences between two durations are held constant, according to Weber’s law, they will be 
equally discriminable.  Consequently, the standard deviation and the mean of temporal 
estimates are proportional to the timed duration (T).  This results in the formation of a 
constant coefficient of variation (i.e., the Weber fraction) and is known as the scalar 
property.  BeT predicts that the Weber fraction should decrease with increases in the 
interval being timed, whereas SET predicts that the Weber fraction should remain constant 
irrespective of trial duration length.   
 On a two-alternative free operant psychophysical procedure using pigeons, similar 
to that used previously (Bizo & White, 1995a; 1994a; 1994b), reinforcer density, total 
reinforcement duration divided by total session duration, was kept constant whilst the 
timing interval was varied.  This allowed for the assessment of whether the Weber fraction 
would remain constant or not in accordance with the predictions of the two theories.  Bizo 
and White (1997) found that the pacemaker rate varied contingent upon the length of the 
trial and not as a function of reinforcement rate as predicted by BeT (i.e., Weber’s law was 
found to remain constant over those manipulations in accordance with the prediction of 
SET).    
Procedural differences in other research have included putting pigeon’s behaviour in 
extinction (Killeen, Hall & Bizo, 1999; Morgan, et al., 1993).  Killeen et al. (1999) tested 
the prediction that, in extinction, the rate at which the internal pacemaker emits pulses 
would decrease.  Using a standard operant chamber, pigeons were trained, during the 
baseline condition, to discriminate what response would lead to reinforcement.  Two key 
lights were illuminated at the start of each trial.  A response on the left key during the first 
30 s of the trial was reinforced and a response on the right key was not.  During the second 
30 s of the trial a response on the right key was reinforced and a response on the left key 
was not.  Each trial was separated by a 10-s ITI and reinforcement was delivered on a VI 
40-s schedule.  In the extinction condition, the only difference to the baseline condition was 
that responses on either of the two keys did not produce reinforcement.  The results showed 
that during extinction the rate of the internal pacemaker slowed down compared to the rate 
at which pulses were emitted from the pacemaker during the baseline condition.   
 84
Morgan et al. (1993), who tested whether changes in the reinforcement rate affect 
changes in the pacemaker rate with pigeons, also tested, as part of their experimental 
procedure, the effect of zero reinforcement (i.e., extinction) on pigeon’s temporal 
discriminative ability.  Pigeons were exposed to higher and lower rates of reinforcement 
than those they had previously been exposed to in an initial baseline period and then were 
returned once more to the baseline condition.  However, pigeons were also exposed to 
conditions where there was no reinforcement available.  The results showed that during 
extinction the rate of the pacemaker slowed, as predicted by BeT.   
Other studies have addressed how issues of the reinforcement context (e.g., the ITI 
and the type of stimulus used) affect the speed of the pacemaker (Beam, Killeen, Bizo & 
Fetterman, 1998; Bizo & White, 1995b; Fetterman & Killeen, 1991).  In Fetterman and 
Killeen’s (1991) study, the reinforcement context was the ITI, the duration of which was 
varied.  A key light was used to signal to pigeons that the ITI was part of the reinforcement 
context.  For example, if a pigeon’s timing behaviour was affected by changes in the length 
of the ITI in an experimental session, then this may influence timing, in addition to the 
potential effects of reinforcer amount and probability (which this study also investigated).  
The manipulation of the ITI did not influence pigeons’ timing ability.  Thus, any effect of 
the reinforcement context was contingent upon whether or not the contextual changes are 
taken into account by the organism.   
Beam et al. (1998) examined how the experimental context affects the speed of the 
pacemaker.  This was achieved by varying how reinforcement was signalled to pigeons 
during a session.  Two experiments were conducted and in both of them there were separate 
conditions that signalled reinforcement differently.  In the first experiment, a standard 
operant chamber was used, where half of the trials began with the onset of a left key and 
half began with the onset of a right key.  There were three conditions.  In the first condition, 
the left key responses were reinforced on an FI 20-s schedule and right responses were 
reinforced on a FI 40-s schedule.  The second condition was the same as the first except 
that only the left or the right key was lit throughout the session, rather than alternating 
illumination across keys as it was done in the first condition.  The third condition replicated 
the first condition.  In the second experiment, a psychophysical procedure was used where 
pigeons pecked either a left or right key to distinguish between either a short or a long 
duration.  Reinforcement was delivered when a correct choice was made.  Results from 
both experiments showed that different experimental contexts affected changes in the 
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pacemaker speed of the pigeons by signalling changes in the reinforcement rate using 
strong discriminative stimuli.   
Bizo and White (1995b) tested whether changes in the rate of the pacemaker were a 
function of reinforcers from different contexts (i.e., reinforcers that were not directly 
related to temporal estimation).  In a free operant psychophysical procedure, pigeons 
responded on the left or the right key of a 50-s trial.  Reinforcement was delivered on the 
left key for the first 25 s of the trial and on the right key for the second 25 s of the trial, 
using independent variable interval schedules.  There were fourteen conditions.  In the first 
three conditions, reinforcement on the left and right keys was delivered according to a VI 
60-s schedule.  Extraneous reinforcement (reinforcers that are unrelated to temporal 
estimation) was also delivered when the centre key was illuminated red during the ITI only, 
independent of reinforcement delivered on the side keys.  Delivery of reinforcement during 
the ITI was on a VI 10-s schedule in Conditions 1 and 3 and on a VI 20-s schedule in 
Condition 2.  In Conditions 4 to 9, VI 50-s schedules were used on the left and right keys.  
Extraneous reinforcement was delivered throughout both the trial and the ITI, on VI 240-s, 
VI 120-s (for two conditions), VI 60-s and VI 30-s schedules.  There was also an extinction 
condition.  In Conditions 10 to 14, VI 50-s schedules were used on the left and right keys.  
Extraneous reinforcement was delivered throughout the trial only, on VI 240-s (for two 
conditions), VI 60-s and VI 30-s schedules.  There was also an extinction condition.  Bizo 
and White (1995b) found that changes in the pacemaker rate were contingent upon changes 
in the reinforcement rate that were directly related to the temporal discrimination an 
organism makes and not to reinforcers from other contexts not directly associated with the 
estimation task.   
The animal studies that have just been described, investigated the timing abilities of 
pigeons from a BeT perspective.  The results of these studies suggest that BeT provides a 
functional and reliable explanation of animal timing behaviour.  Manipulation of the 
reinforcement rate does affect an organisms’ perception of time passing.  It remains to be 
seen however, whether BeT can explain human timing behaviour as reliably as it explains 
animal timing behaviour.  The next set of studies to be described have investigated timing 
from a BeT perspective for humans, as well as comparing timing abilities across species. 
Wearden et al. (1999) manipulated the rate of a hypothesised internal clock in 
humans.  A click-train technique (Triesman, Faulkner, Naish & Brogan, 1990) was used, 
where a train or series of repetitive stimuli (i.e., clicks) preceded a target stimulus (e.g., a 
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tone).  When a click-train preceded the target stimulus, the rate of the internal pacemaker 
would speed up (Wearden et al., 1999).  The procedure involved the presentation (using a 
computer and speakers) of a standard and a comparison stimulus (a tone).  Participants 
pressed the space bar on the computer keyboard to begin a trial.  A 5-s delay followed the 
spacebar press before the presentation of the standard tone.  Following the end of the 
standard presentation, a 5-s delay period occurred, before the presentation of the 
comparison tone.  The standard and comparison stimulus were both of equal duration.  The 
delay period could either be silent or filled by clicks (1000 Hz tones, 10 ms long).   
Participants were asked whether the comparison tone was longer or shorter than the 
standard tone.  The overall conclusion was that when clicks preceded the comparison 
stimulus the pacemaker rate slowed down, whereas the pacemaker rate sped up when clicks 
preceded the standard stimulus.   
The differences in how pigeons and humans estimate time has also been 
investigated (Fetterman, Dreyfus & Stubbs, 1989; 1993; 1996).  The basic procedure used 
in these three studies has required pigeons and humans to compare two different durations, 
indicating which duration length was longer or whether it was the same or different.  In 
some cases, the differences in duration were also based on a criterion ratio, where a 
judgment was made indicating whether the difference between the two durations was less 
than or greater than a certain ratio (e.g., 3:1).  In other cases, judgments were based on 
instructional rules, where information was provided to participants, prior to the 
commencement of trial, about the choice participants had to make about the duration 
lengths.  Fetterman et al. (1989; 1993; 1996) found that humans judged durations on ratio-
based tasks less accurately than pigeons, whereas humans could judge more accurately than 
pigeons which task was longer or shorter in a straight comparison trial.  Instructional 
information also affected performance, where the estimates of participants who were told 
about the different relational rules of their trials, were more accurate for the ratio and same-
different judgements than the estimates of participants who were not given information.    
In another study comparing the behaviour of species, Fetterman and Killeen (1992) 
used psychophysical procedures in four experiments to assess the abilities of humans and 
pigeons to discriminate small duration intervals.  For pigeons, a standard three-key operant 
chamber was used.  At the beginning of a trial, a peck to the illuminated centre key light 
extinguished it.  A delay was now operating and when it timed out, the two side keys were 
lit.  Pigeons then pecked the left key if the delay had been short or pecked the right key if 
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the delay had been long.  Correct responses were reinforced by receiving 3-s access to 
grain, followed by a 10-s ITI.  Humans were verbally told a description of the task and 
were seated in a dark room, with panels that could be reached and pressed, analogous to the 
operant chamber for pigeons.  The programming was the same as that used for the pigeons.  
Correct responses resulted in a 300-ms feedback flash of the house-light, followed by a 1-s 
ITI.  The ITI directly followed an incorrect response.  
In Experiment 1, humans and pigeons discriminated between whether a fixed short 
duration or a longer variable duration period had been presented to them.  In Experiment 2, 
pigeons repeated the same task as in Experiment 1 but with different durations for the short 
and long periods on fifty percent of the trials within a session.  On the remaining fifty 
percent of trials, which were un-reinforced probe trials, pigeons discriminated duration 
periods that ranged between the duration lengths used in the discrimination trials. 
Experiment 3 tested whether changes in non-temporal cues (i.e., the brightness of the centre 
key light) were affecting pigeon’s temporal estimates but it was found that non-temporal 
cues were not affecting estimates.  In Experiment 4, pigeon’s timing ability was tested at 
very small duration periods (which ranged from 0 ms to 1 s) and it was found that pigeons 
do maintain constant accuracy at these duration intervals.  Fetterman and Killeen (1992) 
claimed that, overall, the results from the four experiments showed that estimates of 
duration between the two species were comparable.  
 The animal and human studies on timing described above had as their theoretical 
foundation, BeT.  BeT is one theoretical approach that has been used, predominantly in 
animal studies, but also in human studies to explain temporal perception.  The results of the 
timing studies described above suggest that BeT provides a theoretical basis from which to 
make predictions about animal and human estimates of duration.  In the context of doing a 
jigsaw puzzle, it might be that a reinforcer is successfully moving a puzzle piece.  When a 
puzzle piece is moved, a participant gets feedback on whether the move resulted in further 
completion of the puzzle or not.  Thus, manipulation of the number of pieces that can be 
moved per unit time could be argued to be equivalent to manipulation of the reinforcement 
rate.  
In the first series of task complexity experiments, attempts were made to vary task 
complexity by increasing and decreasing the number of puzzle pieces in the jigsaw puzzle.  
There was no difference in the number of puzzle pieces able to be moved per unit time 
between the simple and complex conditions, since the rate or speed at which puzzle pieces 
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could be moved was not manipulated.  Thus, it may be that because no attempt was made in 
the first series of task complexity experiments to control the number of puzzle pieces that 
could be moved per unit time, thereby affecting the reinforcement rate, that subsequent 
estimates of duration made by participants were not as expected.  According to BeT, simply 
changing the number of puzzle pieces in the jigsaw will not affect changes in the 
reinforcement rate.  The next series of experiments was designed, based on the behavioral 
theory of timing principles, to manipulate the reinforcement rate provided by the jigsaw 
task, to assess the effect this had on participants’ estimates of duration.  
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EXPERIMENT 7 
 
The aim of this experiment was to try and manipulate the rate of reinforcement 
provided by the jigsaw puzzle to see if this would affect participants’ estimates of duration.  
Sumpter and McEwan (2003) found that, with humans, visual perceptual outcomes (i.e., 
moving pieces within a computer generated jigsaw puzzle such as the present one) 
maintained behaviour within an experimental session.  In their study, participants were 
required to do a 25-piece computer generated jigsaw puzzle.  Participants had to click the 
computer mouse button several times, depending on the condition operating, to enable a 
puzzle piece to be moved.  The number of clicks was increased from 2 to 512 within the 
session.  Participants continued responding to move the puzzle pieces at these high 
response requirements.  Sumpter and McEwan (2003) argued that the periodic presentation 
of perceptual outcomes can serve as reinforcers for adult humans in the same way as 
traditional reinforcers, such as food and water do for animals.  In another study, Case 
(1995) used a popular computer generated game (i.e., Star Trek) to examine observing 
behaviours, which Dinsmoor (1983) suggested are attentional responses maintained by the 
informative properties of stimuli.  Participants were required to engage enemy forces and 
defend themselves.  The reinforcing stimuli were the discovery and destruction of enemy 
forces.  Case (1995) argued that such technologies, once standardised through further 
research and testing, would allow for the valid experimental manipulation of reinforcement 
contingencies to conduct human operant research.  It was assumed for the present study that 
the movement of a puzzle piece to a new location provided the reinforcement that 
maintained behaviour on the jigsaw task.  If this assumption is correct, then moving more 
pieces in a set time should be equivalent to gaining a higher rate of reinforcement and 
moving fewer pieces should be equivalent to a drop in reinforcement rate.  
In testing the BeT prediction, that reinforcement rate affects an organism’s 
perception of time passing, several changes were required to the procedures used in the 
previous task complexity experiments.  First, the complexity dimension was removed, as 
complexity was no longer being manipulated.  Second, the number of estimates made was 
increased.  For this experiment, the session was divided up into four 12-min long 
experimental conditions.  The attempt to manipulate reinforcement rate involved decreasing 
the distance that a puzzle piece could be moved on the computer screen relative to the 
distance which the computer mouse was moved.  This manipulation should result in a 
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decrease in the number of pieces that could be moved within the session.  Given the fact 
that each condition was in effect for 12 min here, the numbers of pieces moved in a 
condition is directly equivalent to the rate of movement, and so the number of pieces 
moved in a condition will be referred to as the rate of movement or rate of reinforcement. 
As in the previous experiments, the participants had to estimate the duration of various time 
intervals as this had been found, in earlier experiments, to be a reliable way of obtaining 
estimates of duration.  The final procedural change consisted of getting participants to 
record their estimates on a flip sheet pad.  This was to avoid any effect that the previous 
estimate might have had on the next one.  It was hoped that the results of this experiment 
would show if the rate of moving pieces affects a person’s perception of time passing.  
 
Method 
  
Participants 
 
Twelve participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P7.1 
to P7.12.   
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
 
 The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 4 except for five differences.  
A thirty-six piece puzzle was always displayed and the number of estimates that 
participants were required to make was increased from 32 to 48.  The session was divided 
into four 12-min conditions and in each condition the participants were asked to estimate 
the time that had passed from the last estimate 12 times.  The interval durations that were 
required to be estimated are given in Table 7.1 in the order they were presented in each 
condition.  The order of the intervals in the third condition was the same as those in the first 
condition and the order of the intervals in the fourth condition was the same as those in the 
second condition.   
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Table 7.1 
Intervals and the order in which they were presented, for each 12-minute 
condition at which participants estimated duration. 
 
Interval durations 
12-min Conditions (in seconds) 
1 2 3 4 
60  30 60 30 
30 120 30 120 
15 45 15 45 
90 60 90 60 
45 15 45 15 
120 90 120 90 
15 45 15 45 
90 120 90 120 
30 30 30 30 
45 90 45 90 
120 15 120 15 
60   60 60 60 
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There was a proportional linear relationship between the distance a puzzle piece 
could be moved and the movement of the computer mouse.  That is, the distance the 
computer mouse-ball travelled when moved by a participant resulted in a smaller distance 
travelled by the puzzle piece when the cursor was placed over a puzzle piece.  The 
proportional relationship was changed depending on which experimental condition was in 
effect.  In Condition 1, the distance travelled by the puzzle piece was slowed to one-half of 
that of the computer mouse.  In Condition 2, the distance travelled was slowed to one-
quarter of that of the computer mouse.  In Condition 3, the distance was slowed to one-
eighth of that of the computer mouse and in Condition 4, it was slowed again to one-half of 
the distance travelled of that of the computer mouse.   
Participants recorded their time estimates on a flip sheet pad, where each page was 
turned or ‘flipped’ over once an estimate was recorded.  The estimation method, where 
participants engage in a task and then estimate how long they think they have been doing 
that task, when prompted, was used throughout the entire experiment.  As in the previous 
experiments, participants were escorted into the computer laboratory by the Experimenter.  
Each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to read the sheet of instructions.  
The instructions were as follows: 
 
Introduction: 
This experiment involves working with jigsaw puzzles where you move pieces around to 
complete a picture. You will be required to estimate the time you think you have been 
working on the puzzle.  Please read the steps below to familiarise yourself with the 
experimental procedure.  
 
Step 1:  In the experiment, a puzzle with a number of squares will be displayed on the computer 
screen.  Each of these squares is part of a picture you will see in the top left hand corner of 
the computer screen. Your task is to use the mouse to move the pointer over a square and  
depress the left mouse button to drag that square to a new location. You can repeat this until 
you have completed the puzzle. 
 
Step 2: Throughout the experiment a box will appear in the centre of the computer screen  
 asking you to estimate how long you think you have been doing the puzzle. You  
 may write your estimate in terms of minutes or seconds or both on the flip pad   
 provided.  Once you have written down your estimate on the flip pad turn the page  
 over in preparation for writing down the next estimate.  Now use the mouse to move  
 the pointer over the ‘Continue’ button situated below the estimation instructions and 
 depress the left mouse button to start the puzzle again.  If you have any questions please ask 
 them now.  You may start the experiment by using the mouse to move the pointer over the 
 ‘Start’ button and depress the left mouse button to begin. 
 
Once any questions were answered, the Experimenter asked the participant to remove their 
watch, if they were wearing one, and informed the participant that it would be returned at 
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the end of the experiment.  The Experimenter then told the participant they could start when 
ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further communication between the 
Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the session, when the participant 
was debriefed as to the aim of the experiment.  
 
Results 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which 
participants were required to make their estimates, in each condition, plotted against the 
number of successive estimates made throughout the session.  Figure 7.2 shows the 
averages of these logarithms for each condition.  It was expected that participants would 
estimate duration as passing more slowly in C2, where the distance travelled by the puzzle 
piece in proportion to the distance travelled by the computer mouse was less than the 
distance travelled in C1 and C4, and that they would estimate time as passing even more 
slowly in C3 than in C1, C2 or C4.  This would be seen by more overestimation (i.e., higher 
data points, in C2 than in C1 and C4) and even more overestimation (i.e., even higher data 
points) in C3 than in C1, C2 and C4. 
The data in Figure 7.1 are very variable within each condition.  Between conditions, 
there are some cases where C2 data tend to be higher than C1 data (e.g., P7.3, P7.5 and 
P7.6) and some where C3 data tend to be higher than C2 data (e.g., P7.5 and P7.8) as was 
predicted.  In no case do the data increase over C1 to C2 to C3 and then decrease again in 
C4.  In fact, the data vary somewhat unsystematically across participants and conditions.  
The mean data in Figure 7.2 confirm that what differences there were between conditions 
were small and that any changes across conditions were unsystematic.   
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the manipulation of 
the computer mouse and the time at which estimates were made, as within-subject 
variables.  The ANOVA compared the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the 
actual times at which participants were required to make their estimates, for the computer 
mouse manipulation and for the actual times at which estimates were made.  There was no 
main effect of the distance at which the computer mouse was moved upon the participants’ 
estimates of duration (F (3, 33) = 1.660, p > .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .131).  
There was a main effect of the times at which estimates were made                                   
(F (5, 55) = 5.221, p < .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .322).  Pairwise 
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comparisons showed that the log ratios from the 15-s interval were significantly different to 
those from the other intervals (p <.05).  There was no interaction between the distance the 
computer mouse was moved and the times at which estimates were made                           
(F (15, 165) = .928, p > .05).   
Figure 7.3 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, together with 
the 95-percent confidence interval, averaged over all participants’ data, plotted against the 
actual times.  The log ratios show that participants’ estimates of duration tended to decrease 
as the times at which estimates were made increased, although it appears that estimates did 
not continue to decrease from the 60-s interval onwards.  Duration was overestimated more 
at the 15-s interval than for any of the other intervals.   
 Figure 7.4 shows the total number of pieces moved by each participant in each 
condition in the experiment.  All but P7.1, P7.6, P7.7 and P7.10 moved more pieces in 
Condition 2 than in Condition 1.  P7.1 and P7.10 moved fewer pieces in Condition 2 than 
in Condition 1 and P7.6 and P7.7 moved the same number of pieces in Condition 2 as in 
Condition 1.  All but P7.1, P7.2, P7.10 and P7.11 moved fewer pieces in Condition 3 than 
in Condition 2.  P7.10 moved more pieces in Condition 3 than in Condition 2.  P7.1, P7.2 
and P7.11 moved approximately the same number of pieces in Condition 3 and Condition 
2.  In Condition 4, all participants moved more pieces than in any of the previous three 
conditions.  A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the number of 
pieces moved in each condition as the within-subject variable.  The ANOVA compared the 
number of pieces moved for the computer mouse manipulation.  There was a main effect of 
the computer mouse manipulation on the number of pieces that could be moved                 
(F (3, 44) = 5.696, p < .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .280).  Pairwise comparisons 
showed that the numbers of pieces moved in Condition 4 were significantly different from 
the numbers moved in the other three conditions (p <.05).  The number of pieces moved in 
Condition 3 were not significantly different from the numbers moved in Conditions 1 and 2 
(p >.05) and the numbers of pieces moved in Condition 1 were not significantly different 
from the numbers moved in Condition 2 (p >.05).         
 
 
Discussion 
 
 In this experiment, an attempt was made to manipulate the rate of moving the 
jigsaw pieces (i.e., the reinforcement rate).  The results showed however, that the  
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 Figure 7.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                         actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,   
   plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
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reinforcement rate was not manipulated as expected.  In fact there were no consistent 
differences in the number of pieces moved in Conditions 1, 2 and 3, when a reduction in 
Condition 2 and in Condition 3 had been expected.  In addition, the ANOVA results and 
Figure 7.3 showed that significantly more pieces were moved in Condition 4, than in any of 
the previous three conditions.  It had been expected that the number of pieces moved in 
Condition 4 would be the same as the number of pieces moved in Condition 1 because the 
distance the computer mouse could be moved in Condition 4 was the same as in     
Condition 1.  However, the actual obtained rate of movement was the fastest in      
Condition 4.  As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Morgan et al. (1993) found that pigeons 
exposed to a high rate of reinforcement estimated duration as longer upon returning to 
baseline (with lower reinforcement rates) than did pigeons returning to baseline after being 
exposed to lower reinforcement rates.  Thus, it might be expected that, as participants 
moved more pieces in Condition 4 once the restrictions were removed, time would be 
estimated as going faster. That there were no consistent differences in the relative estimates 
of duration in Condition 4 as compared to the other three conditions, suggests that the 
participants’ estimates of duration were not affected by this ability to increase the number 
of pieces moved. 
 In this experiment, there was an effect of the actual times at which estimates were 
made on participant’s estimates of duration at the 15-s interval.  This result is similar to the 
results from Experiments 3 and 4, where there was also an effect of the actual times at 
small intervals (e.g., 30 s).  Thus, it appears that participants have a tendency towards 
overestimating duration more after a short time interval than after the longer ones (see 
Figure 7.3). 
 BeT suggests that as the rate of reinforcement is reduced, an organism perceives 
duration to pass slower than if the reinforcement rate is increased.  In this experiment, the 
attempt to manipulate reinforcement rate did not work as planned and the participants’ 
estimates were not affected by controlling the distance that the computer mouse could 
travel.  The failure of the change in relative distance to reduce the number of pieces moved 
suggests that, in Conditions 2 and 3, participants were compensating for the experimental 
manipulation.  In addition, the increase in the number of pieces moved in Condition 4 (over 
and above the number moved in Condition 1) suggests that participants may have learnt 
that they needed to move the computer mouse greater distances before a puzzle piece could 
be successfully moved, and that this learning carried on into Condition 4.  Given the failure 
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to manipulate the number of pieces moved in predictable directions, a new procedure was 
needed to ensure that the participants could not compensate for the experimental 
manipulation.  With better experimental control over the number of pieces that could be 
moved, it would be possible to test whether there is an effect of the reinforcement rate on 
human’s estimates of duration.  The next experiment was designed to do this.  
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EXPERIMENT 8 
 
In the previous experiment participants appeared to learn to compensate for the 
reduced relative movement of the jigsaw pieces by moving the computer mouse faster.  
This next experiment aimed to remove the opportunity for participants to do this by setting 
the maximum speed at which a puzzle piece could be dragged.  It was hoped that this would 
reduce the number of pieces that could be moved during the intervention conditions.  This 
manipulation was chosen as it proved impossible to develop a workable method to control 
for the number of pieces moved directly.  The maximum speed was determined based on 
tests conducted by the Experimenter prior to the experiment commencing.  In the tests, the 
maximum number of pieces that could be moved during each of five 60-s trials was 
established.  The Experimenter’s test average was then used as the basis for setting the 
maximum speed a puzzle piece could be dragged in Condition 2, the first of the two 
intervention conditions.  Thus, in Condition 2, the maximum speed was set to half of the 
speed used in Condition 1 by the Experimenter when he established his test average.  The 
maximum speed in Condition 3 was set to be half of the speed employed in Condition 2.  
Thus, with the maximum drag speed fixed to be half of that the Experimenter achieved pre-
experimentally, a participant should have been able to move only half as many puzzle 
pieces as the Experimenter had been able to per unit time.  It was hoped that this change 
would reduce the number of pieces that a participant could move compared to the number 
they moved without this restriction.  It was recognised, however, that the degree to which 
the number moved depended on the free-rate of movement of the participant.  For example, 
if a participant moved the cursor at a slower rate than the new maximum when not 
restricted, then this manipulation would have little effect.  It was also recognised that 
slightly more pieces could be moved if a participant moved pieces only short distances.  It 
was expected that the participants would work on the puzzle in the usual manner by moving 
pieces all around the computer screen.  It was hoped that the maximum speed restrictions 
would reduce the number of pieces moved (i.e., the reinforcement rate) and so affect how 
participant’s estimated duration.   
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Method 
Participants 
 
Ten participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P8.1 to 
P8.10.   
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
Procedure 
 
In this procedure, as in Experiment 7, participants made 48 estimates of duration, 
twelve in each 12-min condition and they recorded their estimates on flip-sheet pads.  The 
major difference from Experiment 7 was that the maximum speed at which each puzzle 
piece could be dragged in Conditions 2 and 3 was fixed.  This meant that participants could 
not move the computer mouse faster than this maximum in an attempt to increase their 
reinforcement rate.  In Conditions 1 and 4, there were no speed restrictions.  As previously 
mentioned, the maximum speed at which the computer mouse could be moved was derived 
from pre-experimental tests conducted by the Experimenter.  The Experimenter’s test 
average was 96 (i.e., the maximum number of pieces he could move in a 60-s trial, 
averaged across five trials).  Based on this average, the maximum speed at which a puzzle 
piece could be dragged in Condition 2 was set so that only half as many pieces could be 
moved in Condition 2 as the Experimenter moved in Condition 1 (i.e., his test average).  
The number entered into the computer jigsaw programme file to set the maximum speed in 
Condition 2 was completely arbitrary, in that any number could have been used as long as it 
set the maximum speed.  To determine the number that was to be used to set the maximum 
speed in Condition 2, the Experimenter conducted more pre-experimental tests (i.e., ten 60-
s trials) until he was satisfied that he could only move as half as many pieces as he moved 
in Condition 1.  In Condition 3, the drag speed was set so as to be half of that in Condition 
2, by simply halving the number that was used in the computer jigsaw programme file in 
Condition 2.  This change again reduced the number of pieces could be moved by 
participants compared to Condition 2.  In Condition 4, as in Condition 1, there were no drag 
speed restrictions. 
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As in the previous experiments, participants were escorted into the computer 
laboratory by the Experimenter.  Each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to 
read the same sheet of instructions used in Experiment 7.  Any questions were answered 
and the Experimenter asked the participant to remove their watch, if they were wearing one, 
and informed the participant that it would be returned at the end of the experiment.  The 
Experimenter then told the participant they could start when ready.  The Experimenter 
remained in the room.  No further communication between the Experimenter and the 
participant occurred until the end of the session, when the participant was debriefed as to 
the aim of the experiment.  
 
Results 
 
 
Figure 8.1 shows the logarithms of the ratios of the estimates over the actual times 
at which participants were required to make their estimates, in each condition, plotted 
against the number of successive estimates made throughout the session.  Figure 8.2 shows 
the averages of these logarithms for each condition.  It was expected that participants would 
estimate time as passing more slowly in C2, where the drag speed was half of that in C1 
and C4, and that they would estimate time as passing even more slowly in C3 than in C1, 
C2 or C4.  This would be seen by more overestimation (i.e., higher data points, in C2 than 
in C1 and C4) and even more overestimation (i.e., even higher data points) in C3 than in 
C1, C2 and C4.  
The data in Figure 8.1 are very variable within each condition.  Between conditions, 
there are some cases where C2 data tend to be higher than C1 data (e.g., P8.6, P8.7, P8.9 
and P8.10).  However, it appears that time was not estimated as going slower in C3 than in 
C2 (as was expected) because the data in C3 do not tend to be higher than the data in C2.  
The mean data in Figure 8.2 confirm that the changes across conditions were unsystematic 
and that the differences there were between conditions were small.   
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the manipulation of 
the drag speed and the time at which estimates were made, as within-subject variables.  The 
ANOVA compared the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at 
which participants were required to make their estimates, for the drag speed manipulation 
and for the actual times at which estimates were made.  There was no main effect of the  
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speed at which a puzzle piece could be dragged, upon the participants’ estimates of 
duration (F (3, 27) = .340, p > .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .036).  There was a 
main effect of the times at which estimates were made (F (5, 45) = 10.909, p < .05) and the 
effect size was medium (ŋ = .548).  Pairwise comparisons showed that the log ratios from 
the 60-s interval were significantly different to those from the other intervals and the log 
ratios from the 15-s interval were significantly different to those from the 90-s and 120-s 
intervals (p <.05).  Log ratios from the 90-s interval were significantly different to those 
from the other intervals (p <.05) except the 120-s interval.  There was an interaction 
between the speed at which puzzle pieces could be dragged and the times at which 
estimates were made (F (15, 135) = 2.502, p < .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .218).     
 Figure 8.3 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, 
together with the 95-percent confidence interval, averaged over all participants’ data, 
plotted against the actual times.  The log ratios of participants’ estimates of duration tended 
to decrease as the times at which estimates were made increased, although at the 120-s 
interval estimates increased compared to those from the 90-s interval.  Duration was 
overestimated more at the 15-s interval than for any of the other intervals.    
 Figure 8.4 shows the total number of pieces moved in each condition by each 
participant.  All participants moved fewer pieces in Condition 2 than in Condition 1 and 
fewer pieces in Condition 3 than in Condition 2.  In Condition 4, all participants moved 
more pieces than in any of the previous three conditions.  A one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed, with the number of pieces moved in each condition as the within-
subject variable.  The ANOVA compared the number of pieces moved for the drag speed 
manipulation.  There was a main effect of the computer mouse manipulation on the number 
of pieces moved (F (3, 36) = 25.159, p < .05) and the effect size was large (ŋ = .677).  
Pairwise comparisons showed that the numbers of pieces moved in C4 were significantly 
different from those moved in C1, C2 and C4 (p <.05).  The number of pieces moved in C1 
were significantly different from the number moved in C3 (p <.05).        
   
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, a procedure that fixed the maximum speed at which a puzzle 
piece could be dragged was used to try and reduce the number of pieces moved, while, at 
the same time, reducing the ability of participants to compensate for this reduction.  As  
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Figure 8.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                        actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,   
  plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
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shown in Figure 8.4, in Conditions 2 and 3, where the maximum speed was fixed, fewer 
pieces were moved.  However, despite the fact the reinforcement rate was successfully 
manipulated, Figure 8.1 and the ANOVA results show that there was no effect on 
participants’ estimates as would be predicted from BeT.  Slowing down the maximum 
speed at which a puzzle piece could be moved did not affect the participants’ estimates of 
time passing in any consistent way.    
 In this experiment, there was an effect of the actual times at which estimates were 
made on participant’s estimates of duration.  As in the previous experiment and in 
Experiments 3 and 4, Figure 8.3 showed that participants tended to continue 
underestimating duration as the actual times at which estimates were made increased.  
 The behaviour of the participants doing the jigsaw puzzles was observed by the 
Experimenter during the experimental session.  The Experimenter observed that the way 
the participants moved the computer mouse was quite varied once the restriction started.  
For example, some participants lifted the computer mouse from the mouse-pad and then 
forced it back onto the mouse-pad very quickly during Conditions 2 and 3.  The 
Experimenter also heard other participants make barely audible verbal comments to 
themselves that the computer mouse was not working during both of these conditions.  
Thus, in the restricted speed conditions participants appeared to be changing their 
behaviour in an attempt to counteract the effects of the restriction.  The participants 
continued to attempt to do the jigsaw puzzle, even though during the manipulation 
condition they could not move as many puzzle pieces compared to the non-manipulation 
conditions.  It is possible that these changes in behaviour counteracted any effects of the 
speed manipulation on their estimates of duration.  For example, it might be possible that, 
like the participants in Experiment 7, these participants were also trying to compensate for 
the speed manipulation (even though the variable behaviour observed by the Experimenter 
would not result in more pieces being moved, since the drag speed was fixed).  The data in 
Condition 4 of Figure 8.4 show that more puzzle pieces were moved once the restrictions 
were lifted hence, it appears that the changes in the participants behaviour in Condition 2 
and Condition 3 carried over into Condition 4. 
In this experiment, the manipulation (i.e., reduction) of the reinforcement rate by 
fixing the maximum speed at which a puzzle piece was dragged was successful but this did 
not affect the participants’ estimates of duration.  It might be possible that this type of 
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manipulation does not signal to participants that there has been a change in the 
reinforcement rate.  Humans have a history of working with computers.  Perhaps a 
manipulation of a stimulus with which humans are more familiar with is required.  For 
example, something that is analogous to the computer hour-glass icon that appears and 
signals to a computer user that a waiting period is required before continuing.  If such a 
manipulation is successful, then perhaps participants will estimate duration as expected, or 
predicted by BeT.  The next experiment tested this possibility. 
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EXPERIMENT 9  
 
In the previous experiment, the speed at which a puzzle piece could be dragged was 
fixed so that the participants could not compensate for the manipulation of the 
reinforcement rate (as they did in Experiment 7).  Despite the fact that the reinforcement 
rate (i.e., the number of pieces that could be moved per unit time) was controlled 
successfully, the participants did not change their estimates of duration as predicted by BeT 
when reinforcement rate is varied (i.e., an organisms’ perception of time passing is affected 
by rates of reinforcement).  It was assumed in the previous two experiments (and in the 
current one) that controlling the number of puzzle pieces that can be moved per unit time is 
a manipulation of the reinforcement rate.  As discussed previously, it might be that simply 
slowing down the speed at which a puzzle piece could be moved did not indicate to the 
participants that the reinforcement rate had changed and did not, therefore, affect how they 
estimated duration.  Participants continued to work at the jigsaw puzzle by moving the 
computer mouse around, in some cases, quite erratically.  In this next experiment, an 
attempt was made to signal to the participants that there was a change in the reinforcement 
rate.  The stimuli to signal the change would, it was thought, be analogous to those used in 
computer usage, with which humans have a history.  Thus, it was expected that participants 
would learn that continual movement of the computer mouse would be ineffective in 
moving a puzzle piece.  It was hoped that the stimulus would signal a change in 
reinforcement rate and that this would influence the participant’s estimates of duration as 
predicted by BeT.  
   
Method  
 
Participants 
 
Seven participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P9.1 
to P9.7.  In this experiment, 2% was credited to their first-year Psychology course.    
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
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Procedure 
The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 8 except for two 
differences.  The first difference was operational, in that the cursor became inoperative for 
a set duration after each piece was moved in Conditions 2 and 3.  The duration of this 
inoperative period, termed here the delay, was 5 s in Condition 2 and 10 s Condition 3.  
Participants could still move the computer mouse around on the mouse pad during these 
delays but the computer cursor would not move until the interval to be estimated had 
elapsed.  The second difference was visual, in that a ‘fade in’ delay was also operating in 
Conditions 2 and 3.  The fade-in procedure operated after a piece was moved; at this point, 
all the other pieces, except the piece just moved, would become transparent and then ‘fade 
in’ until becoming fully visible again.  The duration of the fade was the same as the 
programmed delays.  So, after a participant moved a piece, simultaneously the computer 
curser became inoperative and the jigsaw pieces faded in, both for the same delay.  This 
meant that the participant could not move any more puzzle pieces until the delay had timed 
out.  In Condition 1 and in Condition 4, the cursor was always operative and there was no 
‘fade in’ procedure.  
As in previous the experiments, participants were escorted into the computer 
laboratory by the Experimenter.  Each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to 
read the same sheet of instructions used in Experiment 7.  Any questions were answered 
and the Experimenter asked the participant to remove their watch, if they were wearing one, 
and informed the participant that it would be returned at the end of the experiment.  The 
Experimenter then told the participant they could start when ready.  The Experimenter 
remained in the room.  No further communication between the Experimenter and the 
participant occurred until the end of the session, when the participant was debriefed as to 
the nature of the experiment.  
 
Results 
 
 Figure 9.1 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which 
participants were required to make their estimates, in each condition, plotted against the 
number of successive estimates made throughout the session.  There were nine data points 
(three in C2, C3 and C4 respectively) for P9.7 that are not shown on the plot due to a scale 
issue (i.e., the log-ratio was greater than 1 because the ratio was greater than 10/1).   
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 Figure 9.2 shows the averages of these logarithms for each condition and for each 
participant.  It was expected that participants would estimate time as passing more slowly 
in C2, where there was a 5-s delay operating, than in C1 and C4 where there was no delay 
operating, and that they would estimate time as passing even more slowly in C3, where 
there was a 10-s delay operating, than in C1, C2 or C4.  This would be seen by more 
overestimation (i.e., higher data points in C2 than in C1 and C4) and even more 
overestimation (i.e., even higher data points) in C3 than in C1, C2 and C4. 
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show that the data did not follow this pattern.  Figure 9.2 shows 
that 6 participants did, on average, overestimate more in C2 than in C1, as predicted.  
However, in no case was the average (of the logarithms) in C3 higher than that in C2.  
Figure 9.2 also showed that there were no systematic trends over all conditions and across 
participants’ data.     
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the conditions and the 
time at which estimates were made, as within-subject variables.  The ANOVA compared 
the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants 
were required to make their estimates, for the operational and visual manipulation and for 
the actual times at which estimates were made.  There was a main effect of the 
manipulation upon participants’ estimates of duration (F (3, 18) = 3.792, p < .05) and the 
effect size for the manipulation was small (ŋ = .387).  Pairwise comparisons showed that 
the log ratios from Condition 2 (where there was a 5-s delay) were significantly different to 
those from the other three conditions (p < .05).  There was a main effect of the times at 
which estimates were made (F (5, 30) = 3.877, p < .05) and the effect size was small          
(ŋ = .393).  Pairwise comparisons showed that the log ratios from the 15-s interval were 
significantly different to those from the 45-s and 120-s intervals.  There was no interaction 
between the conditions and the times at which estimates were made                                    
(F (55, 90) = .868, p < .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .126).  Figure 9.3 shows the 
logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, together with the 95-percent 
confidence interval, averaged over all participants’ data, plotted against the actual times.  
The log ratios of participants’ estimates of duration tended to decrease as the times at which 
estimates were made increased.  Duration was overestimated more at the 15-s and 30-s 
intervals than for any of the other intervals.    
Figure 9.4 shows the total number of pieces moved in each condition by each 
participant.  In Condition 2, all participants moved fewer pieces than in Condition 1.  In  
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Figure 9.2. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, plotted against 
each experimental condition. C1 & C4: no delay; C2: 5-s delay; C3: 10-s delay. 
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Figure 9.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                        actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,   
  plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
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Condition 3, all participants moved fewer pieces than in Condition 2, except P9.6 who 
moved the same number of pieces in Condition 3 as in Condition 2.  In Condition 4, all 
participants moved more pieces than in any of the previous three conditions.  A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the number of pieces moved in each 
condition as the within-subject variable.  The ANOVA compared the number of pieces 
moved for the operational and visual manipulation.  There was a main effect of the number 
of pieces that could be moved (F (3, 24) = 23.296, p < .05) and the effect size was large    
(ŋ = .744).  Pairwise comparisons showed that the number of pieces moved in C1 were 
significantly different from the number moved in C2, C3 and C4.  The number of pieces 
moved in C4 were significantly different from the number moved in C2 and C3 (p <.05).           
 
Discussion 
  
 In this experiment there was a delay introduced immediately after moving a puzzle 
piece before another puzzle piece could be moved.  The delay was indicated by the puzzle 
picture ‘fading in’ and the computer cursor being inoperative.  The delay did reduce the 
number of puzzle pieces that were moved in a session, hence the manipulation resulted in a 
reduction in the reinforcement rate.  The effect of the manipulation was statistically 
significant for only the 5-s delay and the effect size was small.  It is unclear why the effect 
was not observed in the 10-s delay condition.  However, given that the effect size was small 
for the 5-s delay condition, it is possible that the statistical result obtained here may not be 
reliable.   
 Figure 9.4 showed that fewer pieces were moved during the delay conditions than in 
the non-delay conditions and more pieces were moved in Condition 4 than in Condition 1.  
It appears that once the delays ended, the participants moved more puzzle pieces in 
Condition 4 than they had in Condition 1.  This trend was also observed in Experiments 7 
and 8.  It might be possible that the manipulations in these two experiments and in the 
current one only served to teach participants that a more varied response was needed which 
would enable them to continue moving pieces, rather than indicating to them that there was 
a change in the reinforcement rate and consequently, affect their estimates.   
 There was an effect of the actual times at which estimates were made on the 
participants’ estimates of duration.  Figure 9.3 showed that the participants tended to 
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continue underestimating duration more as the actual times at which estimates were made 
increased.  This trend was also observed in Experiments 7 and 8.  Duration was also 
overestimated more at the 15-s interval than for any of the other intervals in this and the 
previous two experiments.  It appears that being asked to make an estimate of duration after 
a short time results in a greater degree of error than if asked to make an estimate after a 
longer time (i.e., Figures 7.3, 8.3 and 9.3 showed that duration was estimated more 
accurately at the 120-s interval than at the 15-s interval).  Perhaps having more time to 
work on a puzzle enables a participant to make a more accurate estimate of the time that 
has passed.  However, if this assumption is correct, it would be expected that there would 
be less variability, which is not the case.  It is unclear why estimates are decreasing as the 
times at which estimates are made, increase.  
 The results from this experiment were not conclusive in showing that participants’ 
perception of time passing was reliably affected by signalling to them that a delay was in 
operation.  Beam et al. (1998) investigated how changes in the pacemaker speed of pigeons 
were affected by signalling changes in the reinforcement rate using strong discriminative 
stimuli.  Increasing the strength of the stimuli was expected to affect the speed of the 
pigeons’ pacemaker.  Beams et al.’s (1998) manipulation was successful at affecting the 
pigeons timing behaviour.  Thus, if the stimulus manipulation in this experiment had of 
been strong, as found by Beam et al. (1998) it would have been expected that there should 
have been a stronger effect and that the effect would have been across both delay 
conditions, rather than just one of them.  Nevertheless, the significant result found during 
the 5-s delay condition does suggest that further investigation is required.  The following 
experiment replicated Condition 2, the 5-s delay condition, to test the reliability of the 
statistical effect found for this condition. 
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EXPERIMENT 10 
 
In Experiment 9 an attempt was made to signal to the participants when a change in 
the reinforcement rate was occurring, so their behaviour would, hopefully, come under 
stimulus control.  A significant result was returned for the 5-s delay condition but not the  
10-s delay condition.  Given this, it could not be concluded that the visual stimulus reliably 
affected the participants’ estimates of duration.  The reliability of the result in the previous 
experiment was assessed in this experiment by replicating the 5-s delay condition.    
  
Method  
Participants 
 
Eight participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P10.1 
to P10.8.  In this experiment, 2% was credited to their first-year Psychology course.    
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 9 except for two 
differences.  The first difference was that the length of the simultaneous ‘fade in’ and the 
period during which the cursor was inoperative was 5 s (i.e., a 5-s delay).  The second 
difference was that the order in which the 5-s delay condition was presented was 
counterbalanced.  There were two groups of participants.  For the first group, Participants 
P10.1 to P10.4, the order of the conditions was as follows:  Condition 1, no delay; 
Condition 2, 5-s delay; Condition 3, no delay and Condition 4, 5-s delay.  The order was 
reversed for the second group, Participants P10.5 to P10.8, as follows:  Condition 1, 5-s 
delay; Condition 2, no delay; Condition 3, 5-s delay and Condition 4, no delay.  As in the 
previous experiments, participants were escorted by the Experimenter into the computer 
laboratory.  Each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to read the same sheet 
of instructions used in Experiment 7.  Any questions were answered and the Experimenter 
asked the participant to remove their watch, if they were wearing one, and informed the 
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participant that it would be returned at the end of the experiment.  The Experimenter then 
told the participant they could start when ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  
No further communication between the Experimenter and the participant occurred until the 
end of the session, when the participant was debriefed as to the aim of the experiment.  
 
Results 
 
 Figure 10.1 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which 
participants were required to make their estimates, in each condition, plotted against the 
number of successive estimates made throughout the session.  Figure 10.2 shows the 
averages of these logarithms for each condition.  It was expected that participants would 
estimate time as passing more slowly in the conditions where there was a 5-s delay 
operating than in conditions where there was no delay operating.  This would be seen by 
more overestimation (i.e., higher data points) in delay conditions than in the non-delay 
conditions.  Thus, it was predicted that the data in C2 and C4 would be high for P10.1 to 
P10.4 and the data in C1 and C3 would be high for P10.5 to P10.8.  Neither of these 
patterns was found for any participant.  The log ratios for P10.1, P10.3 and P10.4 show that 
these participants did not estimate duration more in C2 (a 5-s delay condition) compared to 
C1 (a non-delay condition) as expected, whereas P10.2 did.  P10.8 estimated duration in C1 
(a 5-s delay condition) more than in C2 (a non-delay condition).  Figure 10.2 also shows 
that the participants did not consistently estimate duration as the session progressed.  
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with condition and the time 
at which estimates were made, as within-subject variables and the order in which the 
conditions were presented as the between-subjects variable.  The ANOVA compared the 
means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants were 
required to make their estimates, for the operational and visual manipulation and for the 
actual times at which estimates were made.  There was no main effect of the manipulation 
(i.e., delay) upon participants’ estimates of duration (F (1, 6) = .521, p > .05) and the effect 
size for the manipulation was small (ŋ = .080).  There was however, a main effect of the 
times at which estimates were made (F (5, 30) = 6.517, p < .05) and the effect size was 
medium (ŋ = .521).  Pairwise comparisons showed that the log ratios from the 15-s interval 
were significantly different to those from the other intervals (p <.05) and those from the  
45-s interval were significantly different to the log ratios from the 60-s and 90-s intervals   
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(p <.05).  There was no between-treatments effect of presentation order  
(F (1, 6) = .024, p > .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .004).  There was an interaction 
effect of the delay and the times at which estimates were made   
(F (5, 30) = 3.401, p < .05).  The effect size for the interaction was small (ŋ = .362).  The 
analyses also showed that there were no significant interactions between any other 
combinations of delay, presentation order and the times at which estimates were made, at 
the .05 alpha level.   
 Figure 10.3 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times estimated, 
together with the 95-percent confidence interval, averaged over all participants’ data, 
plotted against the actual times.  The log ratios of participants’ estimates of duration tended 
to decrease as the times at which estimates were made increased.  Duration was 
overestimated more at the 15-s interval than for any of the other intervals.    
 Figure 10.4 shows the total number of pieces moved in each condition by each 
participant.  P10.1 to P10.4 moved fewer pieces in Conditions 2 and 4, the 5-s delay 
conditions, compared to Conditions 1 and 3, where there were no delays operating.  The 
conditions were presented in the reverse order for P10.5 through P10.8, compared to the 
first four participants.  P10.5 to P10.8 moved fewer pieces in Conditions 1 and 3, the 5-s 
delay conditions, compared to Conditions 2 and 4, where there were no delays operating.  A 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the number of pieces moved in 
each condition as the within-subject variable and the order in which the conditions were 
presented as the between-subjects variable.  The ANOVA compared the number of pieces 
moved for the operational and visual manipulation.  There was a main effect of the number 
of pieces that could be moved (F (3, 18) = 4.452, p < .05) and the effect size was small      
(ŋ = .426).  Pairwise comparisons showed that the numbers of pieces moved in Condition 1 
were significantly different from the numbers moved in Condition 3 (p <.05).  The numbers 
of pieces moved in Condition 2 were significantly different from the numbers moved in 
Conditions 3 and 4 (p <.05).  There was no between-treatments effect of the presentation 
order (F (1, 6) = .710, p > .05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .106).  There was an 
interaction effect between the numbers of pieces moved and the order in which the 
conditions were presented (F (3, 18) = 45.664, p < .05).  The effect size for the interaction 
was large (ŋ = .884).   
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Figure 10.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                        actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,   
  plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
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Discussion 
 
 This experiment tested the reliability of the effect found in Experiment 9.  The 
effect was not reproduced, as the changes in the reinforcement rate did not result in changes 
in how the participants estimated duration.  Figure 10.1 showed that there was variation in 
participants’ estimates throughout the experiment.  The order in which the conditions were 
presented was counterbalanced to control for order effects but none were found.  There was 
an interaction between the number of pieces moved and the order in which the conditions 
were presented.  This effect suggests an interdependence between pieces moved and 
condition.  Thus, more pieces would have been moved in a non-delay condition (or fewer 
pieces moved in a 5-s delay condition) irrespective of the order in which the conditions 
could have been presented.   
Figure 10.2 showed that fewer pieces were moved in the delay conditions compared 
to the non-delay conditions.  This suggests that manipulating the delay influenced the 
number of pieces that could be moved, resulting in control of the reinforcement rate.  
However, participants moved more pieces in the second non-intervention condition than in 
the first non-intervention condition.  This suggests that the participants kept on working at 
the jigsaw, increasing the number of pieces they moved as they continued trying to 
complete the puzzle.  In Experiment 9, participants also moved more pieces in the second 
non-intervention condition than in the first non-intervention condition.  It may be possible 
that manipulation of the stimuli in this and in the previous experiment may only serve to 
suggest to participants that they need to vary how they respond, rather than affecting how 
they estimate duration.  
BeT (Killeen & Fetterman, 1988, 1993) predicts that the reinforcement rate affects 
an organisms’ perception of time passing.  In the present series of experiments it was 
assumed that moving puzzle pieces was a reinforcer and thus, allowed for the manipulation 
of the reinforcement rate (i.e., moving more puzzle pieces in a set time should be equivalent 
to gaining a higher rate of reinforcement and moving fewer pieces should be equivalent to a 
drop in the reinforcement rate).  In Experiment 7, there was evidence that the reinforcement 
rate was not effectively controlled or manipulated.  Even when there was control of the 
reinforcement rate in the current experiment and in Experiments 8 and 9, manipulation of 
the number of puzzle pieces had no effect upon how long participants’ estimated the 
interval to be.  The results from this series of experiments brings into question the 
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assumption that moving puzzle pieces per unit time is a way to successfully manipulate the 
reinforcement rate, affecting how participants estimate duration.  This suggests that further 
investigation is needed into reassessing this assumption.   
The majority of BeT experimental studies have used animals as subjects and it 
appears that BeT predicts animals’ timing behaviour, in that animals’ timing behaviour 
comes under control of the reinforcement rate.  Previous studies with humans also support 
the predictions of BeT (Fetterman et al., 1993; Fetterman & Killeen, 1992).  However, this 
present series of experiments with humans failed to obtain results as predicted by BeT.  As 
mentioned above, moving puzzle pieces per unit time may not be a successful way of 
manipulating the reinforcement rate.  However, it may also be possible (if we assume that 
that moving puzzle pieces per unit time is a successful way of manipulating the 
reinforcement rate) that the attempts made to influence how participants estimated duration 
in this experimental series may not have indicated to participants that there had been a 
change in the reinforcement rate.  In Experiment 9 and consequently in the current 
experiment, this idea was tested and an attempt was made to signal to participants that there 
was a change in the reinforcement rate by using stimuli, it was hoped, that were analogous 
to those in computer usage with which humans have a history.  Although these changes did 
have an effect on the number of pieces that were moved, they did not affect estimates of 
duration.  It may be possible that a more extreme manipulation is required, one that will 
indicate to participants that there has been a change in the reinforcement rate.  The next 
experiment was designed to test this.  
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EXPERIMENT 11  
 
In Experiment 9 an attempt was made to signal to the participants that changes in 
the reinforcement rate were occurring by introducing a delay, where the picture puzzle 
‘faded in’ and the computer cursor was inoperative.  This was partially successful in that 
the 5-s delay intervention condition returned a statistically significant result, although the 
effect size was small.  Thus, in Experiment 10, this condition was replicated.  However, the 
statistically significant finding was not replicated.  Having failed to obtain control through 
previous manipulations of the reinforcement rate, it was decided to test the most extreme 
case, where the task was completely absent.  The rate was reduced to zero by removing the 
puzzle altogether.  If reinforcement was provided by having access to being able to do the 
jigsaw by successfully moving pieces this would make the rate zero when there was no 
puzzle.  It was hoped that this would affect participants’ estimates of duration.  Thus, in this 
next experiment, manipulation of the reinforcement rate occurred across the experimental 
session by providing periods in which the puzzle could be done and periods in which it was 
removed.   
 
   
Method  
Participants 
 
Eight participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as P11.1 
to P11.8.   
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
Procedure 
 
 The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 10 except the simultaneous 
5-s ‘fade in’ and inoperative cursor conditions that were operating in Experiment 10 were 
not used and the number of conditions within the session was increased from four to eight.  
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The order in which the conditions were presented for Participants P11.1 to P11.4 was as 
follows: Jigsaw-Blank-Jigsaw-Blank-Jigsaw-Blank-Jigsaw-Blank.  For Participants P11.5 
to P11.8, the order of presentation was reversed.  In the jigsaw condition, participants could 
do the puzzle without any programmed restrictions or manipulations.  In the blank screen 
condition, the entire computer screen went black and the jigsaw was not visible at all.  
During this period, participants had no access to being able to do the jigsaw puzzle.  
Participants had to sit and wait and were required to make an estimate of the time interval 
when the computer prompted them to do so.  When the blank condition timed out and the 
jigsaw reappeared on the screen, the participants were again given access to moving puzzle 
pieces.  The times at which participants were prompted by the computer to make their 
estimates of duration are given in Table 11.1.  The session was divided into eight 6-min 
conditions.  Initially, participants were asked to estimate the time that had passed since they 
began the experiment, and from then after, were asked to estimate the time that had passed 
since their previous estimate.  Six estimates were made within each condition, with 48 
estimates being made in total.   
As in the previous experiments, participants were escorted into the computer 
laboratory by the Experimenter.  Each participant sat down at a computer and was asked to 
read the sheet of instructions.  The instructions were as follows: 
 
 
Introduction: 
This experiment involves working with jigsaw puzzles where you move pieces around to 
complete a picture. You will be required to estimate the time you think you have been 
working on the puzzle.  Please read the steps below to familiarise yourself with the 
experimental procedure.  
 
 
Procedure:  
 In the experiment, a puzzle with a number of squares will be displayed on the computer 
screen.  Each of these squares is part of a picture you will see in the top left hand corner of 
the computer screen when you move the pointer over the preview button directly to the right 
of the target picture. Your task is to use the mouse to move the pointer over a square and 
depress the left mouse button to drag that square to a new location. You can repeat this until 
you have completed the puzzle. At other times, the screen will appear blank.  
  
Throughout the experiment a box will appear in the centre of the computer screen asking 
you to estimate how long you think you have been doing the puzzle or how long you think 
the blank period was. You may write your estimate in terms of minutes, seconds or both on 
the flip pad provided.  Once you have written down your estimate on the flip pad turn the 
page over in preparation for writing down the next estimate.  Now use the mouse to move 
the pointer over the ‘Continue’ button situated below the estimation instructions and 
depress the left mouse button to start the puzzle again. 
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 Table 11.1 
The times at which estimates were made for each   
6-minute condition.   
 
Times at which estimates were made (in seconds) 
6-min conditions  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
60  15 30 45 60  15 30 45 
30 90 120 120 30 90 120 120 
15 30 45 30 15 30 45 30 
90 45 60 90 90 45 60 90 
45 120 15 15 45 120 15 15 
120 60 90 60 120 60 90 60 
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If you have any questions please ask them now. You may start the experiment by using the 
mouse to move the pointer over the ‘Start’ button and depress the left mouse button to 
begin. 
                        
Any questions were answered and the Experimenter asked the participant to remove their 
watch, if they were wearing one, and informed the participant that it would be returned at 
the end of the experiment.  The Experimenter then told the participant they could start when 
ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further communication between the 
Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the session, when the participant 
was debriefed as to the nature of the experiment. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 11.1 shows the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which 
participants were required to make their estimates, in each condition, plotted against the 
number of successive estimates made throughout the session.  P11.1 to P11.4 started the 
session with the jigsaw condition first, whereas P11.5 to P11.8 started the session with the 
blank condition first.  Figure 11.2 shows the averages of these logarithms for each 
condition and each participant.  It was expected that participants would overestimate 
duration more in the blank conditions than in the jigsaw conditions.  This would be seen by 
higher data points in the blank conditions than in the jigsaw conditions.  The data in Figures 
11.1 and 11.2 show that this was generally the case.  Figure 11.2 shows that P11.1, P11.2, 
P11.3, P11.5 and P11.8 overestimated duration more in the blank than in the jigsaw 
conditions as expected.   
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with task complexity and 
the time at which estimates were made, as within-subject variables and the order in which 
the task was presented as the between-subject variable.  The ANOVA compared the means 
of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants were required 
to make their estimates, for both the jigsaw and blank conditions, and for the actual times at 
which estimates were made.  It was found that there was a significant effect of the 
condition manipulation upon participants’ estimates of duration (F (1, 6) = 10.035, p <.05) 
and the effect size was medium (ŋ = .626).  There was no between-treatments effect of 
presentation order (F (1, 6) = .138, p >.05) and the effect size was small (ŋ = .187).  There 
was no significant interaction between condition manipulation and presentation order 
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(F (1, 6) = .308 p >.05).  There was a significant main effect of the times at which estimates 
were made (F (5, 30) = 5.397, p < .05) and the effect size was medium (ŋ = .474).  Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the log ratios from the 15-s interval were significantly different to 
those from the 45-s, 60-s and 120-s intervals (p <.05).  There was also a significant 
difference between the log ratios from after the 30-s interval and those from the 60-s 
interval (p <.05).  There was no significant difference between the log ratios from any of 
the other time intervals.  
 The mean data from the jigsaw and blank conditions are given in Figure 11.3.  This 
shows the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, together with the 
95-percent confidence interval, from all data from the jigsaw condition and all data from 
the blank condition.  Figure 11.3 shows that, on average, intervals during the blank 
condition were overestimated, whereas, on average, intervals during the jigsaw conditions 
were estimated accurately.  The logarithm ratio averages, expressed as a percentage of 
participants’ under- or over-estimations of the actual time showed that the estimates made 
during the blank condition were 58 percent bigger than the actual times, whereas during the 
jigsaw condition, the estimates approximated the actual times.  
Figure 11.4 shows the averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual 
times, together with the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against the times at which 
estimates were made.  Participants overestimated most after 15-s intervals and the degree of 
overestimation decreased as the intervals increased.  Estimates were, on average, accurate 
after the 120-s interval.     
The averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, together with 
the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against the times at which estimates were made 
for the jigsaw and blank conditions are shown in Figures 11.5 and 11.6 respectively.  The 
same trend observed in Figure 11.4 can be seen in Figures 11.5 and 11.6.  The log ratios 
during both the jigsaw and blank conditions decreased as the times at which estimates were 
to be made increased.  Figure 11.5 shows that during the jigsaw condition, more 
overestimation occurred when the times at which estimates were made were shorter than 
when they were longer.  However, during the blank condition, Figure 11.6 shows that 
overestimation occurred at all the times when estimates were made.   
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     Figure 11.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                              actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,  
    plotted against the jigsaw and blank conditions.   
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                        Figure 11.4. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                             actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,  
    plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
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    Figure 11.5. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                              actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,  
     plotted against the times at which estimates were made, for the 
     jigsaw conditions.  
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    Figure 11.6. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                              actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,  
     plotted against the times at which estimates were made, for the 
     blank conditions.  
 140
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, an attempt was made to indicate to the participants there was a 
change in reinforcement rate by removing their access to being able to work on the jigsaw 
puzzle during the blank conditions, irrespective of the interval being estimated.  This 
resulted in a statistically significant effect and participants estimated duration as passing 
more slowly in the blank conditions than in the jigsaw conditions.  Figure 11.2 showed that 
in the blank conditions, the log ratios of the estimates over the actual times were higher 
than the log ratios of the estimates over the actual times in the jigsaw conditions, 
irrespective of whether the blank condition preceded the jigsaw condition or visa-versa.    
These results support BeT, where Killeen and Fetterman (1988, 1993) argued that estimates 
of duration are overestimated when there is a reduction in the reinforcement rate.  
Manipulation of the reinforcement rate across the session affected participants’ estimates of 
duration in the same way that animal timing behaviour is affected as predicted by BeT.   
Morgan et al. (1993) found that pigeons estimated time as passing faster upon 
returning to baseline after being exposed to lower rates of reinforcement than in the 
baseline condition.  In this experiment, Figure 11.2 shows that participants, generally 
estimated duration as passing faster, repeatedly, in each jigsaw condition than in each blank 
condition.  The availability of reinforcement, or lack of it during the blank conditions, 
appears to have affected human estimates of duration, in the same way as Morgan et al. 
(1993) have shown it to affect pigeons’ estimates.   
The reinforcement rate in this experiment was reduced to zero by making the screen 
go blank.  Thus, participants’ access to the jigsaw was removed as they could no longer see 
it.  In Experiments 7 to 10, where there was no significant effect on estimates of duration, 
participants’ access to the jigsaw had not been removed but they were unable to move 
puzzle pieces.  In Experiments 7 to 10, participants had access to the jigsaw puzzle in all 
conditions, whereas in this experiment access was removed in certain conditions.  It might 
be possible that having access to the jigsaw puzzle was, in spite of not being able to move 
the pieces, affecting participants’ estimates of duration.  The blank condition had been 
effective in producing overestimates of duration.  However, it is unclear what accounted for 
this.  Unfortunately, in the blank condition the opportunity to move puzzle pieces is 
removed (i.e., reinforcement is zero) and the jigsaw is not available to participants.  This 
situation confounds reinforcement rate with access, making it difficult to determine which 
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factor is responsible for the overestimations.  The next experiment explored this possibility 
to determine whether there was an effect of the access to the jigsaw puzzle upon 
participants’ estimates of duration.  
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EXPERIMENT 12 
  
In Experiment 11, participants’ estimates of duration were affected when all access 
to the jigsaw was removed (i.e., the blank condition).  Duration was overestimated more in 
the blank conditions than in the jigsaw conditions.  However, there could be a confound 
between there being no arranged reinforcement during the blank condition and the effect of 
participants having no access to the jigsaw puzzle.  It is unclear why participants 
overestimated duration in the blank conditions in Experiment 11.  Was it that they did not 
have access to the jigsaw puzzle at all or because they did not have access to moving a 
puzzle piece successfully? 
In this experiment there were eight conditions and the manipulation consisted of 
limiting participants’ access to being able to do the jigsaw puzzle, whilst simultaneously 
controlling the reinforcement rate (i.e., the number of pieces that could be moved).  In two 
conditions (the standard conditions) participants were able to work at doing the jigsaw 
puzzle freely and it remained visible at all times.  During the remaining six intervention 
conditions, participants had limited access to the jigsaw puzzle.  The puzzle was presented 
(i.e., they could see it) and they had an opportunity to move a puzzle piece.  However, once 
a piece was moved, they had to wait for one of three delays (i.e., 20 s, 60 s and 120 s, 
depending on the condition in effect) during which the screen was blank.  Once this delay 
timed out, the jigsaw reappeared and they had another opportunity to move a puzzle piece.  
The reinforcement rate was controlled by the three delays (i.e., with a 20-s delay, 
participants were presented with six times as many opportunities to move a puzzle piece 
than with a 120-s delay).   
It was expected that if participants’ estimates were affected by the reinforcement 
rate or by the removal of the puzzle, then there should be a difference in the estimates of 
duration from different conditions (i.e., the three delay conditions and the standard 
condition).  Differences in each of the delay conditions would suggest an effect of the 
reinforcement rate upon duration estimates, whereas no differences would suggest an effect 
of limiting access to the puzzle.    
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Method  
Participants 
 
Sixteen participants were recruited as in Experiment 1.  They are referred to as 
P12.1 to P12.16.   
 
 Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1.   
  
Procedure 
 
The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 11 except for the following 
changes.  The jigsaw puzzle was presented in the first and in the last experimental 
conditions, and participants were able to work freely on the jigsaw puzzle.  The jigsaw 
puzzle was also presented in the second to the seventh experimental conditions but 
participants were not able to work freely at doing the jigsaw puzzle (i.e., continuously 
moving more than one puzzle piece).  During these conditions, the re-presentation of the 
jigsaw puzzle was delayed after each move.  At the beginning of each of these conditions 
participants were presented with an opportunity to move a puzzle piece.  When a puzzle 
piece was moved, the screen went blank.  The screen remained blank for the length of the 
delay in operation.  The delays were 20 s, 60 s and 120 s cross conditions 2 to 7.  Once the 
delay timed out, the jigsaw was again presented so a piece could be moved.  Once the 
participant moved a puzzle piece the screen went blank once more.  With a longer delay, a 
fewer number of puzzle pieces could be moved, hence manipulating the reinforcement rate 
within conditions.     
The order in which the delays were presented, for all participants and irrespective of 
whether a standard or a delay condition was operating, was as follows: standard (no delay) 
(C1), 20-s delay (C2), 60-s delay (C3), 120-s delay (C4), 120-s delay (C5), 60-s delay (C6), 
20-s delay (C7) and standard (C8).  The times at which participants estimated duration were 
the same as in Experiment 11 (i.e., 15 s, 30 s, 45 s, 60 s, 90 s and 120 s).  These times were 
randomised thus, where a 120-s delay was operating, participants would only be able to 
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move a jigsaw piece every 120 s, but could make several estimates during the delay period, 
as most of the times at which the computer prompted participants to make an estimate were 
less than 120 s. 
As in previous experiments, the Experimenter escorted participants into the 
computer laboratory, where the same set of instructions used in Experiment 11 were read 
and watches were removed.  The Experimenter then told each participant they could start 
when ready.  The Experimenter remained in the room.  No further communication between 
the Experimenter and the participant occurred until the end of the session, when the 
participant was debriefed as to the nature of the experiment.  
 
Results 
 
  Figures 12.1 and 12.2 show the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at 
which participants were required to make their estimates, in each condition, plotted against 
the successive number of estimates made throughout the session.  Figures 12.3 and 12.4 
show the averages of these logarithms for each condition and each participant.  If access to 
the puzzle affected estimates then it would be expected that duration would be 
overestimated more than in the delay conditions (C2 to C7) than in the standard conditions 
(C1 and C8).  This would be seen as higher data points in the delay conditions than in the 
standard conditions.  Also, if the rate at which puzzle pieces could be moved had a 
differential affect then it would be expected that in the delay conditions duration would be 
overestimated more when there were longer delays than when there were shorter delays.  
This would be seen as higher data points when there was a 120-s delay (C4 and C5) than 
when there were 60-s and 20-s delays, and higher data points when there was a 60-s delay 
(C3 and C6) than when there was a 20-s delay (C2 and C7).   
 Figures 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4 show that the data did not follow this latter 
pattern.  The log ratios of the estimates to actual times in the first three conditions for 
P12.1, P12.3, P12.5, P12.7, P12.9 and P12.14 increased as expected (i.e., the data points in 
C2 were higher than in C1 and those in C3 were higher than those in C2).  However, the 
remaining log ratios show that the estimates for these participants did not consistently 
follow the expected pattern (i.e., data points highest in C4 and C5; data points higher in C6 
than in C7, and data points higher in C7 than in C8).   
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              Successive estimates                               Successive estimates                           
 
Figure 12.1.  Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times for each condition,  
plotted against the successive number of estimates made in the session. P12.1-P12.8. 
C1: Standard; C2: 20-s delay; C3: 60-s delay; C4: 120-s delay; C5: 120-s delay;  
C6: 60-s delay; C7: 20-s delay; C8: Standard.
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                  Successive estimates                                Successive estimates                        
 
Figure 12.2.  Logarithms of the estimates over the actual times for each condition,  
plotted against the successive number of estimates made in the session. P12.9-P12.16.  
C1: Standard; C2: 20-s delay; C3: 60-s delay; C4: 120-s delay; C5: 120-s delay;  
C6: 60-s delay; C7: 20-s delay; C8: Standard.
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                  Conditions                                              Conditions  
Figure 12.3. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, 
plotted against each experimental condition.  P12.1-P12.8.  
C1: Standard; C2: 20-s delay; C3: 60-s delay; C4: 120-s delay; C5: 120-s delay; 
C6: 60-s delay; C7: 20-s delay; C8: Standard. 
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                    Conditions                                               Conditions  
Figure 12.4. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, 
plotted against each experimental condition.  P12.9-P12.16.  
C1: Standard; C2: 20-s delay; C3: 60-s delay; C4: 120-s delay; C5: 120-s delay; 
C6: 60-s delay; C7: 20-s delay; C8: Standard. 
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  A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the condition 
manipulation and the time estimated as the within-subject variables.  The ANOVA 
compared the means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times for the 
standard and delay conditions, and for the actual times at which estimates were made.  
There was a main effect of condition manipulation (F (7, 105) = 4.648, p < .05) on the 
participants’ estimates of duration.  The effect size was small (ŋ = .238).  There was a main 
effect of the times at which estimates were made (F (5, 75) = 9.567, p < .05).  The effect 
size was medium (ŋ = .389).  There was an interaction between condition manipulation and 
the times at which estimates were made (F (35, 525) = 3.604, p < .05).  The effect size was 
small (ŋ = .194).  Pairwise comparisons for the condition manipulation showed that there 
was a significant difference between Condition 2 (the first 20-s delay) and all other 
conditions and between Condition 1 and Conditions 4 and 5 (p < .05).   
Pairwise comparisons for the times at which estimates were made showed that the log ratios 
from the 15-s, 30-s, 60-s and 120-s intervals were significantly different from each other   
(p <.05).  Significant differences were also found between the log ratios from the 30-s, 45-s 
and 90-s intervals; from the 45-s, 60-s and 120-s intervals; from the 60-s and 90-s intervals, 
and from the 90-s and 120-s intervals (p <.05).  There were no significant differences 
between the log ratios from the two standard conditions, from the two 60-s intervals and 
from the two 120-s intervals (p >.05) but there was a significant difference between the two 
20-s intervals (p <.05).   
 These ANOVA results show that there were no within-session effects.  There was 
also no significant difference between the replicated conditions, except for the 20-s delay.  
Given these findings, the data over the replicated conditions was combined and a two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the condition manipulation and the time 
at which estimates were made, as the within-subject variables.  The ANOVA compared the 
means of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times at which participants were 
required to make their estimates, for the standard and delay conditions, and for the actual 
times at which estimates were made.  There was a main effect of condition manipulation  
(F (3, 45) = 5.547, p < .05) with a small effect size (ŋ = .270).  Pairwise comparisons 
showed that there was a significant difference between the standard condition and the 20-s 
and 120-s delay conditions (p < .05).  There was a main effect of the times at which 
estimates were made (F (5, 75) = 10.305, p < .05).  The effect size was medium (ŋ = .407).  
Pairwise comparisons showed that the log ratios from the intervals were significantly 
 150
different from each other (p <.05), except for those from the 30-s and 45-s intervals, and 
from the 90-s and 120-s intervals (p >.05).  This re-analysis enables the degree to which 
participants overestimated or underestimated duration to be shown by the log ratio averages 
expressed as a percentage of the participants’ under- or over-estimations of the actual time 
at which estimates were made.  In the standard conditions, this showed that, on average, the  
estimates approximated the actual times, whereas in the delay conditions, duration was  
overestimated by 26 % for the 20-s delay, 15 % for the 60-s delay and 23 % for the 120-s  
delay.      
 Figures 12.5 and 12.6 show the total number of pieces moved in each condition by 
each participant.  In Conditions 4 and 5 (the 120-s delay) all participants moved the same 
number of pieces.  This also appeared to be the case for Conditions 3 and 6 (the 60-s delay) 
and Conditions 2 and 7 (the 20-s delay).  P12.1, P12.2, P12.3, P12.4, P12.8, P12.11, 
P12.12, P12.13, P12.14 and P12.16 moved fewer pieces in the Condition 1 (the first 
standard condition) than in Condition 8 (the second standard condition).  For P12.5 and 
P12.6, the reverse was true.  P12.7, P12.9, P12.10 and P12.15 moved approximately the 
same number of pieces in both the standard conditions.  A one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed, with the number of pieces moved in each condition as the within-
subjects variable.  The ANOVA compared the number of pieces moved for the condition 
manipulation.  There was a main effect of the number of pieces that were moved               
(F (7, 105) = 83.831, p < .05) and the effect size was large (ŋ = .848).  Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the number of pieces moved in all conditions where the delay 
differed were significantly different from each other (p < .05), except for the conditions 
with the same delay (i.e., Conditions 4 and 5, Conditions, 3 and 6, and Conditions 2 and 7) 
(p > .05).   
 Table 12.1 shows the time spent with the jigsaw puzzle visible to each participant in 
each delay condition.  This was calculated my multiplying the number of pieces moved in 
each condition by the condition delay and subtracting this result from the length of the 
condition.  In Conditions 4 and 5, this calculation shows that all participants did not wait to 
move a puzzle piece.  In appears that this would be unlikely and if true, the last delay would 
have been shorter than 120 s as it would terminate when the 6 min condition finished.  
Inspection of the individual data files revealed that participants did wait for one or two  
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             Conditions                                                       Conditions 
 
Figure 12.5.  Number of pieces moved, plotted against each experimental  
condition.  P12.1-P12.8: C1 & C8: standard; C2 & C7: 20-s delay;  
C3 & C6: 60-s delay; C4 & C5: 120-s delay.  
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             Conditions                                                       Conditions 
 
Figure 12.6.  Number of pieces moved, plotted against each experimental  
condition.  P12.9-P12.16: C1 & C8: standard; C2 & C7: 20-s delay;  
C3 & C6: 60-s delay; C4 & C5: 120-s delay.  
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Table 12.1  
 
Time spent (s) with the puzzle visible to each participant for each condition.  
 
 
 Delay Conditions 
Participants C2 
20 s 
C3 
60 s 
C4 
120 s 
C5 
120 s 
C6 
60 s 
C7 
20 s 
 
P12.1 80 0 0 0 60 100 
P12.2 100 60 0 0 100 100 
P12.3 60 0 0 0 0 120 
P12.4 80 60 0 0 60 100 
P12.5 100 0 0 0 60 80 
P12.6 100 60 0 0 60 80 
P12.7 140 60 0 0 60 140 
P12.8 100 0 0 0 60 80 
P12.9 40 0 0 0 60 40 
P12.10 80 0 0 0 60 0 
P12.11 100 60 0 0 60 180 
P12.12 60 0 0 0 60 80 
P12.13 140 0 0 0 60 140 
P12.14 60 60 0 0 0 160 
P12.15 100 60 0 0 60 60 
P12.16 100 0 0 0 0 40 
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seconds before moving a puzzle piece and that the condition finished before the 120 s delay 
timed out.  In Conditions 3 and 6, participants generally waited 60 s before deciding to 
move a puzzle piece.  In Conditions 2 and 7, the times participants waited varied between 
40 s and 140 s.   
  Figure 12.7 shows the averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual 
times at which participants were required to make their estimates, together with the 95-
percent confidence interval, plotted against the standard and three delay conditions within 
the session.  It can be seen that during the standard conditions, duration was slightly 
underestimated, on average, by all participants, whereas for the three delay conditions, 
duration was slightly overestimated. 
 Figure 12.8 shows the averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual 
times, together with the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against the times at which 
estimates were made.  It can be seen from Figure 12.8 that the log ratios decreased as the 
times at which estimates were to be made increased.  Duration was overestimated more at 
the shorter intervals (i.e., 15 s, 30 s and 45 s) than at the longer intervals.   
 The averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual times, together with 
the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against the times at which estimates were made 
for the standard and delay conditions are shown in Figures 12.9 and 12.10 respectively.  
The same trend observed in Figure 12.8 can be seen in Figure 12.10.  In Figure 12.9, 
duration is not overestimated as much at the 15 s, 30 s and 45 s intervals compared to 
Figures 12.8 and 12.10.   
 
Discussion 
   
 In this experiment, participants’ access to the jigsaw puzzle was limited and the 
reinforcement rate was controlled in six of the eight experimental conditions.  This was to 
determine whether the statistically significant effect found in Experiment 11 was a result of 
reducing the reinforcement rate or of participants not having access to the jigsaw puzzle.   
The ANOVA results showed that effects of the manipulation were replicated in the second 
half of the session and that there were not statistical differences between the standard, 60-s 
and 120-s delay conditions.  There was a statistical difference found between the two 20-s 
delay conditions.  This was probably to be expected, as participants encountering the first 
delay condition (which was 20 s) would have noticed a decrease in how many pieces they 
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          Figure 12.7.  Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over  
          the actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, 
 plotted against the standard and delay conditions within the session.                        
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard      20-s delay      60-s delay     120-s delay 
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   Figure 12.8. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the   
                             actual times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval,  
    plotted against the times at which estimates were made.  
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         Figure 12.9. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual          
                     times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against the  
        times at which estimates were made, for the standard conditions.   
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    Figure 12.10. Averages of the logarithms of the estimates over the actual           
                    times, plus or minus the 95-percent confidence interval, plotted against the  
   times at which estimates were made, for the delay conditions.  
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were able to move and how much access they had to the puzzle compared to the standard 
condition.   
 Table 12.1 suggests that exposure to the jigsaw puzzle was similar across the same 
delay conditions.  During the 60-s and the 120-s delay conditions, participants generally, 
did not wait to move a puzzle piece once they had access to do so.  Inspection of individual 
data files showed that participants during the 120-s delay condition, for example, were 
exposed to the puzzle piece for 1 to 2 seconds, before moving a puzzle piece.  Thus, this 
response latency indicates that the times spent with the puzzle visible, as shown in Table 
12.1, are approximate estimates.  In the 20-s delay condition it appears that participants did 
wait longer before moving a puzzle piece.  This suggests that the reinforcement rate (i.e., 
successfully moving a puzzle piece) was not controlling how participants estimated 
duration.  If there was control by the reinforcement rate, participants would not have spent 
time viewing the puzzle before moving a puzzle piece.  Rather, it would be expected that 
they would move as many puzzle pieces as possible during the condition, resulting in less 
exposure to the puzzle.  This was not the case, as it appears participants did spend time 
viewing the puzzle before moving a puzzle piece.    
 Figures 12.5 and 12.6 showed that more pieces were moved in the standard 
conditions than in the delay conditions.  In some cases, participants moved more pieces in 
the second standard condition, although not always (as was the case in the previous BeT 
experiments).  Figures 7.4, 8.4, 9.4 and 10.4 showed that more pieces were moved in the 
second jigsaw/standard condition compared to the first jigsaw/standard condition.  These 
results suggest that the carry-over effect in Experiments 7, 8, 9 and 10 did not eventuate in 
this experiment.  Thus, the shift in the reinforcement rate was not as effective here as it was 
in the previous BeT experiments.  During the delay conditions, fewer pieces were moved as 
the delays that were controlling access to the puzzle, increased.  Thus, there was control by 
the reinforcement rate.   
  The results from this experiment, when compared to those from Experiment 11 and 
to those from Experiments 7 to 10, suggest that not having access to the jigsaw puzzle 
rather than any control of the reinforcement rate is what affected participants’ estimates of 
duration.  Control by the reinforcement rate would result in differences in estimations of 
duration between each of the delay conditions.  This was not the case.  In Experiments 7 to 
10, participants always had access to the jigsaw puzzle, even when the reinforcement rate 
was being varied.  However, when access to the jigsaw puzzle was removed in Experiment 
11 (and consequently the reinforcement rate was zero) there was a statistically significant 
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effect on how participants estimated duration (i.e., duration was overestimated in the blank 
conditions).   
 It is possible that the presence of the jigsaw puzzle may have enabled participants to  
engage in ‘private’ behaviour (e.g., planning a future move or comparing the appearance of 
two pieces to see if they match) whilst they have access to the jigsaw puzzle (as they did in 
Experiments 7 to 10).  Thus, participants were still actively working towards the 
completion of the jigsaw puzzle, even though they were unable to move pieces.  When 
there is no access to the jigsaw puzzle (i.e., Experiment 11) participants are not able to 
engage in ‘private’ behaviour and consequently, overestimate duration.  It appears that  
so long as the jigsaw is available to the participants time will not be perceived to drag.  The 
presence of the jigsaw puzzle therefore, may constitute some form of information that can 
be used by participants to assist them in completing their jigsaw puzzle.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
This thesis investigated the perception of how time passes in an attempt to show 
how a task a person is engaged in affects their estimation of duration.  Contrary to 
previously published findings, in the first four experiments it was not reliably demonstrated 
that task complexity had an effect on people’s perception of time passing.  In the first four 
experiments, the number of the pieces in the puzzle was changed, as was the colour of the 
puzzle and two separate measures of duration were compared.  Despite these attempts to 
vary participant’s estimates of duration, as predicted by previous research on task 
complexity (e.g., Allen, 1980; Axel, 1924; Loehlin, 1959; Smith, 1969) no significant 
results were obtained (i.e., there was no support that varying the complexity of a task 
affected estimates of duration).  In order to establish why no significant results were 
obtained, replications of two previously reported task complexity studies (Allen, 1980; 
Hogan, 1975) were conducted.  The replications did not return significant results and 
therefore, do not support the general theoretical view, prevalent in task complexity 
literature, that estimates of duration are underestimated for complex tasks and 
overestimated for simple tasks.  
These findings lead to two possible conclusions.  Firstly, that there is no reliable 
relationship between task complexity and perceived duration.  The second possible 
conclusion is that there was no manipulation of task complexity at all, despite efforts of 
trying to do so.  The question arises then, if any of these possible conclusions is correct?  
To establish if the first conclusion is correct relies upon being assured that the independent 
variable of task complexity was varied.  However, the task complexity literature does not 
provide any clear definitions of what task complexity is.  Rather, it appears from the task 
complexity literature that researchers have arbitrarily defined task complexity based on the 
type of task being used.  For example, in Hogan’s (1975) study, it was assumed that line 
drawings with more interior angles were more complex than those with fewer interior 
angles and consequently, that time should be perceived as going faster when drawings with 
more interior angles are compared to drawings with fewer interior angles.  However, there 
is no way of knowing if drawings with more interior angles will produce estimates of time 
passing quickly, before the research is conducted.  Or, in other words, whether drawings 
with more interior angles are complex is not established independently before the research 
commences, thus it is unclear that the putative independent variable functions as envisaged 
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by the researchers.  
Not being able to independently establish whether a task is simple or complex (i.e., 
defining what task complexity is) means that there can be no answer given to the first 
possible conclusion (i.e., that there was no reliable relationship between task complexity 
and perceived duration).  If there is no reliable definition of task complexity, then it cannot 
be demonstrated that such a reliable relationship exists.  The results from the two task 
complexity replications (Experiments 5 and 6) support this argument as these results were 
not replicated.  The second conclusion (i.e., that there was no manipulation of task 
complexity) cannot be tested either, as there is no independent definition of task 
complexity.  Another approach is needed to show how the tasks that people are doing 
affects how they estimate time to be passing. 
BeT (Killeen & Fetterman, 1988, 1993) offered another theoretical approach to 
assessing how people’s estimates of time are affected by the task they may happen to be 
doing.  The basic premise of BeT is that an organism’s perception of time is affected by the 
rate of reinforcement it receives during that time.  In the context of doing jigsaw puzzles, 
this means controlling the reinforcement rate (i.e., the rate of successful puzzle pieces 
relocated within a minute).  The advantage of BeT is that it relies upon reinforcement rate, 
a concept rigorously studied in animal and human research, as the independent variable, 
which can be reliably manipulated and independently defined.  In comparison, task 
complexity cannot be independently defined.  Therefore, BeT, given its reliability, may be 
able to explain why the first series of task complexity experiments didn’t affect, as 
expected, how participants estimated time to be passing.  BeT would predict that simply 
changing the number of pieces in the puzzle does not necessarily alter the reinforcement 
rate, that is, the number of pieces a person can move per minute is not controlled by the 
number of pieces in the jigsaw puzzle.  It is assumed that moving puzzle pieces per unit 
time is what constitutes reinforcement.  In the task complexity experiments, no restriction 
was placed on the rate at which puzzle pieces could be moved.  Thus, how participants 
estimated duration in the task complexity experiments would not be as predicted by BeT.  
This is because there was no change in the reinforcement rate, irrespective of either the 
‘complex’ or the ‘simple’ conditions.   
Two task complexity studies involving playing cards (Allen, 1980) and line 
drawings (Hogan, 1975) were partially replicated but returned non-significant results.  
However, these non-significant results could also be explained by BeT.  In Allen’s (1980) 
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study, participants sorted cards for a set duration period and then made an estimate of the 
time they thought they had been card sorting.  In Hogan’s (1975) study, participants were 
first shown a standard line drawing, followed by a comparison line drawing (both were 
presented for the same duration).  Participants were then asked to make an estimate of the 
length of time they thought the comparison drawing had been presented compared to the 
standard drawing.  In these two experiments, it appears that there was no reinforcement.  
 The way in which BeT could explain the results of the two replication studies is 
around the idea of what constitutes a reinforcer.  In the jigsaw puzzle, moving a puzzle 
piece constituted a reinforcer, in that, by successfully moving a puzzle piece a participant 
would get feedback showing whether the piece had been correctly or incorrectly moved.  
Additionally, moving puzzle pieces would eventually lead to the completion of the puzzle.  
Arguably, Allen’s (1980) and Hogan’s (1975) studies did not involve the use of a 
reinforcer.  Sorting cards and viewing drawings do not, in and of themselves, constitute 
reinforcement (in the same way that moving a puzzle piece does).  Unlike jigsaw, placing a 
card on a particular pile or viewing slides of line drawings produces no feedback about the 
efficacy of the action.  Thus, the non-significant results from the two replicated studies, 
from a BeT perspective, were not surprising as there was no manipulation of the 
reinforcement rate, because there was no reinforcer that could be manipulated in the first 
place.  However, this does not explain the significant results from Allen’s (1980) and 
Hogan’s (1975) studies.  This issue will be addressed later in this discussion.   
In the second series of experiments (seven through ten), referred to as the BeT 
series, the reinforcement rate was successfully manipulated as shown by the number of 
pieces moved, but participants did not estimate time passing as predicted by BeT.  Despite 
successfully manipulating the apparent reinforcement rate, it is not clear however, that this 
was the only way a person could access reinforcement whilst working on the task.  A 
possible reason why time was not estimated as expected, might be because participants 
were still able to ‘get things done’ (Lee, 1994) or obtain ‘outcomes’ (Dube & Schmitt, 
1996).  Lee (1994) suggested that an organism behaves in order to bring about changes in 
the world around it.  “A thing is done only once a specified change has been brought about” 
(Lee, 1994, p 15).  Dube and Schmitt (1996), who investigated how social situations that 
unfold over time, in relation to an individual’s expectations about obtaining outcomes, 
suggested that as long as organisms can behave towards achieving an outcome, time will be 
not be perceived as going slow.  It may be possible that participants did not estimate 
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duration as expected in the BeT experiments because they were still able to behave, and 
thus, continue to do the jigsaw puzzle in some way and thus, keep the rate of reinforcement 
constant, in spite of the manipulation.  The experimental conditions of the jigsaw puzzles 
for the BeT series, involved slowing down the distance a puzzle piece could be moved, 
relative to the distance the mouse could be moved; fixing the speed at which a puzzle piece 
could be moved and increasing stimulus intensity by using visual and operational cues.  
These changes however, in no way limited a participant’s ability to continue behaving, 
albeit privately (e.g., thinking) (Skinner, 1969) or publicly (e.g., moving the computer 
mouse).  There may have been other behaviours occurring when the reinforcement rate was 
being manipulated, analogous to a chess player planning their next move, whilst waiting for 
their opponent to make their move.  A participant could still observe the jigsaw and as such, 
might have been privately planning out how they could make their next move.  Thus, when 
the opportunity again became available for them to move puzzle pieces, participants were 
able to do that, perhaps moving more puzzle pieces due to the time that might have been 
spent working out how they could make their next move.  The results from Experiment 8 
(see Figure 8.4) show that this could have happened, as participants moved more pieces 
after the manipulation conditions, than before the manipulation conditions.  If this is the 
case, envisaging moving puzzle pieces to locations may itself constitute a reinforcer.  
Private behaviour such as this seems to suggest that participants are still getting things done 
or are obtaining outcomes and therefore, may account for why participants did not estimate 
duration as predicted by BeT.   
Another possible reason for explaining why participants did not estimate duration as 
expected during the BeT experimental series is the idea of the informative properties of 
stimuli (Dinsmoor, 1983; Wyckoff, 1952).  Stimuli can contain information that maintains 
observing behaviour or explicit attentional responses (Case, 1995).  In computer web-based 
studies information is contained in stimuli presented to a computer user which in turn 
affects their responses (e.g., Gorn, Chattopadhyay, Sengupta & Tripathi, 2004; Gueguen & 
Jacob, 2002; Nah, 2004).  In other words, information can act as reinforcement.   
The idea of stimuli containing information that can act as reinforcement might have 
affected the way in which participants estimated duration during the BeT experimental 
series.  The jigsaw puzzle was always available for participants to view and in this sense 
participants could use this information for making a response, whether public or private.  
When the reinforcement rate (i.e., the number of pieces able to be moved) was being 
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manipulated, for example, a participant’s public behaviour (e.g., moving the mouse) did not 
result in being able to move a jigsaw piece.  However, a participant could still engage in 
private behaviour and think about how they could make their next move.  Thus, with the 
continual presence of the jigsaw puzzle on the screen, continual information was being 
made available to the participant, which allowed them to behave privately.  Hence, 
participants did not estimate duration as predicted by BeT as they were still receiving 
reinforcement in the form of information.   
 In Experiment 11, a significant result was obtained when the opportunity to publicly 
and privately do the jigsaw puzzle was removed.  During the blank condition, participants 
could not get ‘things done’ or use information as a form of reinforcement.  Thus, it appears 
that when participants had to sit and wait, with no access to information and therefore, 
unable to behave privately, time dragged, whereas when participants were able to move 
puzzle pieces, time flew.  Comparing the results of Experiment 11 to the results of the BeT 
experiments, suggests that time will be overestimated when participants are unable to do 
the jigsaw (i.e., publicly or privately).   
 The results from Experiment 12 further support the idea that when participants do 
not have an opportunity to behave (i.e., do jigsaw), either publicly or privately, time will be 
perceived to drag.  In the delay conditions, participants had the opportunity to move a 
puzzle piece and once a puzzle piece was moved, the screen went blank for a set duration.  
The number of opportunities to work at a jigsaw puzzle was increased or decreased 
contingent upon whether a shorter or longer delay was operating and during these 
conditions time was perceived to go slower, on average, by 21 percent than in the jigsaw 
conditions.  Similarly, in Experiment 11, time was perceived to go slower in the blank 
conditions than in the jigsaw conditions.  These results suggest that perhaps varying the 
reinforcement rates may result in estimates of duration that are in proportion to the degree 
of reinforcement rate manipulation.  However, this was not able to be demonstrated in 
Experiment 12 as there were no effects of arranged reinforcement rates upon how 
participants estimated duration.  This might be due to there being no perceptible difference 
between the each of the delay conditions.  For example, participants could only move a 
single puzzle piece in the delay conditions before the screen went blank.  Or in other words, 
there was very limited information (i.e., reinforcement) available, which didn’t differ 
between any of the delay conditions.  Thus, irrespective of how long participants had to 
wait while the screen was blank before being able to move another puzzle piece, there may 
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have been no perceptible difference between either of the three delay conditions and 
therefore, participants didn’t perceive time differently.   
 It is also possible, that the arranged reinforcement rates do not contribute to the 
control of how duration is estimated.  Participants in Experiment 12 did not move the 
maximum number of puzzle pieces available to them in the manipulation conditions.  
Participants spent time viewing the puzzle before moving a piece.  Thus, it appears that 
information (i.e., participants viewing the puzzle, perhaps working out a move) was acting 
as reinforcement rather than moving puzzle pieces.   
As mentioned earlier in this discussion, the significant results reported in the two 
previously published and partially replicated task complexity studies (i.e., Allen (1980) and 
Hogan (1975)) were going to be discussed in more depth.  Rosenthal (1979) suggested that 
five percent of studies that are published are Type 1 errors, whereas the other ninety-five 
percent are Type 2 errors filed away and forgotten.  He called this the ‘file-drawer 
problem’.  This phenomenon however, interacts with the tendency to publish positive 
findings, hence it must be borne in mind that there are reliable studies published.  Rosenthal 
(1979) suggests that behavioral scientists are becoming increasingly interested in 
summarising entire research domains more systematically than has occurred previously, 
which will lead to effect sizes and significance levels being reported more frequently.  
These measures Rosenthal (1979) claims will enable a calculation to be made by the 
reviewer about the overall probability that the research question is ‘real’ (i.e., not a Type 1 
error).  The first four task complexity experiments did not produce significant results in 
accordance with earlier task complexity literature theory.  These results suggest that the 
statistically significant task complexity studies that have been published might be Type 1 
errors.  The results from the replications of Allen’s (1980) and Hogan’s (1975) studies 
provide further support for this claim, as they failed to reproduce the original findings.   
Cohen (1994) emphasised that the generalisability of results in psychology must 
fundamentally rely upon replication.  The failure to replicate, when seen in the light of 
Rosenthal’s (1979) file-drawer phenomenon, suggests that the earlier task complexity 
studies which reported significant results might in fact have not been correct.  If the results 
of first four experiments and the two task complexity replication experiments had returned 
significant results, then the question of whether the previous task complexity studies were 
correct or not would not have arisen.  However, the question does arise and with it, the need 
for further inquiry into the reliability of the results of the earlier task complexity studies.  
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Though we can never know that a particular paper constitutes a Type 1 error, there may be 
other evidence that leads us to be concerned.  If there were a number of studies published, 
using the same methodology, producing significant results, then it could be claimed that the 
results would be reliable, as this is replication and consequently, the file-drawer 
phenomenon would not be an issue.  However, this is not the case in the task complexity 
literature as there are only single studies published, by different authors, using different 
methodologies, claiming to have produced significant effects of task complexity upon the 
human estimation of duration.  Thus, it can be argued that the significant effects due to the 
putative manipulation of complexity, though appearing to be real, may not be reliable, 
especially given the results of the first six experiments.   
  The results from this thesis suggest that people perceive time to pass slowly or 
quickly contingent upon whether they are receiving reinforcement.  When reinforcement is 
reliably available, time is perceived to ‘fly’, as participants can continually behave publicly 
and achieve outcomes.  Additionally, participants can also continually behave privately, 
achieving outcomes, in terms of reinforcement being used as information.  When 
reinforcement is unavailable, participants cannot behave publicly or privately, hence time is 
perceived to ‘drag’.  The lack of reinforcement equates with definitions of extinction, 
where responses become less common and eventually cease due to lack of reinforcement 
(Skinner, 1957).  With no reinforcement available participants are effectively, in extinction.  
Thus, in terms of how humans perceive time to pass, the results from this thesis showed 
that when reinforcement is totally withdrawn (i.e., Experiment 11) time is perceived to drag 
more in extinction than when there is reinforcement available.   
 This thesis investigated how the type of tasks that people may happen to be engaged 
in affects their estimates of duration.  Despite the claim by task complexity researchers that 
time flies during filled time intervals (e.g., Fraisse, 1963), it is possible that time would 
only fly if the stimuli presented in a filled time interval constituted reinforcement.  The 
results from the six task complexity studies in the first half of this thesis showed that 
despite there being stimuli presented (i.e., filled time intervals) time was not perceived as 
predicted by previous task complexity researchers.  Irrespective of whether an interval is 
‘filled’ with particular stimuli, unless that stimuli constitutes reinforcement, the filled time 
interval will not be perceived as going fast, as predicted by BeT.  Empty time intervals 
appear to be analogous to extinction periods and in accordance with BeT, the prediction  
would be that time would be overestimated during empty time intervals.   
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 Humans perceive time to ‘drag’ when put into extinction.  During extinction, public 
and private behaviour is not possible.  Private behaviour presupposes that information can 
act as reinforcement.   
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APPENDIX 
 
The Appendix is a CD containing the raw data from all the experiments and a 
representative sample of experimental software.  
 
 
 
